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This thesis examines the concept of corporate control in Canadian and Chinese 
business enterprises. Going beyond traditional studies of corporate govemance, which are 
concemed ptincipdly with the reIationship between shareholders and corporate managers, 
this thesis explores the ways in which corporate law in China and in Canada regdates and 
arbitrates the relationships mong al1 corporate participants, in the context of the politicaI, 
social, economic and cultural milieu in which corporate Iaw and policy in both countries has 
evolved. 
Through a comparative examination of corporate control issues under two specific 
corporate Iaw regirnes - that of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), and that of 
the Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China and China's Foreign Investment 
Enterprises Laws (collectivety "China's Corporate Laws") - several key observations 
emerge. The corporate control mode1 embodied in the CBCA represents a modified capitdist 
mode1 of corporate control, whereas China's Corporate Laws represent an attempt to borrow 
corporate control experiences from western countries, and to integrate those experiences into 
the structure of Chinese corporations, whiie adhering to China's distinctive sociaiist political 
and economic regime. China's Corporate Laws may thus be  best understood as the product 
of a modified socidist mode1 that adopts many western corporate law features without 
sacrificing the principles of China's sociaiist regime. 
This comparative study also i1Iustrates a more generd proposition: that regimes 
designed to regdate corporations necessarily Vary across nations and cultures in order to 
address specific conditions and s a t i e  particular govenunentai objectives and cannot be 
regarded simpIy as means of facilitating productive enterprise. The unique approaches to 
corporate control in Canada and in China are rooted in the distinctively different politics, 
economies, histories, statutory traditions and dtud values of these two nations. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The corporation, as a Iegd structure for organizing economic adVities, ha9 existed 
in Western Europe and elsewhere for hundreds of years. Prior to the earIy twentieth 
century, corporations (in partidar, business corporations) were not regarded as 
signincant economic or politicai forces. The corporate fom was initialiy adopted by 
business people generally to facilitate the pooling of capital tiom numerous investors. It is 
the relatively recent emergence of large multinational corporations and their predominant 
position in a state's economk and political life that has Ied to increased concems about the 
regdation of their activities. 
Corporate law in any country is shaped by a cornplex interplay of extemal and 
internai forces, which include the unique business, social, economic, politicai and cultural 
values of that country. This thesis wilI examine this inter-relationship between corporate 
Iaw and such forces through a cornparison of the corporate regimes in two distinctively 
dEerent counuies: Canada and China This cornparison will focus in particuiar upon the 
different approaches in these two counaies to criticd issues of corporate control. 
1.1 The Concept of Corporate Control 
The historÏcd devdopment of corporations fmom mail corporations to large pubIic 
corporations m a changing global economy has meant that the concept of corporate 
controI has been in a state of flux. Research on corporate contml m the earIy twentieth 
cenhiry was Iimited to shidies of the reIationship between investors and managers. The 
issue ofcorporate control in te- ofthe mvestorlmanager rdationship was first serioudy 
addressed by Berle and Means in their treatise The Modern Corporattin and Private 
~ro~er iy '  in 1932. Five major types of corporate contml were recognized in their work. 
They were: (a) one hundred per cent ownership controp @) majority control (Le. over 
nfty per cent ownership control)~ (c) control through a legai device without majority 
ownership (e.g the device of "pyramiding", issuing bonds or non-voting stock, or through 
voting trusts): (d) minority control (Le. through attracting scattered owner proxies): and 
(e) management contr01.~ It was disclosed that in large public corporations, corporate 
control tended to move fùrther away nom ownership and ultirnately Iay in the hands of top 
managers.' Later, Mace's field research in 1971 illustrated the management control 
phenomenon described by Berle and Means in reality: in large and medium-sized American 
corporations, presidents, rather than boards of directon, wield the corporate decision- 
making power.' Thus the concept of corporate control is no longer regarded simply as a 
hnction of ownership of voting shares but inciudes the capacity for mobiiizing other 
shareholders and/or the occupation of powerflll managerial positions in  corporation^.^ 
' A A  Berle. Jr. & G-C. Means, The &fodern Corporation and Private Property (New York: nie 
MacmiUan Company, 1932). 
A A  Berle Ir., "'Contrd' in Corporate Law" (1958) 58 Colruu L. Ekv. 1212 at L213. Reprinted in CE. 
Osbm & AW. Schmua ed, Selected Articles ors Corporate Law (section of corporation, bankilng and 
btcsines law) (USA: Anierlcaa Bar Association, 1977) 585 at 586- 
A year after the publication of The M d m  Coyoration and M a t e  Property, 
Rohrlich in his work Law and Pructice in Corporate ~ontrol, '~ studied the issue of 
corporate control from the perspective of the extefnal controhg power exercised by the 
state and creditors over corporations," the relationship between majority and rninority 
shareh~lders,'~ legal remedies available to the minority shareho~ders,'~ shareholders' 
cornmunicatios I4 and the Fiinction of cornmittees (Le. the proxy-comrnittee, the voting- 
trust, and the proteaive committee)." The concept of corporate control in Rohrlich's 
treatise therefore was broadly defined and moved beyond the narrow issue of the 
relationship between shareholders and managers. 
In recent yean, the term corporate control is more ofien undemood narrowly as 
corporate intemal control,16 a conception relating to corporate intemal management and 
10 C. Rohriich, Law and Pructice in Corporute Contrul (New York: Baker. Voorhis & Co., 1933). 
" Ibid For the state, at 12 - 26; for the creditoa at 169 - 182. The term "controiiing power" might be 
overstated, The power exercising by the state and creditors mentioned in Rohriichts üeatise over the 
corporate business is just irrfIuencing.. 
l 3  Ibid at 96 - 168. 
l4 Ibid at 55 - 64. 
I5 Ibid at 65 - 95. Protectke c o m m i m  m Rohrlich's treatise., is used for enhancing the right of hoiders 
of non-voting secirrities (such as bonds or non-voting classes of stock) to participate in corponte flairs. 
The protathe cornmittee is "seIf-constinited, wiiIing itseff mto being." (fiid, at 72) Tommirte 
members ne& not have any personaf Interest in the SeCLlfiiy or the corporation, and it wouid seem that 
they may even have independent Ïnterests... E h t  they may not make contracts for secret profits,,- The 
pmtecthe cornmitte infonniiiIy brouat together takes its Iegai mus, h m  the 'deposit agreement'." In 
generai, the protective committee in Robrfich's treatïse is a fonn standing hdFivay b e m n  the proxy and 
the voting-tnrst, 
" See the organization in Kt. O'Brien, D.A E b d I  & C C  NichoUs eb Cmes mul iMuteriaIs on 
Busines Associariorrs l;mu (VOL iI) (WiEax: FacnIty of Law &Dalhousie Universityf 1998-99) at 384. 
equivdent to another term - corporate governance. It appears that the term "corporate 
governance", addressing issues in comection with corporate objective, shareholders' 
~ghts,  relationship between the rnajonty and minonty shareholders, the role of the board 
of directors, the powers and duties of directon and officers, oversight f'unction in the 
board, and remedies, is wideiy accepted by the Canadian and US Iegal communities and 
more popular than the term "corporate internai control". '' 
In the 1990s, research regardmg corporate govemance was widely conducted in a 
number of countries in order to improve corporate performance. 
In 1992, the Committee on the Financiai Aspects of Corporate Govemance in the 
United Kingdom (UK) published its report relating to the corporate govemance of public 
corporations: Report of the Comminee on the Financiai Aspects of Corporate 
Govemce.  I8  
Since 1978, the Amencan Law Institute ("ALI") has initiated a projea of 
researching corporate govemance. The fniit of the research campaign, AU'S 1994 
Principks of Cuporaîe Govemmce: Analysis and ~ecommenrkrtom'~ thoroughiy 
examined corporate govemance mechanisrns in business corporations (particu1arIy publicIy 
held corporations) in Amenca and raised constructive suggestions for M e r  improving 
corporate governance. 
17 The tenn "corporate governanceW appears more o h  than the term "corporate controlw in legai 
fiteratUrestUres 
18 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Goveniancq Report of the Cornmittee on rhe 
Financiaf Aspectr of Corparate Goventance ( a h  calIed in some literanire, Cadbrrry Repart) (Londonr 
Gee and Co., 1992). AIS0 avairable o&e: Emopean Corporate Govefnaace Network, 
<httpI/www.ecgnuib.ac. be/ecgnldOCS/COdes/cadbrrry.~ (date a d  Iune 19,1999). 
19 The AmeRcan Law iastitute, PrincÏpIes of Coprate Govemance: Analysis and Recommendations (St. 
Pa& Minrt: American Law Institnte Pubbhas, 1994)- 
In 1994, the Toronto Stock Exchaage (TSE) Cornmittee on Corporate 
Govemance in Canada dso addressed the issue of corporate govemance in as report, 
Where Were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Coporate Govemunce ("Dey 
~ e ~ o n " ) ~ ~  and proposed an effective corporate govemance systern for the aewardship of 
corporations in Canada In 1995, the TSE passed a by-Iaw requiring corporations 
incorporated in Canada and listed on the TSE to disclose their govemance practices in 
their annual report or information circuiar and, to the extent those practices differ nom the 
Guideluies, to explain why they differ.2' 
In 1996, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Ministem at the meeting of the Council at Ministerial level requked a study of corporate 
govemance. As a result, a report - Corporate Governance: Improvcig Competitiveness 
and Access to Capital NI Global ~arket? - was submitted by the Business Sector 
Advisory Group on Corporate Govemance in 1998. Other non-governrnentai 
organizations, Iike the WorId B e  aiso developed research in the 1990s on the subject of 
corporate contro~? 
Toronto Stock Exchange Cornmittee on Coqmrate Governance in Canada, CYhere Were the Directors? 
Guidelinesfir Improved Corportaie Governance in Canada (1 994) 
Online: European Corporate Govemance Nemork < h t t p Y f ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ u l b . a c . W e c g n ( d O C S / c o d e s / d e y . ~  
(date acçessed: June L8,1999). 
" The TSE and Wmte of Corporate Dkctors h e d  a press on .June 17, L999 to a n n o m  the 
nrst officiai follow-up stady on how c10sely TSE listed mmpanies were actnaIly following the Dey Report. 
See Report on Corporute Coveniance, 1999: Fwe Yem to the Dey, Online: TSE 
~http://tse.codmregs&dexhtmI~ (date accesse4: Angust 18, 1999), The study is based ou detaiIed 
responses ftom 635 mefExecutÏve CIfEcers of TE-[isted companies, repfe~enting a SI pet cetrt response 
rate. 
" IM MiIIsteiu et aL, Corporate Governonce: Ihproving Cornpetifnteness md Actes IO Capital in 
Gia6al Matkets (OEQ), 1998)- Aiso avaiiable onIine: Emopean Corporate Govenianœ Netwotk: 
<http:/lPvww.oecdorg/newsewsanddevenWreIease/nw98-35ahtm> (date accessed- June 19, 1999). 
" See onIine: WorId Ba& "Corporate Gmemnœw 
~ h t t p J I w w w I w w w ~ o r f ~ o ~ a n V f p d / p ~ t ~ ~ r / ~ p  (chte accessed: Ime 18,1999)- 
Legd research on corporate govemance in China, however, is not weiI developed. 
Impeiled by economk reform, China in 1993 adopted its k s t  national corporation law - 
Corporatratroon Law of the People's RepuMc of China (ccL).~~ For the firrt time in the 
socidist People's Republic of China, the corporation, the legal creature of capitaiist 
counuies, became recognized in law as an economic organization and a device to serve in 
China's economic refo rm- But research regardhg corporate governance of C hinese 
corporations is still in its infancy. 
Since the concept of corporate control is in a state of fluctuation, there is no 
uniform definition of the term "corporate control" in Canada or China [t will be argued 
here that, though the corporate entity is a legal fiction, corporate control deals with 
relationships among people. Corporate control can be defined as the power exercised, 
directly or indirectly, by one or more penons, to exert a detennining/controlltig influence 
over the policies or the management of a corporation, through ownership, position, tegd 
devices, statutory rights and/or remedies. The policies or the management of a 
corporation in tum impose influences upon people who have interests in the corporation 
no matter whether they are Ui the controhg position. On the other hand, such controhg 
power over the policies or the management of a corporation is embedded in, Ulnuenced 
by, and in tum influences the values of the society of whîch it is an integrai part. 
This broad definition of corporate control denves nom the process of 
See ah, the Corporate Goveniana site o h e :  <httpYhww.corpgov.net/> (date accessed: Iune 18. 
1999). 
24 Corporation Law of the People's Repubiic of China, adopted at the Fifth meeting of the Standing 
Comntittee of the Fghth National People's Congrm on December 29, L993 and & i e  as of Iuly 1, 
1994, 
An English versÏon is avaiIabIe onlùie: Clinia inteniet Mormation Center China's Econorny and Ïts 
Enterprises <httprlhuww.chmRo~clir> (date accessedr hne 20,1999). 
understanding confiicts among various corporate constituents stniggiing for controhg 
power of the corporation in the Iight of economic theory regardii rational human 
behavior. Gary Becker points out that alI intentionai behaviors of human beings cm be 
understood as people pursuing goals as best they cm subject to the constraints of the 
extemal world that is "constrained maximizati~n".~ 
Employing the theory of "consuained maximization" to anaiyze the behaviors of 
corporate participants (that is. corporate shareholders and stakeholders), one can conclude 
that the conflicting interests of these participants and the struggle for corporate control 
among corporate participants &se from the iimited resources of a corporation that cannot 
meet al1 wants of dl such interested people. Shareholders anticipate maximipng their 
personai profits by receivhg dividends £tom the corporation. Directon and officers 
anticipate bigger remuneration packages or salaries or some other end. such as 
professional ambition, prestige, or power nom the c~rporation.~~ Ernployees expect fkom 
the corporation higher wages better benefits, better working conditions and job stability. 
Crediton expea their debts fiorn the corporation to be repaid with interest. Customers 
hope to receive better goods and services at lower prices. Local cornmunities anticipate 
hcrease of employment and reduction of environmentai probtems. The expectations and 
interests among the corporate participants maybe contlictbg and competing. ui the 
meanthe, the resources of the corporation are imtdEcient to satisfil aii these competing 
demands. Corporate behaviors reflect either the dismetion of corporate participants who 
- 
AW. Katz. ed, Foundations ofthe Econmic Approach to Law (New Yodc Mord Univerrity Press, 
1998) at 4. 
Gary Becker was awarded the NobeL Prize in EconomÏcs in 1992 for his work extmding ecoaomic 
analysis to the resear~h area of h m  behavior. For more detaùl of his worïq pIease dix to Ine 
Economic Approach to K m  Behuvior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
Supm note L at t 22. 
have the determùiing1controIIing power or the compromise between decision-makers and 
other corporat e participants. 
1.2 The Theme and Framework of This Thesis 
The broady defked notion of corporate control covers almoa all areas of 
corporate Iaw and aiso touches upon other bodies of Iaw, inciuding securities Iaw, 
takeover law, tax law, and stock exchange regulations. This subject aiso invites an 
understanding of the process of how corporations are managed in reality, as well as how 
they ought to be managed in theory. The cornplex interplay of extemai and internai 
forces, and the role of societd values in shaping corporate law can be  cIearIy illustrated by 
a cornparison of the corporate laws of two countries with disthctly different politicai, 
social, and economic influences: Canada and China Limited by time and space, this thesis 
wilI oniy examine corporate control issues in the context of two specific corporate Iaw 
regimes: that of Canada's federd corporate aatute, the Canada Business Corporations Act 
(CBCA)~', and that of CCL and China's Foreign Investment Enterprises Laws ( E E s  
Laws) 2g (CCL and FIES Laws are hereinafter collectiveiy referred to as China's Corporate 
The Canada Business Corporations A* RS.C. 1985, c C4. CBCA is a @te appropriate example of 
Canadian corporate Iaw for this comparative stucfy since it is very oimilar to the corporate statutes round 
in most of Canadian common Iaw provinces today and has been co~tsciousiy followed by many Canadian 
provinciai corporate laws. 
28 China's Foreign Cnvestment EnterprÏses Laws refér to 
- tow of the People's RepuMc of China on Chinese-foreign E p i p  Joint Ventures (adopted on Jdy 1, 
1979 at the Second Session of the F i  National PeopIets Congreo, aad ameaded pms~aot to the 
P e M o n  on Amendment of The Law of Lhe PeapIe's Republic of Cnioa on Chiiics-Torrign Eqairy Joint 
Venturesw passeci on A p d  4, 1990 at the Third SessÏon of the S N m t h  National People's Congess) (EJV 
Law); - ImpIeme~tfng Reguloioons jor the L m  of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-firejgrt EEqty 
Joins Ventures (pmmttigated by the State Co& on September 20, 1983 and ame~ded by the State 
CounciI on lamiary 15,1986 and on December 21,1987) (hpfemenring Regdations ofW Law}; 
Law s) . 
Given the signiticance of business corporations in a nation's economy, this thesis 
will ody examine business corporations, that is, corporations with the objeaive of makulg 
profit incorporated under the CBCA and China's Corporate Laws. It will not deai with 
Canadian CO-operative corporations, crown corporations, purely Chinese state 
corporations and administrative  corporation^.^^ This comparative study of corporate 
control, as broadly understood will be conduct ed from two perspectives: corporate 
internai power distribution in business corporations incorporated under the CBCA and 
under China's Corporate Laws and extemai public interest factors that affect corporate 
decision-making. 
To illustrate, the comparative study of corporate internai power distribution 
comprises a comparative examination of corporate ownership structures, legal devices 
available to the majonty and rninoriry shareholders, the role of the board of directors, 
- Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Joeign Cooperutive Joint Venmes (adopted at the 
Fint Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on Aprii 13, 1988, and pmmuigated by order 
No.4 of the President of the People's Republic of Ch& on and &&ive fmm A p d  13, I988) (CN Law); 
- Detail fmplementing Rules for the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign 
Cooperarive Joint Ventures (approved ùy the State CounciI on August 7, 1995. promdgated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coaperation on and effective fiom September 4. 1995) 
(Implementing RuIes of CJV Law); 
- Law of the People's Repu6lic of China on WItolly Foreign-owned Eirterprise (adopted by the Fourth 
Session of the Sixth National PeopIe's Congress on A p d  12,1986) (WFOE Law); and 
- Detailed lmplemenîing Rules /or the Law of the PeopIek Repblic of China on WhDlty Fureign-uwned 
Firferprises (adopted by the State CounciI on October 28, 1990, pmxuuIgated by the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade on December 1% 1990 and & i e  fbm December 12, 1990) 
(hnplementing Rdes of WFOE Law) 
It shouId be noted that in terms of Chiaese-foreign cooperative joint ventures, there are two forms under 
CJV Iaw, that is, corporate joint ventures with legai person status and jomt ventures without kgai person 
status. in this thesis, cooperative joint ventures without Iegai person status are not subject to @en 
that they are not legai entities and got dinetent management structure from corporations. 
PIease note that aithoagh Wong Kong was transfened to Chma on Itdy 1,1997, the Iegaï system adopted 
by Hong Kong, dody  comected with British Iegai system, remains unchange& China's Coprate Laws 
111entÏoned in thls thesls do not indude corporation Iaw in Hong Kong 
In addition, mle-shareholder carpcrations unda the CBCA wiU not be wnsÎdered kguse M y ,  
China's Corporate Lam does not permit the existence of saIe-sbaretioIder corporatio~ and secon-, 
managerid otncers, and employees, as weU as the respective positions of corporate 
participants withui the corporate intemal hierarchy in corporate theory and in the business 
reaiity of Canada and China. With regard to e x t d  factors that affect corporate 
decision-making, I wiIi address the role of state, market, creditors (focusing upon banks), 
courts and culture in ùifluencing corporate behaviors in Canada and China 
The business corporation as a form of business association has been well 
established in Canada for a long period. The study of corporate control under the CBCA 
reveals a modified capitalkm mode1 of corporate control in Canada Using the CBCA as a 
touchstone, through this comparative study, it d l  be observeci that China's Corporate 
Laws, which emerged during the age of China's economic refom aimed at building a 
socialist market economy, borrow corporate control expenences h m  western countries 
and try to align western corporate expenences into the structure of Chinese corporations 
within the political and economic regime of this socialist country. China's corporate 
control experience, in particular the internai corporate control provided by the CCL, 
refleas the merger of traditionid socialistic modeIs of enterprise management and the 
modem corporate control mechanisms of western countries. The study of corporate 
control under China's Corporate Laws demonstrates a rnodified sociaiisrn mode1 of 
corporate control. 
A section-by-section technicai cornparison of the provisions of the CBCA and of 
China's Corporafe Laws wouid be uicompIete and vimialiy meaninpiess because such 
comparative work ignores the impact of extemai envkonments and thus E 3 s  to recognize 
the critical comection between corporate control and the poiitics, economy, history, 
corporate contrai is not an issue in such corporations sirice the sinde shareholder effectivdy exercises di 
corporate power, 
To avoid such unhelpful technical cornparison and 
2 includes a general oveMew of the Fieahires of 
and culture of a country. 
rather, a context, Chapter 
Canadian corporate Iaw in the context of Canadian economic development, and the 
historïcal development of the CBCA Chapter 3 provides a generai overview of Chinese 
economic development, its relationship with the development of Chinese corporations and 
the historical development of China's Corporate Laws. Through the hiaorical survey, it is 
observed that the CBCA was developed w i t b  a stable social environment and has a clear 
historicd relationship to British corporate Iaw, connected with Canada's early colonial 
hiaory, as weii as a current inclination to parallel Amencan corporate Iegislation, 
reflecting mon recent close economic integration with the United States. The appearance 
of China's Corporate Laws however is dnven by the program of diversi@ng the 
ownership of enterprises in China's transitionai economy. Under the pressure of 
attempting to prornote efficient management of business and the desire of maintainhg the 
socialia regime in China, China's Corporate Laws embrace western corporate expenences 
but at the same time preserve certain aspects of traditional socialist enterprise 
management. 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively address the topic of corporate control nom an 
Întemal and extemal perspective. The diagram attached as Appendix I illustrates the 
structures outlied in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 4 examines the law and practice of corporate internai control in Canadian 
and Chinese corporations. Shareholders nominaiiy contd the corporation through the 
ownership hction The comparative study of the corporate ownership structures in 
Canada and China demonstrates that Canadian and Chinese corporations have highly 
concenaated share ownership stnic~rres, and that cIosely held corporations dominate 
Canadian and Chinese corporate markets. The Canadian corporate market is firrther 
characterized by hi& overlapping ownership and directors ties. Share structures 
provided by the CBCA and the CCL reffect different social envkonments business 
practices and statutory traditions in Canada and China The CBCA adopts a mode1 of 
shareholders' democracy based on capital wMe pursuhg fiir treatment for the mhority 
shareholders. CCL provides majority shareholders with extraordinary statutory nghts in 
directing corporate business but neglects the protection of the minority shareholders. 
Although CCL also adopts the concept of shareholders' democracy based on capital, it is 
doubtfiil, based on an analysis of the provisions under the CCL, that Chinese shareholders' 
democracy can be solidy established on the basis of capital. Chapter 4 tùrther looks at the 
role of the board of directors in a corporation's internai control and at the board's 
oversight funaion in Canada and China. Generaiiy speaking, the boards of Canadian 
corporations have greater power than their counterparts in China in terms of corporate 
management. Considering the directors' power of directin& corporate business, the CBCA 
and CCL. both split the management and supervision tùnction, although they accomplish 
this split in very different ways. In China, the division is made explicit by the adoption ofa  
two-tier board system. In Canada, the division is somewhat more subtie, but is observed 
nevertheless. Chapter 4 aiso addresses the role of managerid ofkers, particuIarIy the 
chief executive officer in Canada and the generaI manager in China The chief e x e d v e  
oficer of a large public corporation in Canada generally handes corporate strategic 
matters and directs corporate management wNe the general manager in Chuiese 
coqoraûons is usuaüy m charge of corporate daily management and operation. 
Moreover, the comparative study of empIoyeesr collective power for coatrohg or 
iduencing corporate management in Canada and China shows that under corporate laws, 
Chinese employees generally have greater uinuencing power in corporate management 
(particdar in the area of employee werare) than their counterparts in Canada 
Chapter 5 examines the issue of corporate control from an extemal perspective. 
Bnefly, this chapter addresses the role of the state, market, creditors, courts and culture in 
Uifluencing corporate management in Canada and China. In terms of the role of the state 
in corporate management, it is demonstrated that Chinese corporate business enterprises 
are subject to more idluences nom dxect state intervention than Canadian corporations. 
As to the role of the market in iduencing corporate decision-making, the thesis M e r  
nibdivides the market infiuences, and specifically examines capital markets, corporate 
contrai markets, p r o d u d s e ~ c e  markets, managerial service markets, as weii as the 
fiinction of media coverage. It is shown that generally Chinese markets do not play as 
great an iduencing role as Canadian markets in t e n s  of corporate decision-making given 
the uifant market systems in today's China Chapter 5 aIso examines the bank's role as a 
creditor and how banks affect corporate control in the two couatnes. Briefly, the banks' 
role in corporate control is Iimited in both Canada and China With respect to courts and 
their influences upon corporate control, it is demonstrated that Canadian courts are 
normalIy exerting greater innuencing powers upon corporate business than Chinese courts, 
particularly through the use of spedic judiciai and statutory remedies. The reason for this 
merence is attrriutable to different Iegai systems and Iegai traditions in Canada and 
China As to the CU/tureys innuence upon corporate controi, it is observed that the 
capitalist culture adopted by Canada tends to favor protection of private property rights 
aod UidMdualism. Canadian culture encourages a flexible business environment wahin 
which business peopfe may seek to maximize their personai weaith through corporations. 
Today's socialist culture in Chha accords weii with China's traditiond dtura i  vaIues 
embodied in Confiicianism A high respect for hierarchy, emphasis on obligations rather 
than rights, orientation toward groups, and emphasis on d e  by m e  rather than the law, 
as embedded in Confùcianism culture, favor a socialist focus on protection of public 
property rights and collectivism. 
Chapter 6 concludes the comparative study of the corporate control practices in 
Canada and China and points out that China's corporate control expenences merge 
concepts of sociaiist enterprise management with western modern corporate control 
expenences. 
CHAPTER 2 T'Hl3 CANADA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT 
The evolution and refinement of the CBCA, in a stable socid environment, have 
been greatly iduenced by British company law and American corporate Iaw. The 
CBCA's historicd relationship with British company law May be traced to Canada's 
history, Erst as a British colony, then later as a member of the British Commonwealth. The 
strong Amencan influences on the CBCA owe much to the increasing economic 
integration between Canada and the US since the end of World War [I, an economic 
integration that has been expanded since the execution and implementation of the Canada- 
United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA)~' and the North Amencan Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)," as well as increasingiy interdependent commercid relationships in 
today's digital ec~norny'~ especidy in North Amerka. 
Before Canadian codederation in 1867, the economy of colonial Canada was 
resource-based. The rich resources, especidy the resources of cod, fÙr and tixnber, 
'O Cmda-Un~ted States Free Trade Agnemenl, December 22-23 1987-27 ILM 281 (enteted into force 
Jarmrary 1 1989) Oniine: York University Lïbrary, Business and Govenunent Publications Lllbrary 
< http:I/~~~.~yorku.ca/depts/gdas/ft~~ont,  h m  (date accessed: August 8, 1999). 
See aiso, Canada-UniteciStates Free Trade Agreement Implementatiorr Act (1988, C. 65) 
Online: Deparmient of Justice of Canada < http:/~canad;L.justice.gc.ca(FTP/EN/LawdChap/C/C- lO06.txt> 
(date accessed: August 8, 1999) (Iast modined: Aprii 30, 1999). 
~Vorth American F m  Trade Agreement Beîween the Goventment cf Canada. the Governmenr of 
lbfèxico and f lre Govemment of the UnitedState~~ 7 December 1992, Can T.S- 1994 No.2-32 U 289 
(entered into force 1 Sanuafy 1994) Oaliae: NAFïA Net, <httpY&www.naftanet/~gre.htm, (date 
accessed: A u g ~  8,1999). 
iVortIr American F m  Trnde Agreement Implemenfafion Act, Oniine: the Department of Justice of Canada, 
<http~/canada.jiIstice.gccaiftp/daWS/c6ap/dn0/dD23.8.~~ (date a d -  Angust 8,1999). 
* Di@ econoxrty is an economy based on the dÏgÏtÏzatio11 of information and commrmication 
infiastnrcture It is a h d  of economy bas& on knowIedge, The digital economy niaialy consists cf 
eiectronic commerce and the inforxnatiou technoIogy nidustries that make eIectronic commerce poss1'bIe 
The digital economy is changing how people work, commtmicate, consame a d  do busÏness. B appearr 
that the tenu "digitai economy" ïs more often useci in the US- While in other countn'es- rike Canada, 
another te- "electmnÏc econoq" is mare popular, 
attracted European nations (in partidar, Britain) to expand 
power in this land? Corporations, as a form of economic 
th& politid and economic 
power, appeared during the 
development of Britain's overseas exploration efforts as &y as the 1 4 ~  ~entury.~' The 
growing need for establishing an economic institution for accumulating capital handling 
credit, transferring h d s ,  and iimiting nsks cded for a more readiiy available corporate 
form. 
The first generai Act, the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act in the L[K, introduced 
incorporation by registration, the method that has remained in dominant use in the UK 
since then and subsequentiy became the standard mode1 of incorporation in most of the 
~ornmonwealth.~' In terms of incorporation in Canada, the fist Act of incorporation for 
indigenous commercial companies was passed in Canada in the 19" ~ e n t u r y ~ ~  In 1849, 
the est generai Act appeared in Canada, consisûng of one Act for Upper canada3' and 
another for Lower canada3' to authorize incorporation of joint stock companies for 
See U.S. Department of Commerce, The Emerging Digiiai Economy ii (June 1999) Oniine: United State 
Govenunent Eïectronic Commerce PoIicy < http~/~~~.ecommefce.gov/ede/chapterI. h W >  (date 
accessed: August 8, 1999). In Chapter 1 - EIectronic Commerce in the Digital Economy. 
33 GD. Taylor & P - A  BaskeMlIe, A Concise History of Business in Cruroda (Toronto, Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 1 1-28 and 88. 
34 L.C.B. Gower, G d s  Prtnctpies of Modem Company Law, @ eci. (London: Stewas & Sons. L979) at 
24. 
35 7&8 WC. CCIIO & LIL. SeeLS.Ziegeletal.,Cc~sescurd~futeriaIsonPar~nemhipsondCmadim 
Business Corporations, 2& ed (Tomntor The C d  Company Limita 1989) at 98. 
Howe~er~ the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act wïtbheid the pnviIege of limtmtted iiabüity- 
36 41 Geo. [L c l 0  CC. 1801). For a morp detded description, see B. WeEIing Corporate L m  in 
Cimada: me Gmerning Principles (Tomxto: Bntterworths. t 984)- 
construction of roads and bridges. In 1850, a broader gened Act was passed.3g The 
appearance of the generd Acts of incorporation responded to the needs of large capitai 
intensive projects, Iike ship building mining, mechanical and chemicai business in Canada. 
nie est Canadian generai incorporation Act adopted by the federal Parliament appeared 
in the year 1869 and repealed the earlier pre-Confiederation legislation." 
Corporate law in Canada is under vixtudy concurrent federai and provinciai 
jurisdiction. Al1 Canadian provinces, except Quebec, operate under the common law 
based on British Iegai tradition. The commoa Iaw recognized two principal forms of 
incorporation. One was incorporation by exercise of the royd prerogative, usuaify 
referred to as incorporation by letters patent, or royal charter, and the other was 
incorporation b y private or generai act of the legislature." 
In addition to these fiindamental British corporate law roots, Canadian corporate 
Iaw today also owes much to U S .  models. The federal corporate law reforms in the 
1970s proposed by Dickerson, Howard and Getz (Dickerson Cornmittee) in Proposais for 
a Nov Business Corporutiun.s Law for ~anadir:~ Ied to signifïcant changes in the CBCA- 
The Dickerson Cornmittee drew upon the experiences of corporate Iaw makers in the 
Australian aates, New York, California, North Carolina and ~ n t a r î o . ~  Discarding the 
4 Supm note 35 at 97. It is noted that foiiowing 1844 Joint Stock Compani= Act in the UK the 
"registrationn model a h  aasted in Canada 
" RW-V- Dickefsoxt, IL. Howard & L GeQ PropsaIsfir a Nm Bflst3ze.w Corporatioons Lmvfir CmaclQ, 
VOL t (Ottawa,- Information Canada, 1971) (Diclcetson Report) 
letters patent mode1 and endorsing "enablingisdu in terms of incorporation procedures; 
providing mhority shareholders and creditors remediai safeguards for seKprotection; 
elimuiating useless procedures, providing directors and otticers power to manage whiIe 
imposing non-excludable obligations upon them, the CBCA paved a road that is workable 
for business people in Canada. The founding p~c ip les  established under the CBCA 
corporate personality, managerial power, rnajority d e  and maionty protectio~4" 
demonstrate the style of corporate democracy and management effectiveness. 
The reason that CBCA owes much to U.S. models lies in the fact of Canada's close 
business relationship with the US since Worid War II.* It is witnessed that entering into 
the Iate 1980s, the Canadian and Amencan economies have been even further integrated 
because of the implementation of FTA, NAFTA and the arrivai of the digital economy." 
The FTA, which came into force on Ianuary 1, 1989, mainly concemed the graduai 
elimination of tarifts and reductions in non-tariff trade barriers on goods between Canada 
and the US. The FTA was later incorporated into the NAFTA."' NAFTA, designed to 
" B. Welluig, Corporate Law in Canada: The Guverning Principies, 2d ed. (Toronto & Vancouver 
Bunerworth, 199 1) at 53. 
46  16id at 102, The UK, since joining the Common Market in 1972, has began CO move doser to 
continent. perception sin order to harmonize with other European countries. Monmer, it appears that 
UK abandons some old 19" conception dower than American jurisdictioas. In addition UK la& an 
North Amencan style of semrities commission, These aiI together may determine Canada's strong 
inclination CO American jurisdrsdrction i the mntemporary age. 
n S u p  note 32. 
a Deparment &Foreign Anairs and htemtiod Trade, "Trade Negotiations and Agreements Oparing 
Doors to the World, Canadars Internationai Market Access Pnorities 1999" OnIine: <http://www.W- 
maec i . gc . ca l tna -~ddoo~~~or1d lOk~ .  1 (date accessedr Angust 8, 1999). 
The N m A  did not afféct the phase-out of tarif& tmâer the FïA, which was compIeted on Jan- 1, 
1998. To that date, virhially ail on Canada-US üade in origÏnating goods were eIiminat& 
Some tarifE remah in place for certain products In Canada's suppIy-manageci sectors (cg, dahy and 
poultry), as weII as sngar, dajt, peanuts and Cotton in tne United States. 
foster increased trade and investment between Canada, United States and Mexko, 
expands the fiee trade fiom goods to other important sectors @ce hvestment, trade in 
s e ~ c e s ,  inteiiectual property, cornpetition, and the cross-border movement of business 
persans). It contains an ambitious schedule for t a s  elimination and reduction of non- 
tariff barriers, as well as comprehensive provisions on the conduct of business in the fhe 
trade area. Under the NAETA, North Amenca is increasingiy viewed as a sÏngie market. 
The intemationd trade and investment fIows between Canada and the US since the 
implementation ofNAFTA suggest that the NAFTA bas played a pivotal role in increasing 
trade and investment between Canada and the US." The ecoaomies of Canada and the 
US are Uicreasingly interconnected given that Canada and the US are each other's larges 
trading partners. 'O 
The rapid growth of the computer industry and the remarkabie development of 
computer networking in recent years are Ieading Canada into an era of digitai e c o n o ~ ~ . ~ ~  
Canada's ambition of beconhg a world leader in the development and use of electronic 
Ibid It is not totaiiy accurate to exclude trade with Moaa>. Generaiiy speakrng, total trade and 
investment between Canada, Mexico and the United States has Înaeased substantiay since the NAFïA 
was implemented in 1994. Canada's totai KU- trade witii the US and Mexico surpassed a haif a 
trillion dollars in 1998. Two-way merchandise trade between Cimada and Mexico grew by 8.6 percent 
reaching $8.9 billion in 1998. Canadian merchandise trade with the United States is up 1 1.1 percent over 
the same pe- reachhg $505 billion in 1998. 
" Canada's exports of goads and services ceacheci $368.9 billion in 1998. Over 80 per cent of Canada's 
exports go to the US. 
See Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, "Team Canada hc Achievements 
Report 1998-99" (Apd L999), Online: Department of Foreign AE&s and internai Trade 
~http~f~~nfoexportgc~ca/Section4/< (date accessedr Au- 8,1999). 
Department of Foreign Affâirs and internationai Trade, T'rade Negotiations and Agreements: Openhg 
Doors to the WarId, Canada's Intemational Market Access Rioritics 1999" O&: <htl;~Y/WwFK.&t- 
m a e c i , g c . d t n ~ ~ d d o o f ~ ~ o r I ~ O 4 ~ . ~ ~  > (date acEessed: Augnst 8, i999). 
Canada's merchandw exports to the United States done q p r t  aver 2 million Canadian jobs, and 
generate 30.4 percent of Canada's GDf, F a y  83-7 percent &Canadian merchandlse exports are destined 
for the United States. On the other han& the US aqortecî $234.2 bmon ÎII goods into Canada 
Supra note 32 
commerce has been stated by the government o f  Canada for establishg Canada Ïnto the 
most comected nation in the worlb" With the assistance of advanced technology, 
corporations will expand their signifïcance in the internationai economy by p r o m o ~ g  
marketin& increasing production, reducing COQS, increasing communication, and 
developing new services. It is very likely that in this environment, Canadian corporate law 
and Amencan corporate Iaw will become even more closely aiigned. 
in Canada, the sl@cance of the CBCA is growing with Canadian business. As 
of December 3 1, 1 998, there were 162,168 corporations uicorporated under the CBCA'~ 
Over 50 per cent of the Financiai Post's top 500 business corporations in Canada were 
constituted in accordance with the CBCA." The CBCA fiamework has since been copied 
by most Canadian provinces.'5 Other commonwealth jurisdictions have aiso been 
innuenced by the CBCA? 
The CBCA, then, may be regarded as a mature and sophisticated modem 
corporate law, adopted within a stable social environment, and embodying prhciples 
" Eiectronic Commerce Task Force, "nie Canadian EIectronic Commerce Strategy" Onlïne: 
<http://w.e-corn,icgc.ca/engiisMecom-mg* (date accessed: August 8, L 999)- 
According to an internet strategy finn's research, as of May 1999, 17 t mifion people in the worId had 
accessed to the internet, over haifof them in the US and Canada. 
See also Supra note 32. 
" The data was provided by Lee Duforci of Strategïes Client SeMces of industry Ca~ada through emaii on 
March 23, 1999. (Contact detail: 235 Queen Street, In Floor, East Tom, Ottawa, Ontano KIA OB, 
Tel: 6 13 - 954 503 1, Fax: 6 13 - 954 1894; internet: hothe.senrice@c.gcca). 
Y K G. OnenbreÏt & I. E. Waiker, l e d g  b m  the Deiawafe Experimce: A Cornparisort of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act and the Delaware Generai Corporation Law" (1998) 29 Can Bus, LJ- 
364 at 366- 
" I.S. Ziegel The CBCA - Twaity Yean Later Wnae Do We Go Fmm Here" in Faculty of Law, 
McGiU University, Confaence Meredith Lechtres 1994195, Corporations at the Cmss~oacis (Montreal: 
MffiiII University, 1995) 3 at 5. 
" For mstance, New Zealand evai adopted a CBCA stgIe and mmrporated substantiai provigons of the 
CBCA in iîs Companïes Act 1993. Compmies Act 1993 (commenceci on Jdy 1, 1994) ûdhe:  
found in the corporate law regllnes ofother leading Îndusb5aI naîhw chiefly the US. and 
the U.K. Moreover, the profotmd influences o f  the CBCA, both withh Canada and 
elsewhere, attest to its success as a modern corporate firamework and make it an 
appropriate touchstone against which to consider the more ment corporate law initiatives 
of the People's Repubiic of China 
CHAPTER 3 CORPORA'IE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
The appearance and development of china's Corporate Laws are dosely comected 
with China's economic and political development and ideological transformation. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in d e t d  the historical development of the 
Chinese economy, politics and ideology and their association with China's Corporate 
Laws. This chapter, however, d provide a bnef history of the development of 
corporations in the context of China's economic development and the historicai 
development of China's Corporate Laws. 
3.1 The Context o f  Economic Development and Incorporated Companies 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the histoficai development of the CBCA took place in a 
stable economic and political environment and invulveci a process of IegisIative refom and 
refinement in co~ection with a shift Eom primarily UK models to US models. The 
appearance and evolution of Chinese Corporate Laws, however, took place in the mida of 
~ i~ f i can t ly  shifting politicai and economic circumstances. The Chinese Corporate Laws 
therefore unavoidably reflect these changes. 
The People's Repubtic of China (PRC) was inaugurated on October L, 1949 after 
the Chinese Comrnunist Party's victory in the clvil war agauist the National People's 
partyartyn The &stence of a powerfif neighboring &y, the Soviet Union (SU), dowed the 
govemment of the Chmese Communist Party to follow the SU'S model in ds efforts to 
Nationai People's Party, ni Chinese. Guo Ming Dong. Membefs of the NaîionaI People's P;ilty ffed to 
Taiwan their defëat in the cnnL war, 
buiId a socialist regime in China- Wth hanciai and technical assistance fiom the SU, the 
Chinese govemment gradualIy established a Soviet-mode1 economic system. Through 
centrdizing a planning economy, collectivizing agriculture, elirninating pnvate industry 
and trade, and nationaiiig banks in the socialist transformation program, the centrat 
govemment virtualIy cleared d market forces in the 1950s." There were no private 
corporations pursuhg profits in mainland China &er 1956.'~ Up to 1978, oniy two types 
of entities, disthguished by ownership. existeci in mainland China: state-owned enterprises 
and collectively owned enterprises.60 
Rather than pursuhg profits, state-owned enterprises and collectively owned 
enterprises under the planning economy were operated to meet production targets set by 
the pvernment. The enterprises no longer cared about profits and losses since al1 profits 
would be channeled to date revenue and al1 losses would be shoddered by the state. The 
govemment exercised macro-control and micro-control to manage the enterprises. In 
terms of macro-control, the governent controlied b d s  and matenais that the enterprises 
needed for production. With regard to micro-controI, production and sales of an 
The program of sm-dis translormation of i n d m  and commerce in the 1950s was m e d  through 
formation of joint state-private enterprises (referred to as "state-capitaiist") to deal with private 
establishments. in 1956. the h a i  iranbonnation (or nationaikation) of such enterprises was 
accomplished by assuring private businessmen a h e d  interest payment (regardïess of pmfitabifity) in 
exchange for their waiving ownership and control of theïr companies. 
For a detail description, pIease d e r  to C. Risicin, China's Political Economy; The Questjôr Dmeiopmenr 
S'me 1949 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 93. 
S9 P. Jiang & L E  Fang, eds. New Edition of Course in Corporatio~ L m  (China: Law Publishing House, 
1994) at 47. 
At the end of the 1940s and the eady 1950s, there were amrmd 1,300,000 private industnai and 
cornmerciai associations in China They wae registefed aaordllig to conrpany Iaw of the Republic of 
China (iaw issued by the goverrunent of the National People's Party). Among th- on.@ LI298 were 
registered corporations 
1954 Corzstitution of the People's Repblie of China established the state policy of iimiting capitalist 
ownership and "... graduaIIy ( q l a c i n g I  capitalist ownennip with o w n d p  by the whole peophw 
See Artide 10 of Comtitution of the PeopJe 's Republic ofchina (19.54, 
Y-Q. Zhao. "Tbe Co- Law ofCIiinan (1996) 6 iab ht'i & Comp. L. RN. 461 at 462. 
enterprise were connected with govemmentd 
the only representative of the whole people 
directive The goverment, as 
accordhg to sociaiist theory, through its 
administrative organs, exercised decision-making power in the enter prise^.'^ 
Central planning, however, requires too much information. PracticalIy there are so 
many unforeseeable factors and not dl information is obtainable. In the end, enterprises 
were unable to rely on the central govenunent to allocate resources needed to carry out 
aate plans. Accordingly, these enterprises began to pursue a strategy of self-reliance. 
This led to the hoarding of materials and the duplication of productive operations in 
10caliities.~~ Self-reliance became a state policy d u ~ g  China's Cultural Revolution period 
(1966-76)" During this period, the self-reliance policy meant: 65 
(1) fi iU utilization of domestic resources, including labor and skill; 
(2) rejection of indiscriminate imitation of foreign methods in favor of 
accumdating indigenous experience suited to Chinese conditions; 
(3) reliance on domestic sahg to finance capitd accumulation; and 
in Chinese. Zi Ling Ji Hua. 
" The goverment ananges al i  matters ceiating to the enterprises, mch as what to produ- how much to 
be produced, how to distribute, the sale priasT whether to bomw money anci when to repay any loans. 
CentraliPng pIanning econorny had its positive contribution to China's economic deveiopment, howevér, 
[t allowed China to concentrate its cesources and investment on large-sde pmjects, whîch were necessary 
for rapid industriai growth. WorId Bank studies showed that as CO net output, the r d  m u a l  growth rate 
of Chha was mund ten percent for the period fiom t 957 to 1979 which was above the average of other 
low- and middie-incorne countries. 
For detaii, sec WorId Bank, China: Sociaiist Econonttc Deve?opm, vol. 1 (Washington. DC: WorId 
Bank, 1983). 
" C. Riskin, China's Political Economyi The Quesr for Deveiopment since 1949 (New York: Mord 
University Press, 1987) at 7. 
" Culturai RcMIutiou (19664976) is a progtam for pmiçying the commuaiSt party and cleaning 
capitalism and antidatisn, During th& pericxi, ciass strnggïe was part of everyone's Me. 
For detall: Cfüna News Digest International, The Vtsnal Museum of the Cnltntat Revolutiou. online: 
China News Digest IntcmationaI <httpfhvww.cndorg/CR> (date accesse& March 24- 1999). 
The self-reiiance poficy caused CI- to a[ienate itself h m  the international market_ One of the main 
reasons for promoting a &reliance poficy was that durhg the L960s, cüplomatic relation between Chma 
and the Soviet Union became worse due ta issues reiating to Tabaq coahmce and border disputes- 
The Soviet Union withdmu its technid experts who had assisted China in estabiishing Chinese industry 
in the 1960s. W?hout extenial asnStanœ, the Chinese goveniment i~tiated self-reliaace poücy- 
(4) establishment ofa comprehemive industn'd system in China 
Such policy emphasùed a reliance on domestic resources (naturd resources, funds 
and human capital) to develop the Chhese economy. Simply put, China adopted a 
"closed-door" economic poiicy during this penod. 
The Third Plenary Session of the EIeventh Centra1 Cornmittee of the Cornmunist 
Party of China in December 1978 (Plenary) was recognized as an officiai sign that China 
bad Iaunched economic reform and opened up to the outside ~ o r l d . ~ ~  The Plenary 
communiqué was deemed "political enabhg Iegislation" that made it possible to iiiemke 
economic policy." 
Since 1978, a widespread reform has been ongoing for establishment of a non-state 
seaor economy (Le. private, collective, and foreign invested economy), adjushg the 
distriiution system, attracting foreign capital, decenualizing centrai administration, re- 
66 Chinese Comrnunist Party's policy plays a leading rofe in dincmig Chinese economic deveiopment 
Such source of power cornes from paragraph seven of the preamble of the Const~iruton of the Peopfe's 
Repubk of C'tna (adopted at the F i  Session of the Elful NationaL People's Congress and promnlgated 
for implementation by the Proclamation of the Nationai People's Congress on December 4, 1982, as 
amended at the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 12, 1988. and again at 
the Fm Session of the Eighth of Nationai Peopitfs Congress on March 29, 1993.) (1993 China's 
Constitution) 
It  provides that, "Lfnder the Leadership ofthe Coltfmunist Purp of C ' a  and the pidance of Manam 
Leninisrn and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of ail nationafities wiU continue to adhere to the 
people's democratic dictatorship and the sociaiist road and to upho1d refiorm and opening to the outside 
wodâ, steadiïy împrwe socidkt institutions9 deveIop sociauat democracy, improve the sociaiîst legai 
system, and work hard and seIf4antiy to moderniw the counay's indnstrp, agrinilture, aationai defëase 
and science and tahnology step by step to bdd China into a stmng prosperons ctxitmally advanceci, 
democratic socialist nation, (emphasis added) 
An English translation of Constiîution of the Peopfe's ReMlic of China is aMilabIe oaline: Maryland 
University School of Law, ChMaLaw Website 
<hnp:/lwwwlwwwqis.netl~aw/IawtranIhtm, (Dateaccessed: Iarmary 12.1999) 
67 K Fukasaku. D. Waii & M. Wb China's Long March to m Opur Econonty paris: OECD, L994) at 24- 
The Communiquk of the mird Pfenaqt Srnion uf the ELkventh Centrai Cornmittee of the ConvMnst 
Pmy of C h h  (passexi on DeDcmkr 22, L978) (Beijing: People's Publishing Ho- 1978) at 7 (Chinese 
verg0n)- 
The Chinese Communkt P;nty pmdaimed a shat b m  dass stnrggk to economic deveiopmemt and 
adopted a de-centraiïzation policy. The PImary commdqnk lùrther pmfOVfded enterpnseS *th expanding 
amonomy. The Plenary cormmmi@ did mn pmvide a d o m  bIueprïnt uwtcad, it reqoirrd the siate to 
orga-g industries, promoting foreign trade, lifting pnce conirols, increasing enterprise 
autonorny. improving the hanciai system and re-arranging the tax ~ystern.~~ The on- 
gouig economic refom has led to rapid economic achievements in China in a relatively 
short penod." 
The reform program, with its focus on economic reform, had no solid theory to 
support it at first. Wtth the polaicaI aad economic coliapse of the SU and the eastern 
Ewpean s0ciaIis-t countries in the early 1990s, there was no precedent for the Chinese 
f m  on economic constnrction. Some open-minded and pragmatic people (like Deng Xiaoping and Chen 
Yun) resumed power after thk meeting, 
68 In 1978. the policy of Chinese Communist Policy was sbifted h m  strict adherence to socialist state 
ownersfüp to permitting private economy. The 1982 Constitution of the People's Repblic of China and 
1986 Genertzf Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China encourageci the growth of the 
private economy- 1988 Constihction of the People's Republic of China expressLy authorizes the 
devdopment of a private economy (See Article t 1 of 1988 Constihrtion of the People's Repuiific of 
China.) 
The driWig forces behind China's refom campaign are 6inerent from that of eastern European sociaiist 
countries or the fonner Soviet Union. Instead of king pushed to the road of d o m  due to domestic 
macroeconosnic crisis, China's reform campaign was more or l e s  spontaneous and dosely connecteci with 
domestic politid and economic factors, Two main factors codd explain why the Chinese government 
initiateci the d o m  wnpaign: 
(1) PoliticaIIy, d e r  the ten-year "culture revolution", the Ieadîng party in China. i . e  China 
Communia Party (CCP) had to take immediate action to re-estabfish its prestige in the state and regah 
trust h m  the Chinese people so as to foster its Ieadership status in China. The best and a h  the oniy way 
to achieve these goais was to enhanœ the staters productivity and improve the material Ieve1 of Chinese 
people's Iives, so as to evidence that CCP is able to and wiII sa* Ets promise to iead the whok Chinese 
people to reach prosperity; and 
(2) EconomicaIIy, because of its isolation h m  western admced technology, refiaming fiom foreign 
capital and adliering ta a centrai pr;uining economy, the whole economic develaputent was Iagging behind 
devefoped comîries. Irr order to be mdted into gobai economy, China has to open up to the outside worid 
and Iearn h m  other countries. 
For a detailed description, See the World Bank, China: Reform and the Role ofthe P h  in the 1990s 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank. 1992) at 34, 
" The growth rate of the reai GDF (46) of China from 19W to 1997 are: L990 - 1994: L0.7; 1995 10.5, 
1996: 9.5, 1997: 8.8, As to foreign c b c t  iwestment (US$ million), 1990-1994: 16,062; 1995: 35,849: 
1996: 40,180; 1997: 44.236. For ot6er detaiied economic pronl.es, see Online: WorId Economic Fonun 
~http~/www/www~efoniaorglpublioti~ns/asiacriecon~mi~~rofiles.~ (date accessed: Iune 26,1999). 
See also  NO interesthg articles Song Tmgming, "Two Decades af Ecanomic Refonn" on[ine: China 
Today, ~ht tp 'J ' .ChinaTodap~ct98fct98-10-~  and T. G. Ekmki, "China's Ecanonry - Wbat's 
Next?It (Octaber 1998) ontine: ~http'Jf~~~~.pitt,ed~-tgraWcfiin=i.fitml, (date MardL 24+ 
1999). 
govemment to follow in W e r  bdding its socialist economy."' In the process of trial, 
fdure and re-triai, the economic reform in China graduaüy developed its own 
characteristics. The characteristics of China's economic refiorrn are: graduaiism, de- 
centralization, and cornmitment to socialism. China's Corporate Laws developed during 
the transitional economy, also retIea these feanires. 
( 1) Gradudism 
Gradualism is refkcted in two aspects: timing and geography. Usuaily, a 
reforming policy is gradudy and nationally impiemented over a relatively long penod.7' 
As to timing, the reforming perïod starhg from 1978 is miil ongoing With regard to 
geography, some districts were circled out as testing areas for implementing reforming 
policies.R mer  assessrnent and the resuit of experimentation were observed, the cenual 
70 An oId Chinese m g  appiies we[l under such circmnstances: feeling the stones to cross the river. The 
oId saying was cited by Chinese Ieaders in descniing reforms rdated to establishg a socialist market 
economy. Ct might be one of the reasons that Chinese govemment adopted a conservative and cautious 
attitude in almost aIi reforming areas. 
~raduaiism mkes China avoid s d d  shock symptom and ensures a relatively stable uaasitioa 
Transition cost therefore Iargely reduwd On the one hand, people get orientation pend: on the other 
hanci, hpmvemen~ innovation or c o ~ ~ o n  can be made h m  tÏme ta time in a relative long time 
@O6 The disactvantages, howexer- are unequai cornpetition conditions ben~een different m, 
increased cost of enjoying growth attn'bute to d o m ;  and tmpredictable economic environment. 
For an illustration, please d e r  to The WorId Ba.& Chim Refitnz and the Rule of the Plan in the 1990s 
(Washington, D L  T6e World Bank, 1992) at 38, 
There are exceptional cases that canwt adopt gradiÿilisn and nqrrire an mimediate change. For instance, 
cIarifYing rofe of centrai bank, distingaishnig fünctioas between commaciaï bank and non-bank h c i a I  
institutions (Le, trust institutions). 
For a brief summa~~ on d o m s  of China's fTnanaaI system, see f .CH Chai, Chrna- Tramifion to a 
Mwket Economy (New York Mord University Press Inc., L997) at 118, 
The pmcess of stabIishiog SpecM Economic Zones (SEZ) anbodied the graduafiSm, 
In 1980, the ç e m t d  g-ent of China appfoyed for opening S h d e n ,  Znahai, Shantou and Xamen, 
the four Sus in the South Cnma üp to the 1984, the centrd govwmmt appmved anoher fourteen 
cities as opening aties tor the refofmmg trials- The fourteen &es are: Da[ian, Qinghuangdao, Tirniin, 
YantaÏ, Qingdao, Li-gang Nantong, Shanghai, Ni~~gbF Wenzhou, Fuzhoir, Guan&tboa, Zkmj~ang 
and 8eiIiai, 
governent then decided whether or not reforms shouid be extended to other areas. 
Gradualism explains the current situation ofbusiness association Iaws in China: co- 
existence of enterprise laws that categorize entities according to ownership (e-g. ail people 
owned enterprises," collectively owned enterprises, sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly 
foreign owned enterprises) and the CCL which adopts shareholding corporate structures 
borrowed fkom the western wortd. 
(2) Dacentrakation 
De-centrakation of administrative control fiom higher level govemments to lower 
level govemments is another feature of the refonn. It is believed that lower level 
govemments are able to respond to changes more effectively than higher levels since they 
have superior information. 
Accompanying the administrative de-centralization in the governmentai organs, the 
split of administrative control and enterprise management in stateswned enterprises was 
implemented. 
Another distinct feature of the reform is the cornmitment to the socidist system 
SEZ is a aimpromise saIution to the pmbIem of invoducing foreign capital, permitting foreign capitaiist 
practices in China and protecting domestic industn*eses 
Foiiowing the establishment of Shekou ïndustnal Park as a testing point in Iarmary 1979, five other SEZ 
(Sheden, Zhuhai, Shantou anci Hainan) were later set np. The spread of SU reflected centrai 
govemrnent's idea of trial, spread and trial again- 
An discussion of SEZ can be fomd in G. T. Crane, The Politicui Economy ofChinu's Speckd Ecorromic 
Zones (N.Y.: M E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990) and K FnkaJaky D. Wall, & M Wu, Cirina's Long Mmd, to an 
Open Economy (Paris: OECD, L994) at 42. 
Qum Mbg S m  Yott Zhi Qi Ye. 
That k, the state-owned merprises. Sociaiist theory on the state is that the aate represents a i i  the people 
Ur the muntry- Property owned by the state is the piopenp owneâ by all the people in the cotmtry. 
and perseverance with sociaiist theory. It is cleady stated in China's Coastitution that 
C b a  is currently at the primary stage of soualism and concentrates on building socialism 
with Chinese characterlstics." Correspondin&, the Chuiese government emphasizes the 
dominant position of the publicly owned economy (Le. state owned and collectively 
owned economy) within the national e c o n o ~ n ~ . ~ ~  
One of the functions of the CCL, therefore, is to provide a legai bais for 
incorporating state-owned enterprises.76 It is recognized under the CCL that the object of 
CCL is to "maintain the social economic order and prornote the sociak market 
e c ~ n o r n ~ . . " ~  This policy goal is reflected in the corporate ownership structure h China 
where state/public ownership plays a dominant role in Chinese corporations. 
3.2 The Context of Ideologicai Transfomation 
China is now at a crossroad, confronthg confiiaing ideologies in the process of 
building a sociaiist market econ~rn~ . '~  Strugpiing with its own fith, a state-controned 
economy, and pressure fiom the global environment to move toward a more Eee 
74 S u p  note 66 (1993 China's Constitution). 
".AK country is in the primary stage of socialism, The basic task befote the nation is the concentration 
of efXiorts of sociatist modemkation constniction in accordance with the theory of buiiding sociaiism with 
Chinese charactenstics-." 
" AmCle 7 of 1993 China% Corntifution pmides tbat the state-owned economyI i.e. the socialist aonomy 
witfi ownership by the people as a w h o 1 ~  is the Ieading force in the nationai economy. The state wüi 
ensure the consofidation and deveïopment to the state-owned economy. 
Considering that most of the stateowned enterprises are IoSng money but possess major Rate assets, 
one of the reformÏx~g schemes is to incorporate state-owned enterprises and pash them to market so as to 
increase their efEciency and ratiodiy u t i k e  resaurces. Section 3 of Chapter 2 of the CCL provides for 
the incorporation and the organization of whoily state-owried ccqorations. 
" Artide I of C U .  (emphask added) 
AriicIe 15 of 1993 Chinu's Conrtihction pm-des that the state practices socialist marht economy. 
econorny, fa- the confiicting reality of socialist theory regardhg all people's prosperity 
and the nation's present under-developed productivity, China has gradudy established its 
own theory - sociaiism with Chinese chara~teristics~~ - which 1 will call "pragmatism", to 
resolve the ideologicai coaflicts. Prapatism allows costistence of the conflicting 
ideologies and permits China to b d d  its market economy without rehquishing the belief 
of Marxisrn. It permits Chinese people to bormw western corporate practices and 
experiences without worrying about codïcting ideologies. Such CO-existence and 
resolution of conflicts have been deemed a m e r  development of Marxism taking into 
account Chinese reafiky." 
Pragmatism recognizes that China is currentiy at the primary stage of socialism. 
Socidism is the primary stage of commuoism8' AIthough the objectives of both socidism 
and cornmunism are to buiid a prosperous, democratic and strong society, the primary 
stage of socialism is under-developed. This explains why currently China's economy lags 
behind tlat of developed countries. The task of a country at the primary stage of 
socialisrn is to develop nationai productivity and the economy. Planned economies and 
market economies, in spite of their codicts, both can be adopted so long as they are 
favorable to promoting the growth of the productive forces in a sociaiist society, 
increasing the overaii strength of the sotialist state and improving people's living 
Supra note 66 (1993 China's Coastmition). 
Wi 2. M Jiang, "Upholding the Great Banna of Deng Xiaoping's Theory on Building Soàaiism with 
Chinese Characteristics, Seizing Currait Opportimities and Malrllig Bdd Explorations to Advance Onr 
C a m  to the 21st Century" 1997 (AU* 25 - 3 1) Bajmg 
This was a speech d e M  by Jiang Zemin, gcnaal secrdarg of the Chinese Communkt Party ou May 
29, 1997 at the graduation canoony of an a h c e d  stua course for provincial- and maiiSteriai-Ievei 
cadres at the Centrai Party SchooL 
81 ?nef Introduction to Some of Deng's Speech", 1993 (NOK 22 -28) Beijmg RNiew at 33. 
standards." Either planned economies or market econornies can be socidist if they sewe 
to advance socialism* As for pnvate economy, it is a supplement to socialist public 
economy." Practically, as reform of stateswned enterprises has resuked in the Iaying o f  
of a large number of employees, job-creating private businesses have become a bdwark 
against mass ~nem~ioyment.~~ 
Responding to the ideologicd transformation, Chinese lawmakers meld the 
organkationai structure of western private business and corporate management 
experiences into Chinese corporations in the context of a public economy and a sociaIist 
regime, notwithstanding that western corporate experiences are deeply rooted in private 
property rights. Particularly in the area of corporate intemal control the praaices of CCL 
reflect the merge between the traditional socialistic mode1 of enterprise management and 
-- - - - 
Wîth the reinstatement of Deng Xiaoping as a Chinese Communist leader in 1978, he and his supporters 
initiated reforms and opened China to the outside worfd and tried to integrate the Chinese economy with 
the worid econoniy. 
ttz Z M. Jiang, "HoId High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an AU-mnd Advancement of 
the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 2Ist Century - report deîivered at 
the 15th Nationai Congress of the Comrnunist Party of China on September 12, L997" 1997 (October 6 - 
t 2) Beijing Rwîew at 14. 
S e  aiso "Decision of the Communist Party of China Central Cornmittee on Some Issues Conceming the 
Estabiîshrnent of a Socialist Market Economic Stnrcture" (adopted on November 14, 1993 by the ?nird 
Plenasy Session of the 14th Centrai Cornmittee of the Chinese Commtmist Party) 12 at 13- 
"BridinVoduction to Some of Deng's Speech" Beijing M e w ,  Nov. 22 - 28. 1993 at 33. 
84 Article 1 I of 1993 China's Constitution, This article was added to the amendment to Constitution of 
the People's RcpubIic of Cbina (adopted at the F i  Session of the Seventh National PeopIe's Congress 
and promuigateâ for hpIementation by the Prodamation of the Nationai People's Congress on Apnl 12, 
1988). 
Recogninng the status of private cornpanies is a breakthrough given that following the 1956 socialist 
transformation program, there was no private cornpariles in m;iinland Chma 
8s ï t  shouid be clarih.ed that aithough China adopts private economy, pubtic ownmhip (a concept opposed 
to private economy) is the mainStay of nationai economy. 
".,, it is necessary to +Id the principk of takSng the pubiiciy owned sector as the mïnstayZ wMe 
stnvmg for a sixnuitaneam devdopment of a i l  ecoMmic sectorr, .-." 
See 2, M. Jiang, "Decision of the ComrmmIst Party of China Centrai Committee on Some Lmies 
ConcerrPmg the EstabIishment of a SociaiÏst Matket Economic Stnrctnre" (adoptai on No- LQ, f 993 
modem corporate govemance principles m western countries. 
3.3 The History of China's Corporate Laws: An Overview 
Development of China's Corporate Laws lags behind its counterparts in the 
western world rnainly because C b  lacks a fkee market and the correspondhg economic 
and political circumstances for developing private business corporations. The adoption of 
laws relating to foreign investment corporations at the end of the 1970s. in the 1980s and 
1990s and the est national corporation law in 1993 reflect a changing ùivestment 
environment in China and Chinese law's positive response to its transitional economy. 
The est company law in China was passed in 1904 during China's Qing ~ynasty" 
This company law was drafted using Britain's 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act and 1862 
Companies Act and lapan's 1899 Commercial Law Code as its principal models. in 19 14, 
the governent of the RepubIic of Chha adopted Cornpani-es Regdations based on Qing 
Dynasty's company Iaw. In 1929. the govenunent of the Repubiic of China promdgated a 
new company Iaw that has a great influence in today's company law in the Taiwan arean 
After the establishment of the People's Repubiic of China, the PRC under the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party abolished aiI laws and regdations adopted by 
the Republic of China hcluding the company law. hiring the period of transition to 
by the Tnird Plenary Sesion of the 14th CenuaI Cornmi-ttee of the Chinese Commonist Party) 1993 (NOK 
22 - 28) Beijing Review at 12, 
P. rig, Neiv Editon of Corporate L m  Course (China: Law PubIishing Hoose: 1994) at 15. ( C h h a  
version, transIated by anthor) 
in China. it appeacs chat devdopmait of law aiways Iags behind that of business- For insiance, joint stock 
enterprises appeared fint with Iaws to regdate them appearing later- 
socialisrn (1949 to I956), in order to regdate private companies estabiished under the oId 
Iegai system, Intenm Regtliztfons on M a t e  ~nterpr ises~~ and Implementing Rules on 
Interirn ReguIations on Private ~nterpr ises~ were adopted in 1950 and 195 1 respectiveIy. 
Adoption of the two interim regdations guaranteed at Ieast the possibility of the existence 
of pnvate compaaies in China during this period. Further encroachment upon private 
cornpanies by the state appeared in the 1954 Interiin Regulaiom on Joint Operation of 
Public and Private IndlstriaI ~ n t e ~ r z s e s . ~ ~  By  involving state ownership in private 
companies, the state graduaiIy controlied the operations of private companies. By the year 
1956, al1 pnvate companies were transfomed into state or collective owned entitie~.~' 
In 1979, with the implementation of the central government's "open-door" policy, 
China began attradng foreign capital. in order to assure the sectnity of foreign capital 
and enhance foreign investors' confidence Ui the Chinese market, a senes of laws speciaIIy 
goveming foreign investment vehicles (that is, EEs Laws) were pmmulgated.92 
Advanced technology, management and awareness of the growing market shares of the 
foreign companies spurred Chmese domestic enterprises to reform their management 
- - . - -- 
I. Fan, & D . X  Jiang On Corpurate Law (Nanjing, C m :  Nanjing University Pubfishing House: 1997) 
at 68. ( C h e s e  version). 
" si Yimg ~i ~e tui f ig  Tiao Li 
89 Si Yig Qi Ye Zan XÎng Tiao Li Shi Shi Barr Fa The fnterirn ReguIatiotrs on Private &terprises, 
provided for five forms of companis, Le. unlimited Company (Wu Xian Gong Si); Iùnited Company (You 
Xian Gong Si); Kommanditgeseffscbaft (German Ianguage) (Liang He Gong Si), which da to a 
Company in which some sharehoIdets are snbject to Uniimt-ted Wility which others enjoy ümÏted tiabiïity 
in terms of debs of the compaq. This fom of enterprise is simiIar to Canadian mted partnerships. 
The fonn of company Iimited by shares (ga fen gong si) and KGaA (Kommanditgdschaik auf -en 
(Germany tanguage) (Gu Fen Lian He Gong Si) which combines features of a comparry iixnited by shares 
and a KommanditgeseIlschaR It is iike a joint-stock hited partnership. 
" Gong Si He Yhg Gong Ye Qi Ye Zan Xing Tiao Li 
9' For demil, refer to Supra note 86 at 16; and Supra note 87 (Fan & Jiang) at 89- 
* See supra note 28. 
mode1 in order for survivai. in the meantirne, the government reahed that a heaithy 
cornpetition environment would benefit the country% economic development. State- 
owned enterprises should not be the oniy fom of business organization in the market. 
The year 1988 witnessed the adoption of two business association laws: Law of the 
People's Repuolic of China on Public-owted 1ndirstrrii.f ~nte~prise?~ and Interm 
Reguktions on Privme Enterprises of the People's Republic of  hin na." Duruig the 
course of diversimg ownership, joint stock companies appeared. In 1990, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange was opened. A year Iater, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was 
e~tablished.~~ 
The whole process of drafüng the CCL took Chinese lawmakers ten yean. The 
State Economic Cornmittee and the State System Reforming Comrnittee began the 
drafling work in 1983. Four years Iater, the two Conmittees gave up the idea of drafting 
corporation law given that moa companies at that tirne were state owned enterprises. In 
1986, the two Cornmittees began drafting two Standard 0~inions96 which were finalized in 
- -  -- 
" Zhong Hua Rai Min Gong He Guo Quan Min Suo You Zhi Gong Ye Qi Ye Fa (zdopted at the Fim 
Session o f  the Seventh Nationai People's Congress- and promuigated by Order No. 3 of the Chairman of 
the People's Republic of China on and & i v e  h m  August 1, L988.) 
" Zhong Hua Rm Min Gong He Guo Si Yhg Qi Ye Zan Xing Tiao Li (adopted by the Seventh Regular 
Meetmg of the State ComciI on June 3, 1988. promnlgated by the State CoanciI on June 25. 1988 on and 
effective h m  Iune 1. 1988.) 
95 Howevet, the securities law in Chka was rot developed at tbat lime lt was eight years d e r  openhg of 
the Shanghai stock exchange that the Eirst nationai securities lm was îssued. 
Securities Law of the People 's Repblic of China (adopted at the Sixth Meeting of Standing Committee of 
the National Peopde's Congress on Deamber 29,I998 and e f f i  on Idy 1. 1999). 
% Under China's legai qstem, accor4uig to the Constitution of the People's Repubïic of china, the 
Natioaal PeopIe's Congress (NPC) is the suplmie legiskitive organ in the PRC. It bas the power to enact 
and amend basic laws and laws in association with the orgrankation o f  stare organs. The NPC can a h  
amuid the Constitution through a smai pmcedmt. GeneraiIy speakmg, in addition to the NPC, NPC 
Standing Cornmi-ttee, fhe State CounQl the people's congresss at provinaal IeveI and the people's 
congrma of nationai autonomous regions al1 have anain aothority to make repiations The NPC 
Standing Cornmittee may enact and amend ail ïaws except those which my ody k enacteci by the WC, 
pmvided that the mppIanents and amendrnents do not contravene the basic princip1es of the origmal 
1992: Standixrd Opinions on Limited LiubiMy CO+ and Stmhd Opinions on 
Joint Stock Company with Lhited LiabiIzty (Standard ~ ~ i n i o n s ) . ~ ~  On the basis of local 
experience in formdating corporate regulations, the Standard Opinions nationaiized 
corporate provisions in chinag9 Wth the benefit of some experience with joint stock 
corporations in China and with Chinese stock markets, Iawrnakers assimilated certain 
western corporate management practices and officiaiIy introduced a number of 
fundamental concepts of a corporation (üke share, shareholder, listed corporation and so 
on) into China. The two Standard Opinions became the forenimer of the CCL. Based 
laws. The State Council may enact administrative regdations in accordance with the Constitution and the 
Iaws. The people's congresses at provinciai leveI (induding those of municipalities directly under the 
centrai govement) and their standing cornmittees rnay emct local reguiations provideci they don't 
contravene the Constitution, the laws and administrative teguiations. The people's congresses of national 
autonomous areas may emct autonomy reguiations and qxdic teguiations. 
Standard Opinions w a e  promulgated by the State Economic Commission and the State System Refonn 
Commission under the State Council. The State Economic Commission and the State System Refonn 
Commission, according to Article 90 of 1993 Comtitutiion of the People's Repu6lic of China, have the 
authonty to issue orders. directives and regulatioxts within the jwisdiction of their respective departrnents 
in accordance with the Iaw and the administrative rules and regulations, decisions and orders issued by 
the State Council. The Standard Opinions are. in nature, directivs made by adminimative organs 
97 You Xian Ze Ren Gong Si Gui Fan Yi Jian 
Gu Fen You Xian Gong Si Gui Fan Yi Jian 
99 Like econornic reform in China which originated locaüy and experimentalIy, the framework of 
Standard Opinions couid be traced to ïnferim Provisions of Shenzhen ~Municipality on Corporations 
Limited &y Shores. 
tnterim Provisions of Shenrhen Municipahy on Corporarions Limired 6y Shares (Shenzhen Shi Gu Fen 
You Xian Gong Si Zan Xin Gui Ding) issued by Shexuhen Municipal Governent on Mhrch 17, 1992. 
Later it was replaced by Reguiiutions on Corporation Lirniied by Shores of the Shemhen Sgecia& Economic 
Zone (Apd 26, 1993). Guangdong Province pmdgated ReguIatiom on Corporatiom Limired by 
Shares whkh was &&ive on Augost 1, 1993. Shanghai issu& lnterim Pmisions on Corporations 
W t e d  6y Shwes of Shanghai ~Mmicipaiiiiy on May 18, 1992. 
It shouid be noted that on May 15, 1992, the Economic System. Restnrctrrriag Commission, the State 
PIanning Commission, the Ministry F m =  the Peopk's Repubïic of China and the State CorniQI 
Production Office imLed Shore System l3perÏmentaL Procedures of the People's Republic o / ç h n a  
in order to ciear out doubts on the statns of Standards Opinions (some people did not think they had the 
stam of a "Iawu or "regdation") the State Camd h e d  a notice (State C o d  Offiœ Notice 
Concerning ImpIememation of the Standard OpInions 15, 1993) (Guo Ban Fa, No. 27, 1993)) to 
ci- h t  the Standard Opinions had the Hect ofministry-Ievei hw and regdation. 
upon the experience of these shareholding companies, CCL was h d y  issued in 1993 .lm 
Given China's transitional economy, China's Corporate Laws are stiH in the stage 
of transitionai development. The CO-existence of FiEs Laws and the CCL is an example. 
CCL now applies to foreign hvestment enterprises just as FIES Laws do. But where FIES 
Laws and CCL have connicting provisions, provisions under the FIES Laws prevail. 'OL 
Summary 
It is obsewed that the Canadian economy is developing toward a digital 
economyLo2 and integrating with the economy of the US and ultimately, potentially, with 
South Arnerica. In the meanthe, China is divenifying enterprise ownership structures 
fiom pure state ownership to non-state and pnvate ownership. Such different 
development trends cm be Iinked to the different poIÎticaI regimes and economic 
development models of the two countries. Economic development in Canada requires a 
well-designed business vehicle that permÏts efficiency through a combination of 
predictabiiity and Bemi%ty, with adequate Uivestor protection. The CBCA, in response to 
this reguirement, faditates efficient management of business and requires management 
accountabüity to investing property owners, and Ï t  has been significantiy uifiuenced by 
Amerkm corporate Iaw. Maintaining a sociaüst regime in Chùia, especiaily under the 
Irn For a more detailed description, see Supm note 62 at 464, and G. L. Zhan& & M. Zhou, &., 
Expainhg on Corporate Law (Chma: PubLÏshing House of People's Court, 1993) (Chinese -on). 
The pmcesr of drafting -s Corporation Law refïects îhat in the a m  of corporaie law. the Chmese 
approach is to fomdate Iaw aaording to what is ha-g or aiaïs in pactict 
'O' Article 18 af CCL. 
lm Supm note 32. 
pressure of the collapse of the SU and socialist eastem European countries, requires the 
abolition of long-stmding doctrines mandatmg pure state ownership and the creation of 
incentives through property ownership. China's Corporate Laws, in response to these 
requirements, establish an organization structure of business corporations that draws upon 
corporate experiences fiom the western world By so doing, it is hoped that western-style 
business corporation structures and western corporate experiences can increase the 
eniciency of Chinese corporations and help attract foreign capital to meet the needs of 
Chinese economic development. 
CHAPTER 4 CORPORATE CONTROL: FROM AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE 
4.1 Shanholden - Control through Ownenhip 
The br id  historicd outiine in Chapters 2 and 3 of Canadian and Chinese economic 
deveIopment and their relationship to the deveiopment of business corporations in both 
countries suggeas that principally, the corporate fom was devised and developed to 
satisfy the need for raising equity capital to facilkate the operation of business. 'O3 1t is safie 
to Say that fkom the outset, corporations have been comected with capital. tnvestors are 
capitalists. The rights and obligations of investon in connection with the corporations in 
which they invest are property rights and obligations. 
By transfemng property to the corporation and subscniing for shares, investors 
become the owners of shares of the corporation. Shares represent the status, interest and 
right that the investors have in the corporation and the 
bear for the corporation. '" WhiIe hoIding the shares 
liability that the investors have to 
OP the corporation, investors are 
'O3 See aiso I. B. B a s h  & P. L Miranti, A History of Corporute finance (Cambridge & New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
in this book, Baskin and Miranti recognized how the eariy prefetence for debt financing graduai1 yielded 
to equity financing. It shouId be noted, however, that B a s .  and Miranti linked the rise of equity more to 
the development of markets for trading equity than to the evohtion of the corporate f o r n  
"A shan is the interest of a shaRholder in the company m e d  by a sum of money, for the purpose 
of tiabiliîy in the fkst pIaœ and of interest in the second,.," 
See FarweU 3. in Borland's T-ee v. Steel, [ 190 11 1 Ch279 at 288. 
Cited by L.CB, Gowet, see supr4 note 34 at 398, 
With regard to the iiabiIity of sharehoIders, it is noted that in the early 2 0 ~  cenatry, isued s W  capital 
couid consist partiy of paid up capitai (repre~eating the total of the payments made in respect of the issued 
sitami) and partSt of uncaIIed capitaI (repfeseating the balan- if any, between the amount aiready paid 
ami the totaï nominaï or par vaiue of the issued shares), See mpra note 34 at 2 17 -218. 
Under todag's CBCA, a shm map not be issaed ontil the consideration for the share is ÇuIIy paid in 
money or in property or pst seMces. See CBCA s25 (3), (4) and (5). The prmapal reasoa tmderiying 
fiilly @d shares prwided by the Dickerson Report is protection of sharehoIders since sWoIders  
ownÏng partIy-paid sbates cm become Iiable to make finthet papments when "calIedl or suffer fod'eitme 
of tfieir stiares, "gr Issiring p a ~ x f y - ~ a  sh res, a corporation couid thediore m i d  Secltfities commission 
shareholders of the corporation. Accordhg to the shares they possess, the corporate Iaw 
of the relevant jurisdiction, and agreements they enter mto, shareholders exercise their 
rights (or may not exercise their nghts) and shoulder limited business risks. 
Since shares are so dosely comected with shareholders' status in a corporation, 
before discussing shareholders' controlling/iiuencing power in Canadian and Chinese 
corporate decision-making, it seems necessary to examine share structures under the 
CBCA, CCL and in China's business reaiity.lOs The following comparative examination of 
share structures in Canada and China reveais that China on the one hand adopts corporate 
share structures sidar to those found in capitalist coutries yet, on the other hand, 
remains committed to a socialist regime by ensuring govemment monitoring of the amount 
of private capital on the Chinese equity market. 
4.1.1 Share Structures: Registered Shares and Bearer S hares 
scruùny on what, in redity, is a fresh solicitation of money from the public. The shareholder is put into 
the position where he cm be forced to put up more money aImost at the whim of the issuing corporation 
or M e r  the los  of al1 or part of what he had aiready invested" See supra note 42 (Dickerson Report) 
para. 1 O4 at 104. 
Io' The concept of "share" was not innodu& into FIEs Laws. The word conaponding to "s&" under 
FIEs Laws is "eqirity". in this context, the organization of sharehoIders' meetings is therefore not 
provided for in the FIE% Lam. 
For foreign investment enterprises in China, n o d y  imrestors share profits and losses according to 
imrestors' mpective capital conmiutions to the registered capitai of foreign imestment enterprises. 
"Registered capital" refm to the amount of the paid up c a p M  contributions of ail imrestors as registered 
with the company registtation authorïty- See Article 4 of the EIV Law. 
But the rule of "share profits and losses according to capitai contri'bution" as adopted in sino-foreign 
equity joint ventures may be contracteci ont ofby imrestors through constitutionai documents in the case of 
sino-foreigri co-operative jomt ventmes. See Artide 2 of the C W  Law. 
A confiising phenornenon tmder C U  is that the Iaw does not inciude the concept of "sharen in the case of 
fimiteci ïiability companies (Le- cioseiy-heId corporations in the western mlld), but CCL directIy mpIoys 
the concepts "sharehoIder" and *shareholders' meeting" In the &on refating to &ted üabiIity 
companies, 
Thedore, when I discuss the &are structure in Chùtese corporations within this section, 1 refér oniy to 
the shate structures iu Chinese pubiÏciy heid corporations, 
Shares of a corporation under the CBCA must be m registered form '06 Shares of 
a corporation under CCL may be  in registered or in bearer f ~ r m ' ~ '  Further, CCL 
provides that shares issued by a corporation to promoters, aate authorized investment 
institutions or legai persons'08 should be in registered form; while shares issued to the 
public may be either registered shares or bearer ~hares."'~ 
There are differences between registered shares and bwer  shares in terms of 
shareholders' power to vote and transfer shares. As to votuig, a shareholder with 
registered voting shares has a right to vote at shareholders' meetings without any fiirther 
cornpliance with other legai procedures (except when voting by proxy). It is otherwise, 
however, in the case of holders of shares in bearer form. Ln order to quai@ as a voting 
shareholder, a hoIder of bearer shares, according to CCL, has to deposit hifier shares 
with the corporation for the period cornrnencing five days prior to the shareholders' 
meeting until the end of that meeting. "O 
In reality, many hoIders of bearer shares in China (most of whom are individual 
investors) do not deposit theû shares with the corporation in order to exercise their voting 
CBCA s.24 (1). 
'O7 Article 133 of C U .  
'" According to Asticle 36 of 1986 General PrincïpIes of C M  Law of the People's ReNl tc  of China 
(China's C i d  Law), a legai petsan is "an organization that has capacity for ci* rights and capcity for 
CM1 conducf and independentîy enjoys CM rights and assumes civil obiigations in accordance with the 
law. '' 
Artide 37 of Cbina's CM1 Law hther provides conditions for qmQing a Iegai person: (1) 
estabtishment in accordance with the law, (2) possession of the necessary pmperty or fiinkt (3) possession 
of its own name, orgaukation and premiseq and (4) ability to independently bear civil [iability- 
Chapter 3 of China's C M  Law categorizes Iegai persons into bm cIasses-. are enterprise ie@ persans 
(Le. legai persons with the purpose of making profit); second, are o f f i d  organs, institntions and sociaI 
organizations (Le, legai persons that do not have as  th& objective the making oPa profit). 
The tenir "1ega.i person" m China's Corporate taws rdiers to enterprise IegaI perrons, 
109 Supra note 107. 
rights mahiy because of a lack of interest in voting- Therefore, they Ieave the decision- 
making power to the registered shareholders. If the registered shareholders are aiso 
uninterested in corporate matters (as they may be in the case of large widely-held pubfic 
corporations), the corporate decision power wilI be left with the management through the 
proxy rnechani*~~."' As a result, the structure of bearer shares in modem corporations 
wiII more easily lead to the phenomenon of a split between ownership and control. The 
examination of individual shareholders' status in Chinese corporations in 4.1.4 B(5) is a 
typical example of such split and its relationship with the bearer shares structure. 
As to share transfer, the mobility finction of bearer shares is superior to that of 
registered shares. However, bearer shares are less secure than registered shares. In terms 
of mobility, once a holder of bearer shares delivers hidher share certificate to a transferee 
(either directly or through a broker), the share transfer becomes effective. Tramfier of 
registered shares under the CCL requires endorsement and registration of the tramfier*.'" 
Under the CBCA, registration of the transfer of registered shares is aiso required."' 
Because of the mobïie nature of bearer shares, bearer shares are Iess secure than registered 
shares. Physicd possession of share certincates does not matter to registered shareholders 
but does matter to holders of bearer shares. In China, if a holder of bearec shares Ioses 
'IL In China, the management of a corporation usuaiiy has the contact decaiIs of the registered 
sharehoIders but not of the bearer sharehoiciers- Therefore, management is abIe to soticit xuanagement 
proxies h m  the registered sbarrhoiders. With respect to holders of bearer shares* public announcemcnt 
(through newspapp)  may be emptoyed for the soLicitatÏon. 
Il4 CBCA s-76 (1). Howwefr CBCA s.48 (3) does IIso prwide that, except where its trander is rrstricted 
and noted on a -ty m accordance with devant statutory pcovisions (e.g CBCA n49(8)), a semnïty 
(induding a share ceriificate) is a negotiabte Mstrmnent Pan W of the CBCA firtther provides 
provisions on constraiaed &are corporations 
M e r  share cemficate, m order to prevent any property loss, a Iegd remedy provided by 
ChÏnese civil procedure law mua be sought for a declaration declaring that the share 
certincate is nuU and void."' 
The long-term peaceful social environment and the absence of business practices 
and statutory traditions favonng bearer shares might account for the lack ofa  bearer share 
structure under the CBCA Uniike Canada, China has suEered Eom foreign invasion and 
domestic wars during the 19* and 2 0 ~  ~entuies."~ Bearer shares were &st provided for 
in China in the early 2 0 ~  century. The turbulent social Ncumstances at that time help 
explain the preference for a bearer shares structure which offered holders mobility and 
anonpity. The existence of bearer shares in China also indicates that the Chinese 
governent either does not realize that tax evasion may arise when bearer securities are 
permitted or is not concemed about any such potentiai tax evasion. A corporation does 
not have a Iist of hoiders of bearer shares. Holders of bearer shares in China engage in 
share transactions through brokers. UnIess China's tax authorities want to trace the share 
transactions including receipts of dividends of holders of bearer shares through depository 
l f 5  Sec Chapter 18 of Civil Procedure Law of the People's Repblic of China (adopted on the Fourth 
Meeting of the Seventh Nationai People's Congress on ApriI 9, 199 1 and promuigated by Order No. 16 of 
the President of the People's Republic of China on ApnI 9, 199 1 and effective as of April9, L99 1). 
An Engiish translation of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Repubiic of China is availabte oniïne: 
University of Maryland - ChinaLaw Website <http://wwwqis.net/chinalawfiawtran1.ht (date accessed: 
June 30, 1999). 
L'6 For instance, The Opium War (1839 - E842); Taiping Rebellion (1851 - 1864); The Hmdred Dags' 
M o r m  (June I f ,  1898 - September 21,1898); Repubiican RevoIution of 19 1 1: Anti-Iapanese War (1937 
- L 945); Civil War between Nationaiism and CornmimiSm (1920s - L940s). 
For a detaiied iiiustration of Chinese history, See Sondra Hamilton, "Wmdows an Chinese History" 
OnIhe: <httpYf~~~.q~111netl-jhamlchina/pageslCtiiaese-~ory~sites.h~ (date acasak Imie 
14, 1999) (iast modified: March 1999). 
For thausands of years, China was niled by dynasty after @mty. In addition to those intenial stniggîes 
and nots accomparrylng the change of dynastyp foreign invaders hclwhg Russia, Iapau and Bntain 
controiled sÏ@cant parts of the countty, China haüy m e  a repu6lic country Î n  1912 But after 
that, Chuia was Unroived in WorId War II, engaged in territorial disputes with its neighboring countries~ 
and undement civil war. 
institutions or d e s s  holders of bearer shares voluntariIy report their share transactions to 
the tax authorities, tax is more easily evaded through the structure of bearer shares than 
through the structure of registered shares. The absence of bearer shares under Canadian 
law may tmis refiect, in part, the Canadian govemment's recognition of, and concern over. 
tax evasion problems in connection with the structure of bearer shares. 
With regard to the special requirernent for Chinese promoters, state-authorized 
uivestment institutions and Iegai persons to hoId registered shares, this may be seen as a 
reflection of China's socialist ideology: intereas of the state or the collective are 
considered more important than the intereas of individuals. Therefore, it is thought that 
shares held by the state, institutions or Iegal persons should be more secure than shares 
held by individuals under Chinese law. 
4.1.2 Share Structures in Reality: A Unique Classification of Shares in China 
The classification of registered shares and bearer shares is provided by the CCL. 
in addition to this simple share classincation., another more complex classincation of 
shares has been adopted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Sheiuhen Stock 
~xchan~e,"' and the business communities in China This latter classification appears to 
have more signiscance in determining Chuiese people's rÏght to purchase shares and seems 
to have more "Chinese characteristics". 
Chinese share ~Iassification connects shate structure with the nationaihies of the 
hvestors and the jurisdiaion in which a corporation is Iisted, if its shares are Iisted on a 
"? The hanghai Stack Exchange and Shemhen Stock Exchange are the ody nationai stock exchanges in 
China 
foreign exchange. Shares are categorized into A Shares, B Shares, Red Chip Shares, L 
S hares and N Shares. 
A Shares refer to shares traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 
and represent ordinaty share ownership in a Chinese corporation They are available 
excIusively to investors with Chinese citizenship, aIthough not to residents of Hong Kong. 
B Shares have exactly the same beneficid ownership rights as do A Shares, but cm be 
purchased (and held) ody by investors with foreign citizenship. B Shares are quoted in 
U.S. dollar amounts on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Red Chip 
Shares are tisted on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. These shares are issued by 
corporations that are controiied by the Chinese govemment but that usually have been 
incorporated in Hong Kong, rather than in mainland China. L Shares are shares of 
corporations incorporated in mainiand China that have chosen to be listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. N Shares are shares of corporations incorporated in mainland China that 
bave chosen to lia on the New York Stock ~xchange."~ B Shares, Red Chip Shares, L 
Shares and N Shares are not tradable with A Share~.''~ 
The relationship between share structure, investor's nationaiity and the juns~ction 
in which a corporation is Iisted (if its shares are liaed on a foreign exchange), appears to 
reflect the fact China is subject to foreign exchange control. Foreign currency is not 
negotiabIe in China China's currency - Renmingbi - and foreign currency are not fieeIy 
convertible in China Moreover, the isolation between A Shares and the other categories 
For a brief desCnption in En@4 see B.M. Vandegrift, W a b g  Deah in China" 
(N~vembef/Decemk L998) Onliner ABA Section of Boenes Law - Business Law Taday 
< httpdhww.abanetorghusiaw/ 8-2chinshünb (&te accessed: Iune L5, 1999). 
'19 B siiares, L Sbarrs and N Shares are designed to attract fore@ capital to imiest in Chinest 
corporations. wide Red C6ip Shares play the role ofattracting capitat h m  Hong Kong 
of shares derives fiom the government 's reluctance to d o w  foreign capital to control the 
Chinese equity market. 
The capitai of those corporations listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges (Le. corporations with A Shares structure), is fùrther categorized into State 
Shares (shares held by the state), Legal Person Shares (shares held by a Iegd person'20 
established in China), Employee Shares (shares held by employees of the corporation)'*' 
and Socid hiblic Shares (or Individual Shares, i.e. shares held by individuai investors 
other than the employees of the corporation).'" 
The classification of shares in China in accordance with hvestors' nationality 
(Chinese citizen or foreign citizen) directiy refleas the govemment's cautious attitude 
toward the privatization process and its concems over foreign capital in the Chinese 
market. The m e r  classification of A Shares depending upon whether the holders are the 
state, legai entities, or individuais incikates the governmentrs anxiety about the relative 
proportion of capital controlled by the public and private sectors in the market. One of 
the features of socialism is that public capital (as opposed to private capital) should always 
be in the rnajority position.'" Employing this cornplex classification method enables 
l m  Supra note 108. 
"' Employee S h e s  are issued through intanal offerings and sold at a discount or may take the fom of 
bonus shares without any charge to the employees, They are not tradabie in the secondary market. 
'= UNally state shares and le@ person shares constitute the majority of the A Shares Lnarket 
See Fang Liafang, "China's Corporatization Experimentn (1995) 5 Dnke h Comp & MI L. 149 ai 200 - 
212. 
'" See paragraph L (2) of "Decision ofthe Communist Ekty of C h  Central CommXttee on Some Issues 
Concernnlg the Establichment of A Socjalist Wet Economic Structurew (adopted on November IJ, 
1993 by the T M  Plenary Session ofthe L4ih Centrai Commhe of the C6uiese CommWtiSt Party)- For 
the En@ version, see (1993) 3 6  Beijing Review, No-47- 12 at 12 - L3, 
Ttie sociaiÏst market economic structure is ünked wit6 the basic system ofsociallsm, The estabkhmmt 
of thh stntctme aimsr at enab& the market to play the fimdamentai mie in resonrce allocation urufer 
maclpeconomic control by rhe state To tum this goal hto neaIity, it is necessary to uphoId the princrple 
Chinese authonties to maintain a very cIear view of the stahis of public ownership m 
China's equity markets. 
Thus though CCL's provisions regarding share structures more or less adopt 
western corporate expenences, the classification of share structures in China's business 
realny moves away Eom capitalist countries' corporate practices. 
4.1.3 Corporate Ownership Structures in Canada and China 
By subsmiing for shares, investors become the owners of shares of the 
corporation. The power of the shareholders to exert influence upon or control the 
corporation &ses From shareholders ownership of shares. In order to understand 
thoroughiy the shareholder's role in the corporation, and especialIy shareholders' statutory 
rights provided by the CBCA and CCL, one has to examine current corporate ownership 
structures in Canada and China. The following examination of corporate ownership 
structures in Canada and China indicates both cornmon features and differences. Both 
Canadian and Chinese corporate markets are dominated by closely-held corporations. 
Both corporate markets have high ownership concentration. Moreover, Canada has high 
overlapping ownership of corporations and that, ui turn, restdts in high overlapping 
directonhips. In terms of employee ownership, though it is far fiom developed, China 
seems to prefer to diversifl state ownership through empIoyee shares. 
A Common Features: Domuiance of Closely-heId Corporations and High Ownership 
- - -- 
of t a h g  the pubIic@ ownedsector as the maïmîay, whilt striving for a simdtaneous deveiopment of aü 
economic sectors, - --" (emphasis added). 
Concentration in Canadian and Chinese Corporate Market 
In the Canadian corporate market, the closely held corporation is the It is 
the same in the Chinese market.Iz5 Though publicly heId corporations may have certain 
economic significance in both Canadian and Chinese nationai economies, the quantity of 
closely held corporations no doubt outweighs that of publicly heid corporations. 
It is also evident that one observes Ui both Canada and China the phenornenon of 
high corporate ownership concentration in public corporations. But the p henomenon 
arises Eom different causes in the two countries. 
High ownership concentration is a distinctive feanire of Canadian corporations. lZ6 
An examination of766 Canadian corporations conducted by Rao and Lee-Sing in 1996'~ 
demonstrated that 55.5 per cent of Canadian corporations are legally controlled (Le. one 
shareholder or a smaii group of shareholders owns, direaly or indirectiy, more than 50 per 
cent of the voting shares of a corporation); 21.4 per cent are effectively controiIed (i.e. 
R Daniek & I. Macintosh, "Toward A Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law kgimen (1991) 29 
Osgoode Hall L, 1.863 at 884. 
According to the statistics of Shanghai Administration of hdusuy and Commerce, as of Decemkr 3 1. 
1998, China had 1,189,684 closely-held corporations (Le. Iimited liability companies) and 235,073 
pubIic1y-held corporations (Le- joint stock companies). 
Data coliected by Mr, Zhao, Linyn ttom Shanghai Administration of Industry and Commerce in May 
1999. 
'" Supra note 124 at 8&1. 
Ody 14% of the corporations included in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index were wideiy heId in 
1990. Of the femainderV 60.3% were owned by a hgIe shareholder with kgal control (greater than 50% 
of voting shares), 25.4% by one sharehofder with &ectnre controI(20 to 49-9% of voting sbares) or by 
two or three shareholders haviog the ability to combine and estabhh Iegai or H i e  controL 
A typid example in New Brunswick k the e m p k  of K, C, lMng which bas around 300 companies and 
generates about 25% of New B d c k ' s  gras domestic product, 
Ma to R K Morck, "On the Economics of Concentrateci OwaefSfiipn (1996) 26 Can, Bus. L. J- 63 at 72, 
I n  P.S. Rao & C. R Lee-SÏng, Governance Shwcture. Corporate Decision-making and Fim Perfonnmce 
in North America (Tndusûy Canada, Workmg Paper Numbet 7,1996) at 6. 
one shareholder or a smalI group of sharehoIden owns, directly or hdirectiy, 20 per cent 
to 49.9 per cent of the vothg shares); and only 23.1 per cent are widely controlled (Le. no 
sharehoIder or group ofrelated shareholders owns, directiy or ind*i.edy, more than 20 per 
cent of the voting shares). 
The existence of many individual or family controiied corporations in Canada has 
been noted by many commentators. Some scholars have argued that endowment effects 
rnight aggravate this phenomenon.'28 The endowment effea rnay make a single 
controlling shareholder or related controlling shareholders more reluctant to part with 
control, which in tum, increases the premium required to effect a transfer.'" Thus, the 
endowment effea may make the single controlling shareholder or related controiling 
shareholders decide to retain control of a corporation even though it appears economically 
irrationai to do so."' 
Canadian publicly held corporations aiso exhibit a high degree of ownenhip 
concentration."' A number of facts may account for the high ownership concentration 
IZB RJ. Daniels & P. Halpern, Too Close for Cornfort: The Role of the CloseIy Held RibIic Corpontion 
in the Canadian Economy and Thc Implications fior Public Policy" ( I996) 26 Cm. Bus. L. I. L I at 20. 
The endowment &ect Rfers to the phenomenon whereby an owner of pmperty is relunant to seli for the 
price at which she or he was prepared to buy. 
130 Sid Wh& diverting corporate resources and corporate wealth enhancement are both actMties that 
codd increase the wealth of conmihg shareholders. they may ratiouaily d i a ï r i  bru  doing either since 
the expendeci effort may outweigh the reaüzed benefits. 
"' See C.W. Rota "Concentration of ûwnuship and the Composition of the Board: An Examùiation of 
Canadian Rrbticly-Iisted Corporations" (1996) 26 Cari, Bns. L J. 226 at 228 and 240, 
[n Roth's sttxdy of 568 sarnple corporations, he found- 50% of the corporations arr tmder the ownership of 
one or a snall gmup of sharehoIders, who hola directly or i n M y ,  50% or more of the voàng sharrs; 
26.7% are contmiieü by one or a small group ofshareholden owning direEtly or nidiredy, 20% - 499% 
of the voting -, and oniy 22.2% are wibeiy-held 
Of the 568 corporations in the sample, 503 were fisted on the Tomnto Stock Exchange. 29 wae listed on 
the Montreai Stock Exchange, 14 were Iisted on the Alkrta Stock Exchange, and the remabhg BrIuded 
10 over-thec~llnter stock, 9 listed on the Vancouver Stock Exchange and 2 Med on the Amencan Stock 
Exchange. 
observed in Canadian corporations. The emergence of Uistitrrtiond shareholders as 
controlling shareholders in publicly-held corporations is one explanation. Rao and Lee- 
Singts research shows that institutional owners control about 38 per cent of the dollar 
value of shares in Thus the dramatic increase of total equity holdings by banks, 
life insurance companies, t w e e d  pension plaw, trust and mortgage Ioan corporations and 
investmem h d s  over the past two decades in  anad da,'^ has resulted in such institutional 
investors becorning controllmg shareholden in large public corporations.13* Second, as 
mentioned in chapter 2 above, the Canadian economy is resource based. A low value 
added resource-based economy may require a high degree of consistent corporate policy 
and management to retain the wlnerable value of the corporations."' The concentration 
In  Supra note 127 at 9. 
ln I. G. Madntosk "Institutional Shareholders and Corpomte Gowrnance in Canada" (1996) 26 Cari. 
Bus. L. J. 145 at 147. 
"Total equity hotdùig of banks, lifk insurancc companies, tnisteed pension plans, tnist and mortgage Ioan 
corporations, and investment fun& grew (in constant 1986 dollars) h m  W-7 billion in 1969 to about f 85 
billion in 1990. Then: has been signrficant growth in equity hoIdings in soma sectors even since 1990. 
For example. between 1990 and 1993 the constant dolIar value of equity holdings of investment h d s  
more than doubledi More generally, the constant dollar d u e  of institutionaI equity holdings has 
dramatically in-d over the past two decades.. . 
Life insurance companies heId oniy 2.58% of their portfoiios in equities in 1963. Aithough there have 
been ups and doms beîween 1963 and 1992, the proportion of the portfolio devoted to equities hit a high 
of 19.7% in the bull market of 1992 ... The proportion of the aggregate portfolio of vusteed pension pians 
held in Canadian equities increased fiom 17.9% in 1969 to 23.14% in 1990, ,.For trust and mortgage and 
loan corporations. equity hoIdings as a percentage of the totai portfolio i n d  h m  2% in 1969 to just 
over 2.5% in 19%. . . In 1969, 1.59% of the aggregate bank portfoIio was heïd in eqtiities, and in 1994, 
1.32%. However. banic equity holdings went as high as 5,18% in 1980. Since 1982 there has been veq 
lit& change. " 
134 In Cana& the aseu of pension and munial huids have increased more ihan 35 times in vahe since 
the mid-70~- Pension h d s  the $49-bibn Caisse de Depot, the $53-bi&on Ontario Teachers' 
Pension Plan Board, and the $30-billion Ontario Municipal Employes' Retirement Fuad), and mutuai 
hds are the biggest eqoity holders. 
See TSE News Release, "'How and Wny Corporate Governana is Changing WorIdwideT - Toronto Stock 
Exchange Resident RowCand Remiag remarks to the International Cotporate Governane Conference in 
San Francisco - Iuly 9,1998" TSE Online: 
~http:l/tse.com/~gi-bia/uni~~cgi?~0nte~~n~-reI/news~O36~h~ (date accesseb: Apnf 
23,1999)- 
"' Udike other corporations, for instance, smalI corporations ptoyiding services, may change corporate 
poticy vexy often in order to keep paœ with constantly changhtg madcets or to kmk for high d u e  addexi 
of ownership within a corporation is more iikeIy to ensure a reIativeIy consistent corporate 
policy and management. Third, Canada may have a reIativeIy Iow-cost debt system- 136 ~f 
so, Canadian controiling shareholders wodd be able to access capital &out the sale of 
equity. 13' Fourth, the structure of non-voting shares or restncted voting shares allowable 
under the CBCA"~ and existing shareholders' pre-emptive rights to purchase equityl" aiso 
may contribute to the high ownership concentration in Canada F i a  in a country with 
vast geographicd space and lunited populatios a politicai need for establishing an 
integrated national economy rnay invite a high ownership concentration in the 
corporation. " 
In the case ofchina, accordhg to the statistics of the Shanghai Administration of 
Industry and Commerce, as of December 3 1, 1998, China has 1,189,684 closely-held 
corporations and 235,073 publicly-held corporations. in Shanghai, as of December 3 1, 
1998, there are l2,8 19 closely-held corporations and 1,663 publicly-held corporations. 14' 
products andior senrices. Corporations in the resource sector usually are large enterprises. Consistent 
corporate policy and management in these corporations engaging in low value added pmducts andior 
seMces is more common than in maIl corporations. 
'" Supra note L28. 
Professor Christopher C. Nicholls of Dalhousie Law S b 1  has suggesta tIUs is a c0ntr0v~a.l point 
and, ultimateiy, one h t  can onty be res01ved tbrough empincai researcb, The basic idea is that the 
concentrated Canadian banking system facilitates monitoring of business. and therefo~. by ceducing 
defauit nsk, Iowers the o v M  cost of debt fllli~nce- if this concIusion is correct we wodd observe 
diaetences between the capital structures of Canadian and US corporations. Specificaliy, Canadian 
corporations wodd have more debt on their balance sheets than otherwise comparable US corporations. 
13' CBCA s.24. 
13' CBCA s28(I). Aithough pre-emptive rïghts a~ not obligation, they may k adopted by CBCA 
corporations, 
'" Supra note 128 at 33. 
'*' Data collecteci by Mr. Zhao. Liayn from Shanghai Admiaisna . - tion of Industry and Commerce in May 
1999. 
High ownership concentration k s t s  in both closeIy-held corporations and publicly held 
corporations. '" 
Unlike Canadian corporations, Chinese corporations have a high statdpublic 
ownership c~ncentration.'~~ Though there are few family controIIed corporations in 
China, there are many wholly state-owned enterprises. One of the purposes of adopting 
CCL was to "corporatize" state-owned enterprisedu and sel1 part of the shares of such 
state-owned corporations to their employees a d o r  the public with a view to increasing 
the eficiency of most Ioss-making state-owned enterprises.'4' Wtth statdpublic 
ownership playing a predorninant role in the Chinese economy,'" it is not surprising to 
find high statefpublic ownership concentration. 
Further, unlike in Canada, institutional shareholders in China pIay vimially no role 
in controlling corporations since investment banks, We insurance companies, pension 
ninds and mutual h d s  are d institutions that are stil1 new to the Chinese people. 
Moreover, some of these institutions operate in China in a way that is totally different 
fiom theu counterparts in the western wor~d.'~' 
'" More detailed information on ownership concentration is not available. 
143 StatdpubIic ownership, as opposed to private ownership, cefiers to state ownership and coIIective 
ownership. 
t a  That k, tuniing stateilwned enterprks into sharehoiding companies so as to diverSifL the ownership 
structure of the enterprises, 
145 See paragraph 2 (6) of "Decision of the Communist Party of China Centrai Cornmittee on Some Issues 
Concerning the Estabhhment of A SociaIist Market Economic Stnicture" (adopted on November 14, 
1993 by the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Centrai Cornmittee of the Chinese Commnnist Party). For 
Engiish version, see (1993) 36 Beijing Review. No.47, L2 at 15. 
'" See the chart - Structurai hdiciftm on Nationai Ecommic and SoQaI D~rcIopment - as shown in 
4.1-4 B (5)- 
14? As to instinitioml imrest~rs~ professor Fang Lmfang descriaed insatutionai imrestors as trade & o ~  
the Commnnist Youth Leaguq or the Women's Federation with b d s  taised h m  its members, a 
conception totaIIy dfnerent h m  Canadian commercial institutionai imrestors. AccordÏng to professor 
Consider the example of pensions. The Chinese governent is now trying to 
establish a multi-pillar pension system which, according to the State Council's 1995 The 
Directive on Further Reform of the E n t e m e  Pension System, involves fiinds contniuted 
by the state, employers, and i~tdividuals'~~ to resolve the problem of offering pension 
benefits to Chinese employees left by years of a planned economy in C h  The pension 
is managed by the socid insurance departments of provincial govemments and s u p e ~ s e d  
by the Ministry of Labor and its delegated bureaus. The pension fiind is now only investing 
in government bonds (rather than equities) in the Chinese capital markets. Accordingiy, 
the composition and operation of pensions in China are totdy dEerem nom those of 
Canadian pension fûnds which are more in the nature of private hnds and private 
investments. 
In addition to the Eicts of histoncal economic development as descriied in Chapter 
3 above and the business reality in China as disdosed in 4.1.4 B (5) above, this country's 
socidist ideology also contributes to the phenomenon of high statdpublic ownership 
concentration because according to sociaiist theory, public economy (rather than pnvate 
economy) should be in the dominant position in a soQalist country. Moreover, 
cornpetition with large companies fiom other countries in the giobal market is dso a factor 
that contniutes to a high state/public ownership concentration in China The idea that 
Fang, mider the name of the institutions (Le trade tmions, the Commist  Youth League, or the Womeds 
Federation) corporations that are not qnalined to make pnbIic ~Eerings on, indirectfyr issue theu shares 
to individuais other than their employees. 
See supra note 122 at 207- 
198 Fuads h m  employers and empIoym toge* conaïtute about 10-20 per cent of an anployee's totaI 
wages. Of this IO - 20 percent, employgs have ta conaibote about 2 - 5 percent of their own wages 
By the third qyuter of 1995, about 81 milIion wodrcrr and 21 miIlion retirees in C h î ~  had particÏpated 
in the pension scheme. 
J. bb morid Bd), "China's Ecowmic Reiom in the 1990s" (lantiary 1997) onime: 
<httpY/members.aoLmd~ew/cfiapLLhtm> (date accessed- Iuoe 26, t 999). 
Cbese corporations should be large in order to compete with other large foreign 
corporations coupled with the fact that the Chinese equity market is undeveloped so that 
the state is the major source of corporate equity capital results in high statdpubiic 
ownership concentration in China. 
Mixed-ownership corporations (that is, corporations with a hi& degree of 
statdpublic ownership and a Iow degree of private ownenhip) represent a compromise 
between socialism and a fiee economy. In the words of Dirnock commenting on Canadian 
mixed-ownership corporations, such corporations represent a "compromise between 
kzissez-fàire economics and so~ialisrn".'~~ The CCL emerged Eom and reflects China's 
transitional economy - a sociaiïst market economy whkh is based on a compromise 
between two confiicting concepts: market economics and sociaiist ideology. The 
partnership of public and private capital within a singe business organization and the 
resuiting, the stniggie to achieve a bdance between a corporation's social hct ion and the 
profit-maxirnization god affects the rnodel of corporate controi in China. 
B DEerent Features: OverIapping Ownership in Canadian Corporate Market and 
Emplo yee Owners hip in Chinese Co rpo rate Market 
In addition to the common features of Canadian and Chinese corporate markets, 
(Le. domination of closeIy-Md corporations and high ownership concentration in public 
 corporation^)^ there are different charactensttks between Canadian and Chinese corporate 
markets in tems of overlapphg ownership and emphyee ownership. 
'" MBSnB1I DimockVs wor- cited by S. B r o o k  Who's Ur Charge? Thp Maed Ownemhip Corporation 
in Cmada (Caoada: The Institute for Resean& on Riblic Po.iicy. 1983) at 11. 
The Canadian market is characterized by highIy interconnected corporate 
relationships due to signincant inter-corporate ownership patterns in Canada. This, in 
nini, leads to a high degree of overlapping directorships in  anad da'^* Overlapping 
directorships raise issues regarding the accountability of corporate boards. This issue will 
be addressed in 4.2 befow. 
In terms of employee ownenhip, although the concept of employee share 
ownership pIans originated in North ~menca,'~' Chinese refonners were attracted by this 
concept and believed it could offer hope of improved corporate performance. The 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges require d l  listed corporations to disclose 
employee ~hares.''~ The use of intemal employee shares has become one of the measures 
for refomhg and reorganizing state-owned corporations, since it ailows corporations to 
borrow capital fiom their emp1oyees.'" share ideas and information with employees and is 
an incentive device for the corporations to enhance employees' cornmitment to their 
. -. -- 
'" Supra note 124 at 888. "Of the top one hundred most profitable companies in Canada in 1987. dose to 
45 per cent heîd IO per cent or more of the voting shares of ariother Company on the Li a... 296 of 1023 
directors M d  two or more appointments. 71.1 per cent of thcse [one hundred most profitabIe cornparilpariles 
in Canadaf board appointments were held by directors with oniy one appointment, 17.5 per cent by 
directors with two appoùitments, and I 1.4 pet cent by directors with the three or more appointments." 
See ah, S. D. Berkowitz cf aL, Royal Commission on Corporare Concenmiort St@ lVo.17: Enterprise 
Structure and Corpome Concentration pî Technical Report) (Ottawa: Mininet of Suppiy and Services 
Canada, 1977) at 15; and 
J. C. Bailfie, "Cornments of a Business Lawyer on Rufes Governing Boards of Canadian Ribiic 
Corporations" (1996) 26 C m  Bus. L. J. 127 at 128, 
'" The employee stock ownership pIan concept was devdoped in the United States in the 1950s by Iawyer 
and irrvestment banker Lotis K e b ,  who argued that the capitaIist system wodd be snonger if aiI  
workers, notjust a few stockhoIders, couid rharP in owning capital-produchg assets. ui L973, Keko 
convinceci Senator RusseII Long chairman of the tax-writing Senate fi~liince Cornmittee, that tax bendits 
for the empioyee ~ o d c  ownership pian shootd k pennitted and encouraged under empfoyot ben&< law. 
See "A Short Elhory of the ESOP" Ooline: The National Center for Employee Ownership 
<httpJîm-nceo.orgflibracy/histoty. (date a c d  A p d  22,1999). 
'% ~ e r  to ~ u p m  note 121. 
This is vny cormnon EmpIoyee shares have not oniy ken accessed €y managers but aiso by othcr 
workers and staff 
corporate ernployers. 
But the development of employee ownership in China is fa from mature compared 
with similar instiMions in North henca. '"  Currentiy, in China empIoyee share 
ownership plans are used maioly as a channel for corporations to raise capital since it is 
costiy to borrow capital in Chinese capital markets. ui North America, such plans are 
use& instead, for creating a work force of emp~oyee-owners;"5 buying shares tiom 
departhg shareholders of a closely-held corporation; creating an ernployee benefit 
divesting or acquiring subsidiaies; buying back shares 6om the market; and as a takeover 
defen~e.'~~ In Canada, most provinces have promulgated legisfation providing substantial 
tax credits for investment in employee Associations have been established for 
154 Canadian statistics in respect of empioyee ownership are not avaiIable. 
IS5 "A Brïef Introduction to Employee Owncrship" OnIine: The Nationai Center for Employee ûwnefship 
<http:/fwwwnceo.or~hfary/Ir'brary.html~ (date accessed: A p d  22, 1999). There arc about 15,000 
companies in the U.S. that share ownership broadIy with employees. Over 10,000 of these are ESOPs 
(Empfoyee Stock h e r s h i p  Plans). 
In "An Owrview of ESOPs, Stodc Options, and Employee Owaershipn Online: The National Center for 
Employee Ownership <hnpdf~-nca>.o@%rary/werViewhmit> (date aaessed: Apriï 22,1999). 
"* -Growth of Employee Ownership Aderates Rapidiy in U.S. and Ab& (May 1997) Onhe: The 
National Center for Emphyee Owaership, ~httpYiwww.nçeo.orgfi'bcary/growth,htmi~ (date accessed: 
Aprü 22, t 999). For instance, the governent of Manita encourages empIoyee owc1ership. PIease see 
"Economic Ddopment  Boardr Framework for Economic Growthm 0-e: Goverumem of Manitoba, 
Canada <h<tp://www.govmbb.caiboar& (date acassxt Apni 22 1999). For Bntish CoImnbïa, pIea~e se 
'EmpIoyee Share Ownenhip Program Guidehem Onliae: ~http~/Www.kb.sb.gov.bc.ca/~p~&h~ 
(date accessed- ApriI 22, L999)- 
researching employee share ownership in  anad da.''^ But nationdy, there are no federal 
laws or regulations at the time ofwriting that specincalIy encourage the deveIopment of 
employee share ownership. Chinese authorities, however, recentiy have signded the need 
for caution in M e r  ùicreashg employee share ownership since significant employee 
share owaership in a corporation means that if a corporation fds to survive, the 
employees rriight lose not only their jobs but dso th& savings. 
4.1.4 Voting through Shares at Shareholden' Meetings: The Majority Rule 
The above sections have presented comparative examinations of share structures 
and corporate ownership structures in Canada and China Notwithstanding that 
shareholders' controlling influence power over corporate policy and management m ses 
tiom their ownership of shares, it is through votuig that shareholders exercise their rights 
and exen their power. 
The right to vote is the most essential right by whkh shareholders participate in 
and control the c~r~oration.'~' The number of votes that a shareholder has is determined 
by the type and number of shares he/she hoIds. Through voting, shareholders are able to 
register with the corporation their views about the conduct of the corporation's business. 
in Canada, such nght is regarded as a kind of proprietary right and, in the case of federdy 
' 59  For instance, Employee Share Ownership and investment Association; and nie ESOP (EmpIoyee 
Share Ownership P h )  -ation 
'" Chma Secnrities Regdatory Cornmittee on November 25, 1998 isued a notice to local peop1e.i 
goverment to cestn*ct the issnanœ of imemat empIoyec shares withui public corporations- Onlùle: 
Securïties Times, ~http9/www.Secuntiestimes.mm.Cn/zcf~-L99 1US.htmD (date a m  Ime 2 1, 
1999) in Chinese version 
incorporated corporations, it is specificdy rmgnkeci by the C B C A ' ~  Though China 
has not clearly defîned the cight to vote as a propnetary right, nevertheless, shareholders' 
Bght to vote is legaiIy protected. '63 
A CBCArs Majority Rule: Democracy Based on Capital 
(1) Shareholders' Statutory Power under the CBCA 
Under the CBCA shareholders, through shareholders' meetings and by voting, 
have the power to elect and remove directors;'@ approve fbndamentai corporate changes 
including (but not limited to) amendments to articles and amalgamation,'6s a continuance 
under the Iaws of another junsdi~tion,'~~ a change in the by4aws,'" a sale of aIi or 
substantiaily ail of the assets of the corporation; and to appoint and remove auditors. 16' 
Directors must, at the annuai meeting present shareholders with the annual 
financid statements. "O Relyïng on the financiai reports, shareholden review the corporate 
performance, the perfomance of directors and other corporate agents. 
'" CBCA S. IJO (LI. 
'" Articie 106 of CCL. 
'" CBCA rs.106 (3) and 109 (1). 
'" CBCA gin (1) and 183. 
166 CBCA ~ 1 8 8 .  
'* CBCA s, 103. 
CBCA r 189 (3). 
169 CRCA ss. 162 (1) and 165 (1). 
'm CBCA s. 155 (1). 
In addition, CBCA sharehoIders dso have the right to make proposais relatùig to 
the articles or by-laws, or any other matter in cornedon with the business and a f f i s  of 
the corporation to be discussed at shareholders' meetings,"' to appoint pro>cy-ho~ders,'x 
and to access certain corporate idionnation'" The right of each shareholder to make a 
proposal d1ows shareholders to initiate discussion and express their concems with the 
corporate management. Proposais cannot be easily ignored by managers since the CBCA 
requires that proposais be heard, considered and voted upon by the constituency of 
shareholders. '74 
(2) Voting: One Share, One Vote 
Shareholders most frequentiy exercise their statutory power as discussed above 
for conuoliing the corporation or registering their preferences through vo ting at 
shareholders' meetings. The generd d e  of voting in CBCA corporations, unless the 
articles provide otherwise, is one share, one vote,"' a rule that effectively establishes a 
shareholder democracy based on capital. Because the CBCA p e r d s  a corporation to 
have diffierent classes of shares with different vothg rights (Le. voting shares, non-voting 
shares, or super-voting shares subject to provisions in the  article^),"^ Canadian 
'" CBCA ss. 137 (1) and 103 (5). 
'" CBCA S. 148 (1). 
CBCA s-2 L (1). 
CBCA S. 137. 
'" CBCA S. MO (1). 
'76 CBCA S. 140. 
corporate decision-makm have the opportmity of raising a large amount of equity 
without fosing controt. ln 
(3) The Majority Rule 
SharehoIders v o ~ g  operates on the basis of majority de, a concept stemming 
nom political democracy practices. That means shareholders with a majori~, of voting 
shares govem the c~rporation."~ Majority ntle is a doctrine based on the theory that 
corporations are capitaIist institutions and shareholders are property owners of shares. 
In a widely-held public corporation, shareholders' democracy cannot be realired uniess 
members of the shareholder group become active participants in corporate We. In a 
public corporation with hi& ownership concentration and in a closely-held corporation, 
the majonty mle relates more to the discretion of the controiiing shareholder or a smaü 
group of controIIing shareholden. 
However, majority nile under the CBCA is not absolute. It is mitigated by a 
Voting rights within a dass, however. must be eqpai. See Bowater Canadiarr Ltd v. R L- Crain hc., 
(1 988) 62 0.R (2nd) 752 (CA). 
in this case Houiden J.A said "if the= was no equdity of rights within a class of sharehoIders, there 
wouid be geat opportunity for fraud,,,". 
WiUi regard to some fiiadamental changes (e.g the sale of aiî or substantiaüy ail the property of the 
corporation), each share cam*es the right to vote regardles of whether the share is normaUy a voting 
share- See CBCA S. 188 (6). 
Moceover, such changes may hâve to be approved separately by the hoIda ofezicfi üass by a majority of 
not less than two-tfiirds of the votes cast in respect thereof: See CBCA S. I89(3). 
'* This cootnbutes to the high concentration of omership in Canadian çorporations. m e r  factors that 
account for this phenomenoa Mude Canada's cesource bas& economy, a potiticai need for estabIiching 
an Inregratai national economy in this country owÏng to the combination of its vast geographicaï spaœ 
and hiteci population, and the: emergence of institutionai shareh01ders~ 
See 4.1.3 B (1) in this thesis. 
number of statute-based minority sharehoIder protection rernedies, such as cIass veto,17' 
the appraisd remedy,lm voting protections for minority shareholders (such as cumulative 
voting and class-elected directors), 18' derivative'" or personal actions and the 
oppression remedy. '" 
(4) The Reality 
Shareholders' power in controiiing a corporation in reaiity depends on the type of 
corporation, provisions under corporate law and the artides or other contraaual 
documents. Since the CBCA dictates that the directors shodd manage the business and 
affin of the corporatioR1" Canadian shareho1dersy power in controlling the business of 
the corporation is Iargely reduced particularly in the case of large widely held public 
corporations (see Appendix II - A). Most shareholders in large widely heid public 
corporations are rnînority sharehoIders and are uninterested in corporate affairs given the 
smd amount of weaith they Uivea in the corporations. Thus, corporate controlting 
CBCA S. 176. 
160 CBCA s.190. The appraisai remedy pedts  dissenthg minority shareholders to opt out of the 
corporation and teceive fair compensation. 
IgL C d a ù v e  voting assures that minority shareholders can hase s a w  representation on the board For 
a description of cumulative voting, see CBCA s IO? and supra note 42 (Diderson Report) pm.76 at 216. 
For dass voting, see CBCA ss. i 1 I(3) and (4). 
In order to prevent majority shateho1ders from hpugning the cumulative votïng and c k  voting rights, 
CBCA S. 107(g) and t09(1), (2) pmvide backup roies for enfiorcing these rights by minonty 
shareholders. 
CBCA s.239. 
'" <IBCA s.241. The definition of "Comph.ümtn in s.238 of the CBCA guaramees sharehoiders the ng6t 
to commace a derÏvative and oppression action. 
CBCA S. L02 (1). 
power more often lies in the han& of corporate management. The chief execufive 
officer, depending on Wher specinc d e  in such corporations, very oflen becomes the 
de facto corporate governor. AIthough a more flexible management structure is alfowed 
through a unanimous shareholder agreement7 such a device is Iimited to closelyheld 
 corporation^,'^^ &en that it is hardIy possibIe to get a unanimous agreement among 
numerous sharehotders. 
In the case of a public corporation with high ownership concentration, which is a 
distinctive feature of Canadian corporations, a relativeiy small group of sharehoIders or 
perhaps a single controlling shareholder may legaily or effectively hold a majority of 
voting shares and so be able to exercise decision power. Even shareholders who o w  
directly or indirectly as littie as 20 per cent of the voting shares of a corporation can 
often exercise considerable power in the absence of other major controlling shareholders 
(see Appendk iI - B). 
In the case ofc1oseIy-held corporations7 sharehoIders are able to direct corporate 
business simpIy because shareholders more otten are wilIing and eager to become the 
corporate management memben given that most of the shareholders' wedth Îs typicaily 
put into such corporations (see Appendk II - C). 
An examination of the three types of corporations in Canada Ieads to the following 
conclusion: fiom the shareholder's perspective, the more concentrated capital (represented 
by voting shares) that is contriiuted mto one corporation, the greater the corporate 
decision power that can be obtained in such corporation. The corporate controlhg power 
is cIoseIy associated with the amount of equity capital Ïnvested. 
Supra note 42 (Diclterson Report) at 70. 
( 1) S hareholders' S tahitory Power under CCL"~ 
Compared with the CBCA, CCL vests shareholders with more extensive powers. 
It is clearly stated under CCL that the shareholders' meeting is the most powerful organ in 
a corporation.'" In terms of shareholders' statutory power, CCL provides that the 
shareholders have the power to decide business policy and the investment plan of the 
corporation;'8s to examine and approve the annual financial budget plan and final accounts 
plan;1" to adopt resolutions on the issuance of corporate bonds;1g0 to adopt resolutions on 
rnerger, division, transformation, dissolution and ~iquidation;'~' to adopt resolutiow on 
increase or reduction of the registered capital of the corp~ration; '~~ to arnend 
constitutional documentation;lm and, more notably, to examine and approve plans of 
Ig6 It shotdd be noted that FIEs in China do not have the institution of shareholders' meetings. The board 
of directors is the most powerfUl orgm in FIES and statutorily has the right to decide ail corporate matters. 
Articles 37 and 102 of CCL. 
'" Article 38 (1) of CCL. 
Ig0 Article 38 (9) of CCL. 
19' Article 38 (1 1) of C U .  
M d e  38 (8) of C U .  Reginenxi caph i  of a limiteci EabiIiiy company cefers to the amount of the 
paid-up capitai contnhtion of ait of its shareholders as registered with the state company registration 
authority (see Article 23 of CU). Registered capital of a joint stock Company r e f i  to the totaI amount of 
the paid-up capital as registereâ wÏth the -te company registration anthor@- (see Article 78 of CCL). 
distribution of profits and recovery for 10s sed~~  Many of the shareholders' statutory 
powers as listed above are reserved for management in a CBCA corporation 
Shareholders' power over managerid matters also includes the power to examuie 
and approve reports of the board of directors and the supervisory board"' and to elect and 
remove members of the board of directors or members Eom the supervisory board who 
represent the shareholders, and to set their remuneration.'% 
In the case of a closely-held corporation (i.e., a Limited Iiability corporation 
incorporated according to CCL), share transférs to outsiders (that is any third party other 
than the shareholders of the corporation) mua be approved by the shareholders' 
meeting. IW This provision has recognized the reaiity that closely-held corporations are, to 
some extent, more like partnerships since tn~st between corporate members largely 
decides the fate of such corporations. Such share transfer restrictions are an e f f i v e  
means for shareholders to controt closety-held corporations, maintain a corporation as a 
close corporation and ensure continuity of the corporation.lg8 
(2) Voting: One Share, One Vote 
Shareholden of corporations incorporated under CCL exercise their natutory 
'" Artide 38 (IO) o f C a  
" It is noted tbat restriction on transfers of sbares in a dosefy-heId colporation is also anticipateci by the 
CBCA See CBCA S. 6(I)(d), 49(8), and 173. nie CBCA Rpoircs any limitation on the s h a ~  transfér 
to be included in the articles of incorporation or artides ofil~~lendment, 
power as mentioned above through voting. Like the concept of shareholder's democracy 
adopted by the CBCA, the general voting d e  under the CCL is aIso one share, one 
vote.lg9 Adoption of this principle uidicates that the Chinese government and Iawmakers 
recognize capitalism in the context of corporate management and are prepared to abotish 
the traditional sociaiist enterprise management model, characterized by aate 
administrative intervention in the management of enterprises. Moreover, CCL permits 
shares to carry different voting nghts. In this regard, Chinese corporate decision-makers, 
Iike their counterparts in Canada, are able to raise certain equity without sacrificing 
control position 
(3) The Majority Rule 
Majority rule is aiso recognked under the CCL.~'' Though practicdy the aate 
and business community have provided for a unique classincation of shares as descnied in 
4.1.2 above, theoreticaily, the legai commmity in China prefers to categorize shares into 
ordinary shares and preference shares, a classification similar to that of Canada. Ordmary 
shares constitute the residuary class in which is vested the right to receive dividends and 
the right to receive distribution of the assets of the corporation upon a winding up or 
uisolvency after the speciai rights of other classes, if any, have been satisfied. Within 
ordinary shares, distinctions might be drawn by dividing them into different cIasses of 
shares with different nghts. But generaiiy, oniy ordinary shareholden can have voting 
ArtÏde 1 O6 of C U ,  
rn ArticIes 106 and 107 of CCL, 
rights and vote on al1 rnatters presented at the shareholders' general meetings. The voting 
is operated on the basis ofmajority d e .  In case of hdarnentai changes, nich as merger, 
division, dissolution, or amendments to articles of association (correspondhg to articles of 
incorporation under the CBCA), not Iess than two-thirds of the votes are needed.*O1 
Preference shares are types of shares that coder on the holden some preference over 
other classes in respect either OP dividends or of repayrnent of capital or both. Preference 
shareholders can ody have rights to vote in relation to matters that affect their rights (e-g., 
the corporation fding to pay dividends as presmbed by the corporate constitution) or 
after the occurrence of specified events. 
Politicaiiy or economicaily, majority nile is often deemed a democratic p ~ c i p l e  in
both capitalist and socialist countries. Shareholdersr democracy, however, is largely based 
on shareholders' abaity to comprehend hancial reports of the corporation. If most 
investors are not able to grasp the meaning of corporate information, majority nile will 
have its drawbacks in tems of emphasizing "quantity rather than qudity".202 The fact in 
China is that most Chinese individuai investors (most of them are household investors) 
may not have the abiIity to understand fiindamentai hanciai terms. Therefore, they rnay 
not be able to make reasonable decisions even if they are presented with full, accurate, and 
timely corporate idormation. Of course, it is aiso not clear to what ment individual 
Canadian hvestors cm actuai1y understand corporate information or make reasonable 
informed deùsions when they are presented with compIex corporate thanciai information 
However, even assuming bat  most Canadian mvestors are not able to comprehend 
K I. Glaskelç Wemocracy for Corporatiomc Corporations A m  DemocraqP in Facuity af Law, 
MffiiIi University, Conference M d t h  Lectmes 1994195, C ~ r p o r ~ o m  at the C ~ O Q &  (Uontrealr 
McGiII University, 1995) at 500- 
corporaîe financial information on their own, Canadian investors at ieast have readiIy 
avaiiabIe assistance from professionai investment advisors; and thus majority d e  can be 
exercised in Canada of a relatively high quality. The absence of professional investment 
advisors in China, however, very Iikely results in the exercising of majority nile on the 
basis of "quantity rather than q ~ a i i t y " . ~  
(4) SociaIism Embracing Capitaiism? 
It seems that China acknowiedges capitalism in corporate decision-making since 
CCL accepts the notions of "one share une vote" and majority de. But it is doubtfiil that 
Chinese shareholders' democracy cm be solidly and purely established on the basis of 
capitalism. As a socidist country, the economic reform and free market meamres adopted 
by the Chinese govenunent are different tiom those that prevaii in a western fm market 
economy. Employing the wording in China's Constitution, this country is adopting a 
Ir 204 "sociaiist market economy . Simply put, Chha is making efforts to reduce state 
administrative intervention in economic iife (including in corporate Iife), while still 
emphasizing aate contrai in the country's economy. The control is typicaily reflected in 
the predominant position of state ownenhip in China's macro-economy. The socialist 
market econorny is a state policy that embraces codicts. ReflectÏng on corporate Iaw, 
ArticIe 15 Of 1993 Comtiîutiorz of the People's Republic of China- (Adopted at the F Ï  Session of the 
F i  Nationai People's Congress and Promuigated for ImpIementathu by the ProcIamation of the 
Nationaî People's Congress on December 4,1982, as amended at the Frst Session of the Seventh National 
People's Congress on ApnI 12, 1988, and again at the Fmt Session of the Seventh National People's 
Congress on March 29,1993) En- is adkhie onlnie, ûnihx Mqtand University School of 
Law, China Law Website ~httpf/Www.qjs.aet/chinalawhwtranLhtm> (date aCCeSSedCCeSSed Im  16,1999)- 
Article 4 of CCL offers an example of such conflicts. ArticIe 4 provides thaf "' 
The shareholders of a corporation shali, in their capacity of 
contributors of capital, enjoy nich rights of ownen as benefiting 
from assets of the corporation, making major decisions and 
selecting managerial personne1 in accordance with the marni of 
thezr respective capital investment in the corporation. 
A corporation shall enjoy the nght fo the entzre property of the 
Iegai person formed by the investments of shareholders and shaii 
possess civil rights and bear the civiI liabüities in accordance with 
the law. 
The ownership of state-owned assets in a corporation SM vest in 
the state, 
(emp hasis added) 
The codict contained in Article 4 is obvious. ArtÏcle 4 on the one hand provides 
for shareholders democracy on the basis of the capital invested by shareholders and 
specifies that a corporation is a Iegal person enjoying the property right of the corporation; 
on the other hanci, it clarifies that state assets in a corporation belong to the state. If the 
state has titie to the assets (Le. the assets have not been soId or othemise transferred to 
the corporation for consideration), how cm they be the property of the corporation? One 
of the consequences of incorporation is to establish an independent legai personality. That 
is, incorporation enables the property of the corporation to be clearly diainguished from 
that of investors (Le. shareholders), and the investon have no direct propnetary rights to 
the corporate property but merely to thek shares. Paragraph 2 of Article 4 cIearly 
recognizes the independent personafity of a corporation. But paragraph 3 is in obvious 
connict with the preceding two paragraphs. 
PS Article 4 of CCL (En@,& vcxsion) is axaiMIe onliat Please see China laternet Information Center- 
China's Economy and its Enterprises - Economic Laws and Reguiations, < h t t p ' J / w w w . ~ o r g ~  
(date accessed: Jtme 17, 1999). 
Article 4 of CCL provides a specific example of China's Corporate Laws 
borrowing modem corporate doctrines fiom western countries; and trying to ahgn western 
corporate doctrines into China's socidkt regime. The aim of paragraph 3 of Anide 4 is 
likely to mistrate fiaudulent transfers of state assets into the private sector. But it causes 
considerable confiision as to the theory of independent aatus of a corporation and such 
corporation's ownership of its assets. If protecting state assets cornes at the expense of 
disregarding independent Iegal personality of a corporation, it is not clear that market 
credibility can be f i d y  established in this country. If  China decides to embrace capitalism 
in respect of shareholders' democracy, Chinese lawmakers should consider arnending the 
sociaiist doctrine where mch doctrine is in conflict with capitalkt doctrine. One of 
socialism's hndamentd doctrines regarding public property, as provided in China's 
constitution is, "sociaiist pubIic property is inviolable". 206 Thus, paragraph 3 of Article 4 
might find its origin in this principle. However, inviolable public property can be 
protected by other means (e-g., by penaluing corruption, reprimanding the unlawfùl 
transfer of aate assets, etc.), rather than through impairment of the founding principles of 
mcorporation. 
(5) The Redity 
The praaice ofCCL in ternis of corporate management is to spiÏt the business and 
affairs of a corporation into corporate strategic matters and matters in the ordinary course 
206 Anide 12 of 1993 Comtihition ofhe People's Repblfc o p i n a .  
of business. Shareholders, through shareholders' meetings, control the former and the 
board of directors handes the latter (see Appendix III - E). Where corporate matters 
require specific business skills, or types of matters reqyire fiequent decisions to be made, 
or certain business matters must be handied with greater speed, the board of directors and 
managerid otiicers are expected to make the decisions. In the case of more strategic 
corporate matters or matters concerning greater economic significance, shareholders are 
more IikeIy to make decisions themselves. 
In reality, whether shareholders can have the power to direct corporate &airs 
largely depends on the type of the corporations as well as particular provisions under the 
laws and the corporation's articles. With regard to public corporations in China, individual 
shareholders can never be controlhg shareholders because of regdatory prohibitions in 
China in China, under current regulations, individual investors are not pennitted to 
purchase more than 0.1 per cent of Listed public  corporation^."^ Therefore, the state or 
other legai persons hold the majority of voting shares in every Iisted public corporation. 
In the case of a public corporation where the state holds a major@ of the voting shares 
(Le. state shares occupy the dominant position in the public corporation), the state, 
through its delegates who manage the corporation, exercises the ultimate decision power. 
State policy is more often refl eaed in the decisions of such corporations (see Appendk IIi 
- A). Other shareholders, including other companies or individuai shareholders, may be 
hstrated if they want to register their dissent given that minority shareholders in China 
are @en few Iegd weapons to Eght against the rnaj~rity.~~' 
Artide 46 of Mg3 A&irzistrafion of Ihwinng ond Trading ofsirares Tentative Regulatiom (Gu Piao Fa 
fi Yu Jiao TI Zan Xing Tiao Li). 
See also F L  Fang, "Comments: Chinan in (1997) 28 L. & PoL"yt1 Bus, 897 at 897 - 898. 
In the case of a public corporation where other legal persons20g hold a majority of 
the voting shares (Le. Iegal person shares occupy the dominant position in the 
corporation), such Iegal persons may, through their management, exercise the con~olling 
power by voting and dkechng the corporate business (see Appendùc DI - B).~" But the 
aate, as a minority shareholder, cm very Iikely register its opinion with the corporation 
given that Iegai penons dways want to keep a good relationship with local or centrai 
govenunents. Accordingly, Iegal persons usudy pay special attention to the concems of 
the state. As to individual investors, they are in a disadvantageous position given that they 
have neither the political influence of the state nor any effective power under the CCL to 
keep the majonty shareholders in check. 
In practice, shareholders' decision-making very Iikely relies on the inFormation and 
recommendations provided by the board of directors and manageriai officers since most 
shareholders either do not have any interea in corporate management, or lack managerial 
expertise, enthusiasm or commitment to the corporation (pdcularly when the state or 
Iegal persons have diversified podolios in various corporations). *" 
In the case of udined public corporations (see Appendix III - C), shareholders 
usuaiiy indude the state, Iegai persons and employees. Such corporations are fiequentiy 
incorporated Eom oId state-owned enterprises. The process of privatintion typically 
tums employees iato shareholders. The consequence of such an incorporation is that the 
corporation can raise h d s  from its employees at low cost. In addition, ernployees wiii 
" Supra note 108. 
"O FOC a description of Te@ person in China, sa note 108, supra. 
"' For an interesting perspective on these issues* sa fiang Hezi, "Annuai SharehoIders' Meetmg: The 
PIaœ that SharehoIders Disappointed", Onu'ne: Secmities 
have great cornmitment to the corporation The corporation, however, with nrch 
diversified owners, often encounters competing interests. But generdy, the nate has the 
greatest innuence upon corporate matters partly because of a long-term tradition and 
tendency carried over Eom the management mode of state-owned enterprises. 
In the case of closely-held corporations, such as sino-Foreign investrnent 
enterprises (see Appendk III - D), though the FIES Laws provide that the board of 
directors is the highest organ in the c~rporation,~'~ in realiw, before making major 
corporate decisions relating to strategic matters, the board memben appointed by dEerent 
investors aiways submit such matten to the investors. 
The above anaiysis in respect of shareholders' controliing power in Chinese 
corporations reveals that currently individud shareholders do not play a significant role in 
corporate affairs notwithstanding the tact that shareholders generdly are given extensive 
statutory power in corporate decision making by CCL. The discriminatory treatment of 
individual shareholders under CCL is aiso reflected in the share structure of bearer shares 
held by i n d ~ d u d  investors. The weak position of individual shareholders arises from the 
regime of China's politics and economy and culture. The sociaiist system is a regime in 
which public ownership domina te^.^'^ Pnvate economy in China cannot predominate as 
long as the Iaw prohibits individuds fiom becoming controlhg shareholders. In addition, 
most Chinese people do not exercise their rights as investon. The notion of individual 
legal cÎghts originating kom private propeay is a new concept in the Chinese culture (see 
< httpYIwww-&tiestimes.com.cn/ I999O6l t 8Ifwzc- O 6  14059-dzx?t htmD (date a m :  fune 18, 
1999) (Chinese version) 
"' See 4.2. L . B of this thesis- See also Artide 3 4  of Intptementation Regdations of UV Law and ArticIe 
24 of ImpIementation Ruies QFCN Law. 
"' supra note 123. 
5.5.2 beiow). It is EeIy to be a Iong time before China's indbidual investors may be 
expected to pIay a material role in controlling or infiuencuig corporate affairs. 
The reason for focussihg here on mixed ownership corporations, rather than pure 
(100 per cent) private business corporations, is that in China, in terms of business 
corporations (that is corporations with the objective of pursuing profits), nich mked 
ownership corporations are the nom during the nirrent transitional economic reform age. 
The following chan cited from 1997 China Smistics Ye&uok reflects the general 
econornic structure of China. StrictIy speaking, references to "corporations" oniy include 
the shareholding units as shown below. However, considering the private sector nature of 
foreign funded enterprises, 1 have dso included reference to the convol situation of 
foreign investment enterprises established according to FIES Laws in this thesis. Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan investment companies in China aiso follow the FIES ~aws,*"' 
and such companies are incIuded in my discussion of foreign investment companies. 
Private enterprises, that is purely private economic institutions, however, do not fall into 
the shareholding structure and are not governed by China's Corporation Laws. Among 
the shareholding economic units, pure pnvate business corporations (that is, corporations 
without fùnds from the state) are few.*I5 
Structurai uidicators on National Economic and Social ~ e v e l o ~ r n e n t : ~ ~ ~  
"' ArticIe 57 of hplexnentation Rules of CN Law; and Artide 85 of ImpIementing Ruia  of WFOE Law. 
Aithough no simirar artides are provideci by EJV Law or hpIementùig Regdations of WV Law, 
practicaUyv E N  Law and Impiementing Regdations of EJV Law appiy to equity joint venntres between 
Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan Inmitors and ChMese investors. 
''' Howevec, 1 do not have detadeci &ta on this point 
216 Note: % of GDP. Cited h m  chapter 2 "GeneraI Survey" of 1997 China Statistical Yenrbookv (Mine: 
China Statistid Miormation Network < h t t p ' I ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ s t a t s ~ g o v ~ ~ m f o r m a t i o a l n j 9 7 ~ 3 I ~ ~  (date 
M y  13.1999). 
Stmctun by Ownership 
State Owned Units 
Collective Owned Units 
Joint Owned Units 
Forer'Pn Funded Units 
Funded by Enterprises from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
Other Economic Units 
Private Entemrise 
Individual Industry 
And Commerce Household Units 
Fam~s Engaging in Farming, 
Forestry, Animai Husbandry 
And Fishing 
4. I -5 Minonty Shareholders' InfIuences on Corporate Control 
Although the corporation is an economic structure and majority shareholders can 
more easi1y register thek discretion with the corporation, this does not mean that minority 
shareholders have no influencing power over corporate business. 
A Under the CBCA 
China StatÏstÏcal urformation Network <httpJ/www/wwwstats.g~OVcnliaf~rmati~a/nj97~03 IILEM)> (date 
accessed: M y  L3? 1999). 
Notwithstandhg that the CBCA provides majority shareholders a high degree of 
power to control the corporation, it dso offers muiority shareholders legal devices to 
express their wilI and protect their interests in the corporation The treatment of majority- 
minority shareholders' relationships under the CBCA reflects a deveiopment in corporate 
Iaw from an unmnrnrtigated application of the p ~ c i p l e  of majority d e  to an emphasis upon 
protection of minorïty interests on the bais of equity and fairne~s."~ 
In general, minonty shareholders have the rïght to make a proposal;2x8 to 
requisition a shareholders'  nee et in^;^'^ to a class veto;ZM to apply to a court for an 
investigation or inspection of the corporat e affair~;~' to dissent and appraisal;m t O initiate 
a derivative actionm or personal action;n4 to clairn for an oppression remedy;" and to 
propose the voluntary liquidation and dissolution of a In addition, the 
design of cumulative voting under the CBCA enables minority shareholders of 
corporations that have adopted such voting provisions to have a greater voice in the 
"' Sec an analytis of the majonty-minority shareholders' relatiowhip in an early case Nmh- West 
Transportafion Co. Ltd v. Beafry (1877), L2 k C. 589 (P.C.), 
"' CBCA s.131. That is, a sha~holder proposal. This right can be exercised by any registered 
s Wolder .  
=19 CBCA s.143. A pre-condition is that the sharehoider who intends to exuEise this right shotdd hold 
not Iess than 5 percent of the corporation's voting shares. 
ro CBCA S. 176. 
CBCA s.229. 
~ 2 2  CBCA S. 190. A dissenting sharehoIder may, under certain statutory terms and conditions. Rpuire the 
corporation to pay him the fair value of the shares heId by him in case the corporation makes a major 
change. 
~3 CBCA ss.238 and 239- 
2.24 Pender v, Lushingtort (Iâî7), 6 Ck D, 70 (CA),  
225 CBCA 5.24 t . 
CBCA 
eIection of direct or^.^ 
This thesis however does not purport to go through dl the rÏghts that minority 
shareholders have under the CBCA for striking a baianced relationship with the majority. 
Rather, it will deai with few specinc Iegal devices provided by the CBCA for protedng 
mhorÏty shareholders' rights (and in some cases the interests of other corporate 
stakeholders) which are particularly foreign to the Chinese people. 
The CBCA appraisd right, based upon New York's Business Corporations Law, 
paves a new way for bdancing the relationship between the majority and minority 
shareho~ders.~ It enables shareholders to get the corporation to buy their shares at fair 
value upon the occurrence of certain events which hndamentally change the corporate 
constitution, such as a sale of dl or substantially ail of the assets of the business; removai, 
addition, or dteration of restrictions on the business or businesses the corporation may 
cany on, or of the right to transfer shares; aiteration of the terms of outstanding sectrities; 
continuance in another jm-sdiction; and amaigamation. 
The purpose for including the appraisal right, according to the Dickerson Report, 
was this: 
. . . Instead of reIying on common Iaw standards to reshict the 
conduct of majorÏty sharehdders who propose to make a 
fundamentai change, the provisions in this Part confer upon a 
" Supm note 42 (Dickemn Report) pa ia  206 ai 73. 
CBCA s- 190. 
" J. G. MacIntsh, The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada: A Criticai R e a p p m w  (1986) 24 
Osgoode HdI L, I, 20L at 204. 
shareholder who dissents fkom the fundamental change the 
pnvilege of ophg out of the cotporation and demendhg fair 
compensatirion for his sharesS . . . Mead of plachg the minority 
shareholder at the mercy of the majority, these provisions p e e t  
the muiority shareholder to withdraw fiom the enterprise and, if 
enough minority shareholders are affecteci, to bar the proposed 
change. NevertheIess, the majority shareholders can, if they go 
through the proper fonnaiities, and if they pay any dissenting 
shareholders effect almost any fundamentai change with impunity. 
The result is a resolution of the pmblem that protecfs rnihority 
shurehoIdeersfrom discrimination and at the same time preserves 
flnibikty within the enterprise, pennining it to adapt to changing 
business conditions.. ."O (emp hasis added) 
Therefore, the hnctions of the appraisal right, in the view of the Dickenon Cornmittee, 
are anti-discrimination, presewing "flexibiiity", and making the CBCA "self-enforcingW."' 
Moreover, the appraisal right is non-exclusive of other shareholder remediesB2 
This "opting out" remedy is especialIy significant for minority shareholders of 
closely-held corporations with a restricted market for their sharesD3 and for dissenting 
shareholders of corporations whose shares trade in iliiquid markets. To shareholden of a 
broadiy traded publicly-held corporation, the appraisal right as a means of exiting the 
corporation is of little value since they cm generaiIy se11 out their shares at relatively Iow 
co~t ."~ But the vast bulk of Canadian pubtic corporations do trade in thui markets, that is, 
" Supm note 42 (Dickerson Report) para 347 at 1 1 5. 
Ibid para 476 at 158. 
32 Supra note 229 at 205. "it was designed to suppletnenf and not s u p p h t  altemathe remedies CO which 
the sharehoider might have resofi" 
" A Bnnm & M Lansky, "The Appraisai Rernedy for Dissenthg Shareholden in Canada: Is It 
EîTéctive?" (1978) 8 Man, L, 1.683 at 685. 
~4 Supra note 229 at 218 - 221. 
mchtosh has argueQ titing M. A Eisenberg, that in the case of public corporations with deep eqmty 
markets, large sharehoIciers who are forced to seII out shares qticiciy to escape fimdamentai changes mag 
realize an infcrÏot pria in the market b u s e  of the hurried liquidation d the large btodc Fnrthennore, 
sharehoIders may onIy be able to 0 6 t h  a price for their shares that afready rdects the market's 
their secinities are inactively traded."' A risk oftrading in a thin market is that the market 
pnce of securities is more readily subject to short-nui fluctuation. In such Ncumstances, 
shareholders in thin markets are in greater need of the protection that is provided by the 
appraisai right .D6 
Though the appraisd right has certain weaknesses which will be observed in 4.1.7 
B ( 1) below, given the benefits that the appmisd right offers to rninority shareholders it 
has been widely adopted in the corporate statutes of moa Canadian provinces as we11 as 
the CBCA. 
(2) Derivative ~ction*' 
The derivative action permitted under the CBCA provides minority shareholders, 
as well as other aakeholders, in Canada an effective means to initiate an action on behalf 
of the corporation against directors, managena1 officers, and other third parties to redress 
wrongs done to the corporation.238 The legd device of the derivative action addresses the 
problern that arises Eom the conflicting theories of mdependent Iegai personaiity of a 
corporation and shareholder majonty rule. The availability of derivative actions promotes 
anticipation of the eEect of the fundamentai change. TheMore, for shareholders of such pubiic 
corporations, the appraisai right serves as protection against the cost of sale of a Iarge blo& 
~ 3 '  D. I. FowIer. C X  Rorke & V. M. log, Thin Trading and Beta Esrimation Problems on the Tomnto 
Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 1. Bus. Admin, 77. 
z36 Supra note 229 at 2 14. 
237 CBCA ~~2,238,239,240, and 242, 
ra CBCA s.239, 
CBCA s-238 pmvides a broad defhition af "compiaÎnant". There are certain pmoadifom that a 
"comglainantn has to meet More initiahg a derivatthe action 
manageriai responsibiliw and accountabüity because it ensures that sharehoIders can 
enforce rights to which the corporation is entitled or recover property belonging to the 
corporation where managers or the directors refùse to take action partidarly in the case 
of corporate mismanagement. 
The derivative action is different fiom personai actions by shareholders against the 
corporation. Personal actions invoive direct claïms by shareholders for damages d e r e d  
by them (arising for example, tiom hadequate disclosure in an information cirdar, or 
violation of proxy rights) caused by wrongdoing by the corporation. Denvative actions, 
however, generdly involve claims of the corporation against third parties directed at 
obtaining or retaùiing a benefit belonging to the c~r~oration."~ 
But the denvative action is seldom used in The reasons are that 
wrongdoing by the management of a corporation can be dficuIt to uncover when the 
wrongdoers are in control of the corporation, and in any event, there may not aiways be 
significant financial incentive to commence a derivative action shce the relief granted in a 
mccessful derivaiive action generaIIy flows to the corporation rather than to the 
complainant. 
(3) Oppression Remedy 
239 McCarthy T&trau.it., Directors ' mrd ODcers' Duties mid Liubilities IR CMO~Q (Toronto & Vancouver 
Butterworths, 1997) at 7 1. 
'' ibid However, CBCA 6240 (c) fùrt21er prouides that the court may make an order dirsrmg that any 
amouut adjudged payable by a defiadant in the action shouid be paid (in whoIe or in part) directIy ta 
former or present secnrity hoIders of the corporation Ïnstead ofto the corporation- 
The oppression remedy provides muiority shareholders in Canada with access to 
the courts in cases where they have been oppressed by the majonty shareholders a d o r  
corporate management. Thus, the minonty shareholders have the power to protect 
themselves against the majority and so to challenge the basic tenet of corporate law that 
the will of the majority mua be respected (with certain exceptions Iike f r a ~ d ~ ~ ~ ) .  In the 
meantirne, the legislators put teeth h o  the section by giwig the court the power to make 
aimost any kind of order to remedy an oppressive or unfairiy prejudiciai act or use of 
power. The device of the oppression remedy facilitates courts' intervention in corporate 
management through potentiaily expansive interpretation of vague ternis under the CBCA, 
such as "oppressive", "unfair" or " prejudicial" . " The philosophy underlying the 
oppression remedy is to allow the courts to "continue to develop the cornmon law of 
The majority mie was set out in the case of Fosr v. Himbonle (1843). 2 H m  46 1.67 E. R 189. 
Foss v. ffurbottle mainly estabîished two propositions: f i  a shareholder Ems no locus srandi to sue on 
the Company's behaif where the brcach complained of was a wrong done to the company (this point is 
beyond the scope of this section of the thesis); and second, majority shareholders in generai meeting, have, 
both at common law and by the terms of incotporation of the company, power to bind the whoIe body and 
dtimateiy control the destiny of the company. 
See aIso SM. Beck, "An Anaiysis of Foss v. Harbotfle" in J.S. Ziegei ed Sîzidies in Cmadiian Company 
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 545. 
The exceptions to the so-called "ruie in Foss v. Harbottien were iisted by Jenkins L.1. in EdwcrriS v. 
ffalliwell, [I950] 2 A11 E X  I O 6 4  at 1067 (CA): 
"It has been noted in the course of argument that in cases where the act complained of is whoiiy ultra 
vires the company or association the ruie lus no application. because there is no qpestion of the transaction 
being c o n f i a i  by any majority. It has been fiirther pointed out that where what has been done amounts 
to what is genenlly caüed in these cases a/rrmd on the minor@ and the wrongdoers are themseives in 
c o n r d  of the company, the mie is relaxed in favor of the aggrieved minority who are ailowed to brhg 
w h t  is known as a minority shareholders' action on behaif of themSeIves and all others, The teason for 
thïs is that, if they were denied that rÎght, their @evance codd never reach the court b p s e  the 
wrongdoers themseives. king in controi, would not N o w  the company to sue, -., There is a fllrthw 
exception, ... the d e  did not prevent an individual member fiom suing Ï f  the autter in respect of whkh 
he was siring was one whidt could validiy be done o r  sanctioned, not by a simple majority of thé members 
of the company or association, but only by some speczai mojorify, as, for instance, In af a =ted 
c o m p a .  unâer the Companies Act, a specM tesolution dnly passed as su& ... the rule has no 
application at di, for the individuai members who are suhg me,.,. in their own right to protect h m  
invasion their own Ïndividual rights as members," (emphasis added) 
CBCA s.241 (2) d&nes an o p p h  act (or conduct) as any act or condnct "that is oppresWe or  
dairiy prqudiciai to o r  tbat d i L y  disregards the interests ofany SeCrrnty hoIderT creditor, directors or 
officerT the court may make an otder to rectifjr the matters compfaineû af" 
responsibüity of corporate management unharnpered by the legai men created at a tirne 
when courts were preoccupied with edorcing 'dernomtic' structures" &en that very 
broad quality standards can accommodate corporate Iaw in a very "fluid" It 
appears that in modern Canadian business society, it is the courts that decide many 
questions ofbusiness ethics. 
Such standards set by the CBCA have been the subject of criticism. It  has been 
argued that the application of the oppression remedy ailows the courts to violate 
previously cherished tenets of corporate law, ignoring the corporate penonq extensively 
re-ordering corporate affairs relying upon the judge's own assesment of the business, and 
giving remedies to othen for wrongs once regarded exclusively as the corporation's 
o m .  24s 
It seems that a policy of laisser-faire is not acceptabIe in Canada in the latter part 
of the twentieth century, and equity has gained the upper band? The disadvantage that 
the oppression remedy bnngs is potential uncertainty and unprediaability in corporate 
affairs. However, though the CBCA casts the oppression remedy in vague terms, the 
more the oppression remedy is used by compiainants, the more it wüi become clear what 
behavior is or is not acceptable to the ~ourts.~'' 
t44 Supra note 42 (Dickerson Report) para477 at 159. 
z45 M A Waidron, "Corporate Theory and the Oppression Remedy" in (1981 - 82) 6 C m  Bus. L.J. 129 at 
130. 
'* D. Kaafinan, "Oppression Remedies Recent Deveiopments" in L. Sama ed. Corporute Sîrucchue. 
Finance and Operations (voL3) (Toronto: The CarsweIi Company Limited, 1984) 67 at 10 1. 
'* This conchsion howeveq is based on the assumption Inat courts wilI strict@ foiiow precedent and on 
art asstllllption that they wiü endeavor not m pwdc coitfïÏctÎng~dgexnents. 
(4) Cumulative Voting 
Cumulative voting is a device which provides for minonty shareholders to be 
represented on the board of dire~tors.*~* As the Dickerson Report explaineci, 
The purpose of a d a t i v e  votuig system is to enable minority 
interests to obtain representation on the board of directors by 
permitting them to multiply the number of shares they control by 
the number of directors to be eIected, and then to concentrate the 
total nurnber of votes upon a single candidate or group of 
candidates, and thereby secure the eleaion of thW n ~ m i n e e s . ~ ~ ~  
In order to prevent the cumulative votuig system fiom being defeated by other devices 
(such as reduction of number of directors), the CBCA further provides class vote*' and 
Since cumulative voting is a device that seeks to suike a balance between the 
interests of minorky and majority shareholders, it is very suitable for corporations with 
high ownership concentration." 
'4S For a derailed descriptio~ see supra note 42 (Dicicenon Report) para216 at 76 and S.G. Mackinnop 
rrie Protection of Dissenthg SharchoIders" in II S1 Ziegei ed. Shcdies in  mad di an Company L m  
(Toronto: Butter~ortfis~ L96T) vol. t 507 at 540. 
Supra note 42 @idcenon Report) para 206 at 73. 
CBCA s.176 (1). 
" However, the o ~ e  ofcumalative vohg provisions by CBCA corporations is very rare, prrsmaably 
because most coutrolIing sharehotcfers are ductant to share the power to e1ect the board wÏth minority 
shareholders, 
(1) The Lack of Legal Protection for Minority SharehoIders 
CCL does not provide suBiCient statutory rights for the protection of minority 
shareholders comparable to those provided by the CBCA Minority shareholders in China 
are not equipped with statutory protection such as appraisai rights, an oppression remedy, 
or cumulative voting. But a shareholder of a Chinese Company does have the nght to sue 
for an uijundon and damages in case a decision of the board or shareholders' meeting 
violates laws, administrative niles, or invades the legd interests of the shareholder." 
CCL does not specie, however, whether the shareholder's nght to take action for 
redressing wrongdoing is based upon a personal right or a derivative tight, 
notwithstanding that theoreticaily the two differ significantly as analyzed in 4.1.5 A (2) 
above. 
In the absence of comprehensive aatutory protection for minonty shareholders, in 
addition to taking a legd action, the oniy IegaI weapon Iefi for China's mùiority 
sharehdders is the super-majority rule. That is, if there is a fimdamentai change to the 
corporation contemplated, a super-majonty shareholders' approvai must be ~btained?~ 
The absence of sufficient Iegal protection for minonty sharehoIders is not 
€ortuitous in China TraditiondIy, the Chinese are directed that where personai interests 
are in conflia with the interests of the state or the collective, one should comply with the 
Article 1 I L of CCL 
LU Anides 39 and 40 of CCL for dosely heId corporariox1s~ ArticIes IO6 and 107 of C U  for publidy Md 
cocpotati0Ils- 
interests of the state or the ~olIective.*~ Applying such doctrine to Chinese corporate ii£é 
where individuai sharehoIdersr interests are competing with the interests of the state or of 
legd persons, the interests of the state or the legai person shouid prevaiLa6 As anaiyzed 
in 4.1.4 B (9, the state or legai persons aiways occupy a majority position in Chinese 
corporations, wMe individuals are aiways in a rninority position. Thus, application of this 
doctrine to Chinese corporations leads to a situation where the majority will aiways be 
weii protected. 
(2) Applying CBCAts Minority Shareholder Protection Devices 
in the short-term period, it appears unlikely that China's Corporate Laws will be 
reformed so as to enhance legai protection for minonty shareholden. It is unliiely 
because of certain Chinese cuiturai values, involvhg disrespect for private interests, 
coupled with the business reality that state and Iegai persons are invariably in the position 
of majonty shareholders. ui any event, certain rights provided by the CBCA for the 
purpose of protecting minority shareholders. Iike appraisai rÏghts and the oppression 
remedy, are not applicabIe in China for the t h e  being. 
An effective appraisai right and forced share buyouts (which are the most 
Requentiy granted oppression remedies under the CBCA) both require the court to make a 
deteenation of the fair vdue of a holderk shares. The problem is how to assess fair 
market d u e  of shares in the absence of a mature market systern in China Wth few 
sS The sequence Ïs that the interests of the state are *or to the interests of the collective and to those 
of indMdaatS. The collective interests are snperior to wd&i mterests. This perspeEave is deepb 
mted in the consciousness of the Chinese people who Erne recelved commllst edncatioa 
zs See 4.1.4 B and Appndùr ID. 
sophisticated judges in China, do Chinese courts have the capacity to mess  the fair value 
of shares held by dissenting shareholders? As for derivative actions or personal actions, in 
a country where people traditionaüy adopt mediation and negotiation tu senle disputes 
and shy away fiom Uiitiating actions, to what extent can the availabiky of such actions 
help to relieve unjust treatment imposed upon minority shareholders? 
4.1.6 Summary 
The above sections have examined the role of shareholders and their 
con~olling/influencing po wer over corporate business under the CBC A and the CCL as 
well as in the business reality of Canada and China. Corporations as capital institutions 
facilitate business for the capitalkt shareholders. Shares represent the interests and iiability 
of shareholders in a corporation. A comparative examination of share structures under the 
CBCA, CCL and China's business reality indicates that share structures are closely 
comected with a nation's socid environment, statutory tradition and business redity. The 
unique classification of shares in China wfiich connects shares with an Uivestor's identity, 
coupled wÏth a share structure simüar to other western countries under the CCL 
demonstrates that China on the one hand has sought to integrate western corporate 
experiences into China's Corporate Law, yet on the other hand preserves a sociaiist regime 
by caretùlIy monitoring the amount of private capital in the Chinese equiiy market. 
Shareholders exercise controiiing/irnfluenciag power over corporate business 
through ownership of shares. A comparative examination of Canadian and Chinese 
corporate omership structures shows that Canada and China both have hi& owuership 
concentration and that cbsely-heid corporations domniate Canadian and Chinese 
corporate markets. Moreover, Canada has a high degree of interlocking ownership and 
directorships and China is now taking cautious steps toward developing employee s h  
ownership. The common characteristics of Canadian and Chinese ownership structures in 
corporations may mean that each country wiU be able to leam lessons fiom the other in 
fiiture. 
Shareholders exercise their statutory rights for control1ing corporations through 
voting. One share, one vote and majority rule are the pnncïpaI features of democracy 
based on capital. Through examuiation of three types of corporations in Canada, it is 
evident that when capital (represented by voting shares) is concentrated in the hands of a 
few shareholders, such shareholders are the true governon of the corporation 
Shareholders in China are granted extensive rights to participate in corporate 
strategic management. Through adoption of the p~c ip l e s  of one share, one vote and 
majority rule, it seems that China is embracing shareholder dernocracy on a capitalkt basis. 
But the socialism deeply moted in China appears not to completely ernbrace capitzt[ism. 
Provisions under the CCL in respect of protecting state assets reflect the fact that 
sociaiism is strongly protected during the diversification of Chinese corporate ownership. 
Examination of four types of corporations in China demonstrates that individuai 
shareholders (Le. the capitalists) are discrùninated against by both China's Corporate Laws 
and Chinese business practices. Such discrimination is associated with certain features of 
China's current economy and the phüosophy adhered tu by the Chinese people. 
[t is without doubt that sninority sharehoIders in Canada are weil protected by the 
CBCA as compared with CCL's indiaerent attitude toward minority sharehoiden in Chiaa 
Canadian corporate experiences in respect of protecbng minority shareholders on the basis 
of f h e s s  and eWty may serve as a valuable lesson for Chinese corporate Iawmakers in 
htur e. 
4.1.7 Outstanding Issues 
As abserved in Chapter 1, corporate control is associated with relationships among 
people. Proper corporate control shouid maintain bdanced relationships among corporate 
participants. This section intends to address a number of issues that need to be noted 
while appmaching bdanced intra-corporate relationships in Canada and China 
A The CBCA 
(1) DBenng Treatment for Closely-held Corporations and Publicly-held Corporations 
Aithough the vast majonty of corporations in Canada are closely-held corporations 
and Canadian corporate Iegai theory makes a cIear distinction between cIoseIy-held and 
publicly-heid corporations, the CBCA does not provide a corresponding definition or 
MerÏng treatments of the two types of corpora t i~n.~  The reason for this approach in 
the CBCA, as explained by the Dickerson Cornmittee, was that it was thought more 
appropriate for distinctions to be made between public and private corporations on 
U7 =CA ss.6(l)(d), 49(8) and 173 deaï onïy with share restnctioas For a dhssion ddinaing 
treatment for cIOSeIy-hefd corporations and pnbiic corporations, see F. IacoGucci, U L. Pikington, & J. R 
S. Pnchn& Canadian Business Coptutions: An Anabsis of Recent LgÏsIative Developments 
(Aghcomt, Ont;: Canada Law book, 1977)- 
"finctiond rather than on doctrinal grounds."z' Rather than making a broad distinction 
between public and private corporations for ail purposes, then, the CBCA defines 
corporations in diierent ways in dEerent sections? 
It is very clear that, as a pracûcd matter, corporate decision making in closely-heId 
corporations is very daferent fiom that of publiciy-held corporations. Even in public 
corporations, there are major differences between widely held public corporations and 
public corporations with high ownership concentration. Shareholders of cIoseIy-held 
corporations are more ükely to be involved in managing the corporations and have more 
cornmitment to the corporations than sharehoIders of publicly-held corporations given that 
shareholders of closely-held corporations conmiute most of their weaith to the 
corporations. Therefore, the CBCA provides shareholders of closely-held corporations a 
more ff exile business structure, which can be similar in ways to a partnenhip with limited 
liability. 'O 
As for public corporations with high ownership concentration, a single controUing 
shareholder or a smdl group of controiiing shareholders are more commined to the 
corporate business than their fellow shareholders given their more signincant investment in 
the corporation. Because a single controlhg shareholder or controIIing s hareholders of 
mch corporations are often dso the directors a d o r  managers of such corporations, they 
are very Iikely the decision-makers. Under such circumstances, there is a great need to 
- - 
SUpra note 42 (Dickerson Report) pam 36-38 at f 0-1 1. 
'W For instance, some corporations are not requlred to soücit proxies h m  thek sbanhoIdas. See CBCA 
S. 149 (2). 
" It is noted that the (IBCA in some respects aiïows ddy-heid corporations to avoid much mrporate 
formaCism, by, for example, allowing signed resofutions h Liea of m g s  (see CBCA r 111). and by 
pmviding ciosely-heid corporations the opportimity to adopt a more flexi'bie management stmcbrre [sec 
CBCA S. L02(i)). 
protect minonty shareholders' hterests. 
With regard to shareholders of widely-held public corporations, most, if not a& 
shareholders of widely held pubk corporations tend to consider themeives as passive 
hvestors rather than active participants in the corporate business."' Muiority 
shareholders of high ownership concentration public corporations also have the same 
tendency. One reason is that professional managers, by wtue of their knowIedge and 
expertise, are usudiy better qualified to make manageriai decisions than shareholders. 
Another reason is that for an investor who owns shares in a large number of companies, 
panicipating in the affairs of one typically wilI not be worthwhile since the contriiution of 
any singIe corporation to the overd value of his or her portfolio is probably going to be 
trivial. In case mismanagement does becorne a serious concem, mch an investor might 
think that selling the equity is a much quicker and Iess costly solution than trying to turn 
the corporation around b y attempting to marshd enough support fiorn other minonty 
sharehoIders to have a materiai effort on corporate management. Moreover, an investor in 
a public corporation (in particular, a widely-held public corporation) with a relatively srnaII 
proportion of personal wealth inwsted in the corporation is more Likely to reLy on other 
sharehoIders to oversee corporate performance. ActuaIIy, many other investon wiII have 
the same thought. The resuit is a "free riding" phenornenon. The fact that a shareholder 
enjoys limited Iiability fùrther reidiorces sharehoIders' indwerence to corporate decision- 
making.262 Professionai managers wield controhg power d o u t  intemention Eom 
shareholders. Under these circumstances, the pestions of how to improve corporate 
S u p  note 45 at 458. 
FIL Easterbroak and D.R Fischef, "Limiteci LiabiIity and the Corporationw (1985) 52 U. Chi  L. Rev. 
89 at 94- 
intemd control and management's accountability to the corporation and shareholders 
become very important. Given the Werent business reality in respect of corporate 
management in closely-field corporations, high ownership concentration public 
corporations and widely-held public corporations, the CBCA needs to be fiirther refined to 
deal with the very different business needs of these types of corporations, and the current 
CBCA "one size fits ail" approach, abolished. 
(2) Fiduciary Duty Owed by Majority Shareholders 
As discussed in the above section 4.1.3, Canadian corporations tend to have hi& 
ownership concentration. That is, the will of the majority shareholden can be more 
readily refiected in the corporate decision-making process. In other words, dominant 
shareholders might pursue their interests at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Nthough minorïty sharehoIders have certain Iegal rights and remedies under the 
current CBCA,'~~ Canadian courts. historically, have seemed to have a strong sympathy 
toward the majority shareholders and are reluctant to find a clear fiduciary duty owed by 
the majonty to minority shareholders or to the corporation. In the case Re Jury Gofd Mine 
Devefopment Co., 264 MiddIeton I. aated that 
If [the minority shareholder] chooses to risk his money by subscrîbing for 
shares, it is part of his bargain that he wiIi submit to the will of the 
majonty. In the absence of fiaud or transactions ultra vires, the majority 
must govern, and there shouid be no apped to the Courts for r e d r e s ~ . ~ ~  
'53 Rekr to 4.1.4 of the text. 
264 Re Jury GoidMine Deveiopment Co,, [ 19281 4 D L K  735 at 1736 (0 .C .k )  
266 I6td See also Brant ImesbnenLs Lfd v. Keeprite Inc (1987). 60 O R  (2d) 737. w b  the Ontario 
Court of Appeal hdd that majority sharehoiders in Canada do not owe a fiduciary duty to miuonty 
sharehholders. 
Such antipathy of the courts towards minority shareholders has its mots in the "intemal 
management d e "  developed by Lord ~ a v e ~ : ~ ~  and the "seifish ownership d e "  
developed in the case of Pender v. ~ u s h i n g d ~  and dtunateiy traced to Foss v. 
~ ' o t t i e . ~ *  
Therefo re, hist oricaily, Canadian courts have adhered to the notion that controlling 
shareholders owe no fiduciary duties to fellow shareholders or the corporation269 ifmost 
Canadian public corporations were widely held, with no controlling shareholder, contlicts 
between controlling shareholders and mino* shareholders wodd be rare. However, 
Canadian markets are characterized by a high degree of concentrated corporate 
ownership. This business fact gready increases the potentiai confiïcts between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 
The business reality of Canadian corporate markets requires Canadian judges to 
Iook beyond common law precedents Uihented from a century of jurisprudence, that have 
See a h  the comments of J. G. Machtosh, " The Role of Institutionai and Retail Imestors in Canadian 
Capital Markets" ( 19%) 3 1 Osgoode Hall L. I. at 2371. 
'66 Burhdv. Eark (L902), AL.  83 (P.C.) at 93. 
Tt is an elementary principle of Iaw rdating to joint stock companies that the Court wil l  not interfere with 
the internai management of campanies acting wi îhh  their powers? and in fact has no jurisdiction to do 
Sb." 
" Pender v. Lushington (1877),6 Ch. D. 70 (CA) at 75. 
"Where men ex- their rîghts of property, they exefcise their rights h m  mue motive a-te or 
hadequate, and 1 have aiways considered the law to be that those who have the rights of property are 
entitïed to exercise them whatever theu motives be for snch exeruSerusen 
" Svpm note 242. 
Roberts v. Pefhg (198 L), 130 D L R  (36) 76 I,16 B U  150 (B.C.S.C.). 
B m  Imesîments Lrd v- KeepRite Inc (1987), 60 OJ1 (2d) 737, 42 DL& (4th) 15, (ELC-J-), 
suppiemenîary reasons, 6 1 O R  (2d) 469, 43 D I A .  (4th) 141, 
found that shareholders owe no fiduciary duties either to their feilow shareholders or to 
the c ~ r ~ o r a t i o n . ~  
In the 1970s, the Ontario Court of Appeal appeared to move fkom the majority 
rule to an equity and faimess mie and began to consider minority shareholders' interests in 
the corporation. The Court of Appeal appeared to be prepared to impose a fiduciary duty 
upon majority shareholders. In the case, G o l '  Mines Ltd v. Revill, n1 the Court of 
Appeal stated that 
The principle that the majority govems in corporate affairs is 
fiindamentai to corporation law, but its coroiIary is also important 
- that the majority must act fairly and honestly. Faimess is the 
touchstone of equitable justice. and when the test of faimess is 
not met, the equitable junsdiction of the Court can be invoked to 
prevent or remedy the injustice which misrepresentation or other 
dishonesty has caused.. . . 
in the Canadian legai cornmunit-, whether majority shareholders today have a 
fiduciary duty to the mino@ shareholders or the corporation is a matter of some 
controversy. Some Canadian scholars argue that the oppression remedy under the CBCA 
rnay provide a way of imposing directiy or indirectiy a fiduciary duty on majocity 
" In addition to the importance of common Iaw pcecedence. Machtosh, HoLmes and Thompson provide 
other possible explanations as to why Canadian judges may be refuctant to impose fiduciary duties upon 
conuoIhg shareholders. PIease see I.G. Macïntosh with f. HoImes & S. Thompson, "The M e  of 
Shareholder Fiduciq Duties" in (199 1) 19 Can, Bus. L.I. 86. 
in this artide, Macintash, Homes and Thompson seek to expIain why7 in the face of more widespread 
inter-investor con£Iicts of interest (@en high degree ownership concentration in Canadian corporations), 
the Iegai doctrine in Canada has not fo&y adumbrated fiduciary standards of conduct for controUiag 
shareholders. whiIe the Amencan courts have. Three possibIe expIanations &d by them are as 
FoIIows: 
Fust, since controiiing shareholders are often aiso directors or officers, they are subject, in their capacity 
as offices or directors, to fiduciaq duties, in arry event (at 100 - 105). Second, minority shareholders 
have been protected to a relatively great extent by the existence of widdy cast power of review wbch has 
aliowed the administrators and courts alike to test the fairaes of the majonty7s treatment of the nrinority 
(at 105 - 129)- Thirb ddopments under the statutory opp-ou rem* which have reduced the 
pressnre to impose fiducia~~ duties on shateho1de.r~ (at 130 - 13 4). 
I" G o l k  Mhes Ltd v. Reviif (I975),7 O X  (2d) 216 ai 224. 
shareholders to either the rninority shareholden or the corporation.m It seems that 
Canadian courts will have to M e r  clarify this issue. 
(3) Institutionai Shareholders in Publicly-held Corporations 
As analyzed in Seaion 4.1.5 above, instmitionai shareholden, especidy pension 
fùnds, life insurance companies and mutual funds, hold large equity positions in big and 
more iiquid publicly-held c ~ r ~ o r a t i o n s . ~  According to the Task Force on the Future of 
the Canadian Financial SeMces sectoqn4 
. . . many of Canada's financial institutions own investments in 
public corporations throughout the country that may, panicuiarly 
in special circumstances, enable the hancial institutions to 
inauence manageriai decisions of the public corporations. This is 
particulady the case if investments that are not directly owned by 
the institutions, but are owned by pooled funds (Le. mutua1 funds, 
pension hnds and segregated funds) that are managed by the 
institutions, are taken hto account. 
Montgomery's survey demonsvates that today's institutional shareholders in 
Canada are more likely to take actions for improving corporate performance rather than 
simply "vote with the feet" (i.e. by seliing their shares)." Such increased institutionai 
shareholders' participation in corporate management challenges controlling shareholders' 
" J.S. Ziegel et al., Cases and Materiais on Partnerships and Canadiart Business Corporuttions. 2nd ed 
vo1.2 (Toronto: The CarsweIl Company Limited, L 989) at 69 1. 
rn KE. Montgomery. "Market Shift - The RoIe of Institutionai Investors in Corporate Govenianœn 
( 1996) 26 Can, Bus. t. J. 189 at 196. 
The nwey was mmpleted by over 100 Canadian institutions, maidy public and prNate pension h d s  and 
Ïnvestment counselors, 
274 T& Force on the Future of the Canadian Fihanaai Semices Saor, Tak Force on the Future of rhc 
Canadian FinanciaL Services Secfor DiscumOn P q e r  (Toronto: Task Force on the Future of the 
Canadian F~tlil~~ciai Sector, L997). 
" Supra note 273 at 192- 
power in corporate decision making? For example, in the case of a corporation with a 
controlhg sharehoIder, the provisions of the CBCA regarding special resolutions for 
fiindamentai corporate changes could permit an institutional shareholder to defeat a 
special reso~ution.~ 
(4) Shareholders' Communication in Publicly-held Corporations 
Shareholder democracy provided by the CBCA can oniy work if shareholders can 
be "reached, persuaded, and galvanized to active participation in corporate ~ a e . ' ' ~ ~  
Without facilitative shareholder communication devices, shareholders' power to coaaol or 
influence corporate rnatters wiU be hstrated. Shareholder proposals under the CBCA 
provide a platform for registered voting shareholders to bypass the corporate management 
and place an issue before a shareholders' meetings. As such, a shareholder c m  participate 
directly in corporate business and inform other shareholders to take action. 
However, the sharehoIder proposa1 scheme provided by the CBCA is not d o u t  
defects. Fust, the ability of beneticiai shareholders whose shares are registered in the 
name of a depositary or other nominee is ~ u r b e d . ~ ~  Some reformers have advocated 
imposing Iegai obligations upon intermediaries regarding communication between 
36 Supra note 133 at 172. 
" This wouïd oniy be me, however, if00 the con~olIing shareholder had l e s  ihan 213 of the shares and 
the instituîionai sharehoIder, together with otbers opposed to the tesoIutioa, togeher hold as Ieast 1/3 of 
shares present and voting at rhe reIevant meting. 
" Supra note 45 ai 456. 
n9 S. Kaz* "Canada Shareholder ProposaIsn onluie: Oder Hoskui & Harcourt (Bamster & 
Solicitors, Patent and Trademark Agents) 
<httpf/~-osler~~~m(pubIfcations/BOardmOm-P~dn~html~ (date a- June 18, t999), 
beneficial shareholders and the corporation under the C B C A . ~  Second as criticized by 
Professor Welling, though the CBCA provides that individuai shareholders have the right 
to bring a proposal before the shareholders' generai meeting, the CBCA fails to clarify the 
power of the generd meeting to nile on the matter of the propo~al.~~' In other words, the 
CBCA specifies the procedure of initiating shareholder proposais but neglects to give the 
geneml meeting substantive power to deal with the shareholder proposai.2s2 
One way to overcome the limitation upon kneficiary sharehoIders woId be for such a shareholder to 
purchase a singie share, register it Ur his or her m e ,  and submit the proposal fier that. 
The case of V e r h  v. Toronto-Dominiorr Bank, [ 19961 3 SCRSSO raised an issue regardhg whether the 
appellant (J.R Verdun), a s  a bencficiai shareholder of the cespondent bank (Toronto-Dominion Bank), 
was entiticd ta have his shareholders proposais included in the respondent's management proxy circuiar. 
in order to submit a proposai, a person must be "a shareholder entitied to vote at an annual meeting of 
shareholders of a bank". The Suprcme Court had to determine whether a beneficiai shareholder is a 
"shareholder entitled to votew within the meaning of the Bank Act, 
It was held that a bendicial shareholder is not entitied to submit a propod. lacobucci J. stated that a 
shareholder is not without recourse however since he or she rnay submit a proposai through the registered 
holder or the benficiai holder may have one or more shares registered in hisher own cight. 
ft is dso noted that as a generai matter some of the shareholder communication problems arising h m  
shares held by a depository or othcr nominee have ben addressed by Secufities regulations. See e.g 
Nationai Policy Statement No.41 - S W o I d e r  Communication (1988/03/18) 1 L O.S.C.B. 1242 (NP#41). 
Under M I ,  an issuer must q e s t  and obtain fiom depository institutions the names of the beneficial 
shareholders (or other secmities holders) on whose behalf the depository institution or other norninee 
holds the securities More an upcoming meeting of securïty holders. NP#4I m e r  provides that the 
depository institution or other nominee must let non-registered sedty  holders know their rights under 
NP#Jl, and request written instructions as to whether they wish to receive materials about annuai or 
special meetings of security holders from the issuer. 
The issue of shareholder communication between benefiicai sbareholders and registered shareholden 
has attracted considerable attention fiom Canadian commentators and Iaw refomers. The Standing 
Senate Cornmittee on Banking Trade and Commem, chaired by Michaet Kirby, made 27 
recommendations in its report in August, 1996, induding recommendations that registereâ shareholders 
be furnished, at a h e d  pcriod of tirne, a Iist that ÏncIudes ait benenciai shareholders. But Intermediees 
wouid be permitted to withhold the names and addresses of beneficiai shareholders who have requestd in 
writing that their fnformation not be teleased Such a list could be used to enhance the communication 
among shareholders with regard to the business and a f E n  ofa corporation, 
"' Supra note 45 at 475. 
sz did at 468 - 480. Professor Chnstopher C. Nicholls of Fanilty of Law of DalhoUge Univenity bas 
presented anouier view of this apparent Itdefin: if the CBCA providecl that any shareholder proposai 
presented, and passed, at a sharehotders meting of a public corporation requhd the directors to act in 
accordance with such a propasal, it is possliIe tbat s6arehofders couid appme d o m e d  proposais 
since the sharehoIders do not have acçess to decaileü business Mormatioa Indeed, shareholders couid 
never be given access to mch information because, in a p u b k  corporation, information providecf to 
s W o I d e r s  i~ by its nature, pubiic information CommeraaIy sngtive mformation, accordin&, must 
be withIieid, subject to continnous disclosme rcries. As a cesui, sharehoidhs simply do not have sutfi:cient 
Further reform of the CBCA may have to address the problem of shareholder 
communication within public corporations in order to improve s hareholders' democracy . 
The CCL 
Protection of Minority SharehoIderst Interests 
As discussed in section 4.1.3 above, Chinese corporations have a high 
concentration of aate/public ownership. The extraordinary rights enjoyed by shareholders 
with respect to corporate management (see 4.1.4 B (1) above) may permit controllhg 
shareholders more easily to pursue group interests or political aims at the expense of 
minonty shareholders. In China, most of the minority shareholders are individual 
shareholders. Individual investors are already in a disadvantaged position relative to the 
state shareholders or other Iegal penon shareholders in terms of information resources and 
expertise in anaiyzing corporate information. For mhority shareholders in China, who 
dislike the way management operates, there are only two choices: keep silent or sel1 one's 
shares.*" Selling shares requires a liquid market. The Chinese secunties market is not as 
Iiquid as the Canadian market. On the other hand, there are fewer iisted corporations in 
China than in which means Chmese investon' oppomuuty to diversify their 
intorrnation to make inforneci decisions on detailed business matters For tbis raison, the argument goes, 
the CBCA m o t  requirr direaon to impkment aiI sharehoIder proposais. and sa at best, they cm k 
precauto y in n a m .  
'83 PIease note that C U  does not pmvide appraisd rights tu dlssenting sharrhoIders. 
At the end of 1998, there wue 454 corporations Iisted on Shanghai Stock ExcZiange, and 43 1 Iîsted on 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
holdings to reduce investment nsk is largely restricted. The infant Chinese market system, 
an absence of a "lawmaking " fùnction on the part of the China's  courts^" unsophisticated 
Chinese investors, and a shortage of professional investment advisors and professional 
experts, iike auditors and lawyers. make Chinese investoa more dependent upon 
corporate law (rather than contractual arrangements) to protect their interests and express 
their wishes to corporate management. If corporate Iaw does not provide sufficient legal 
remedies to the minority shareholders and allow them to protect their own interests? 
eventuaiiy China will Iose capital support fiom the private sector. 
Reforms in Canada have dready alleviated the problems associated with the 
generai nile that shareholders holding more than 50 per cent of the voting shares cm elect 
or remove 100 per cent of the board of directon and othenvise pass shareholder 
resolutions. The solutions are cumulative voting, class veto and separate class resolutions. 
CCL, however, lacks similar provisions. Chinese law-makers should similarly move Eom 
the simpIe majority rule to a mle ernphasizing faimess and equity so as to enhance the 
credibility of its capital market.'*' In so doing, Canadian experiences in protecting 
minority shareholders can serve as good examples. 
a Cumulative Votinç 
Sec Onlhte: Securities Times < h t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t i e s t i m e s . c o m c n l n b  I998fshzb. h t m  (date accessed: Iune 
18, 1999) in Chinese version, 
See 5.4 infra. 
" China d w  not h;Nc a ease law systcm. Iudges are mt pennitted to make law. Generaiiy, thy can 
on& appiy Iaw accordiag Co specific fans. Therefoce, the oniy power to d o m  law rests with the 
IawmakerS. 
As discussed in section 4.1 -5 A (9, a cumulative voting system ensures minority 
shareholders have representation on the board of directon. Examining the business reality 
of Type A and B public corporations as demonstrated in the Appendk III - A and HI - B, 
individual shareholders in China very likely encounter the situation that state shareholders 
or legal penon shareholders holding jua over 50 per cent of the voting shares are able to 
elect IO0 per cent of the directors. 
If Chinese lawmakers want minority shareholders to be represented on the board, a 
cumulative voting system is a technical provision that can be borrowed from the CBCA. 
If cumulative voting were adopted however, CCL would aiso need to address the 
possibility that a simple majority of shareholders codd easîly remove a "minority" director 
originally elected through the exercise of cumulative voting since CCL States clearly that 
shareholders have the right to remove a director. Thus, the technicd provisions under the 
CBCA relating to class veto" and separate reso~utions~~~ as weU as the CBCA provision 
that deals specifically with this "minority director" issue would also need to be taken into 
account . *" 
b. Appraisal Right 
As andyzed in section 4.1-5 A(1), the appraisai right ailows shareholders to 
protect themselves against being forced to participate in a corporation that has undergone 
a &damental change 6om the time they initialIy investeci in the corporation. The 
CBCA rl76 (1). 
xm CBCA a I76(6). 
" CBCA S. IOXg). 
appmisd right is Iike an "exit" door to dissenting siiareholders. Shce the appraikd right 
has certain value for protecting minonty shareholders of cIoseiy-heId corporations, and 
minority shareholders of public corporations with high ownership concentration or whose 
shares trade in thin capitai markets, it appears that the appraisai right is weU suiteci to 
China. This is so because, fht, C b a  has a vast number of closely held corporatioas; 
second, because the Chinese equity market is not highIy liquid; and third, because China 
has a high ownership concentration corporations' market.290 
For shareholders of Chinese closely-held corporations and Ininority shareholders of 
high ownership concentration pubIic corporations, the chance for withdrawing tiom the 
corporation and receiving fair compensation is ~united.~' The provision under the CCL 
requiring that fundamental changes to the corporation must be approved by a super- 
majority of shareholdersm is a device that may effectively protect muiority shareholders in 
Chinese corporations. 
Introducing appraisal rights into CCL would no doubt enhance the ability of 
rninority shareholders to protect their own interests. Further, appraisal rights couid serve 
to protect against unwise or opportunistic findamentai changes faditated by a 
management-controlled proxy mechanism in a corporation where the majority of 
shareholders are uninterested or apathetic. However, at this stage in its developmem, 
Refer to 4.1.3 A above and 5.2, L B belaw, 
Artide 35 of C a  provides that in a k t e d  Liability company (th* is a doseiy hdd corporation) when 
a sharehorder intends to assign its capitai contribution to persans who are not sharehofders, the consent of 
over haif of ai i  the shareholderr must k senned Those shareholders disappmving the assigmnem W 
purchase the capital cona i ion  to be assigneb If mch shareholders do aot make the pmdmse, dey are 
deemed to have consenteci to the assignment 
29 t Arcides 39 and 40 of C U  Tor cIosely held corporations. Artides 106 and 101 of CCL for pubtic 
corporations. 
China c a ~ o t  borrow the Canadian version of appraisal rights suice the pre-conditions for 
effectively exercising the appraisal right (such as, the cultural values, the development of a 
market economy, sophistication of the courts, etc.) are not satisfied in China as discussed 
in the section 4.1.5 B (2) above. 
In addition, the Canadian experience with appraisd rights raises some serious 
questions about the value of nich rights to Canadian sbarehoIden in any event. China 
wouid need tu consider these concems about the appraisal remedy before adopting it. The 
concems raised by the appraisd remedy under the CBCA include issues relating to tax 
coas, brokerage costs, delay coas, procedurd hurdies, the expense of exercise, 
adjudication tisk and cos to the corporation as analyzed by Professor ~aclntosh?~ Tax 
cost refers to the fact that the election of the appraisai option by a dissenting shareholder 
may trigger a taxable event for that shareholder. The fiindamental change dissented from 
may or rnay not aIso result in a taxable event for a non-dissenting shareholder. The 
decision of whether to elect to exercise the appraisai right may be influenced by the 
relative tax treatment accorded dissenting and non-dissenting shareho~ders.~~~ It is 
suggeaed that, irrespective of the rationaie and ciraunstances under which the right is 
claimed, the appropriate tax treatment of dissenters shouid be the same as that accorded 
non-dis sen ter^."^ Brokerage costs issues arise on the assumption that the dissentient 
shareholder rehvests the proceeds arkng Eom the appraisal, so that brokerage fees or 
- - 
L93 1. G. MacIntosh, The Shareholders' Appraisai Right m Canada,- A Critical Reappraisalw (I988)13 
Canada-United States Law J o d  299 at 344. The artide fint appearrd in (1986) 24 Osgoode AaII L. 1. 
20 L. 
other reinvestment costs wouId be added to the appraised value of ~hares?~ As in the 
case of tax costs, the objective shouid be to ensure equai treamient of dissenters and non- 
dissenters in order to eliminate any art i f id  incentive to claiming or not claiming the 
appraisai right. Delay cost is the cost that may arise Eom the time Merence between the 
date of a resohtion adopting the hdamental change, and the date on which a cash payout 
is made to the shareho~der.~ Procedurai hurdles refer to the fact that the exercise of 
appraisai rights requires shareiioiders to foUow detaiied technical procedures under the 
CBCA?' The expense of exercise relates to the expenses arising nom hiring experts to 
appraise share value. Adjudication risk arises in comection with the considerable 
uncertainty connected with the current mode of the appraisai remedy under the CBCA." 
Cost to the corporation refers to the fact that the exercise of an appraisal ri& is beyond 
the predictable expenses of the corporation and so might deter value-added fundamentai 
changes.300 Moreover, beneficid shareholders are not entitled to invoke the appraisd 
remedy since only "a holder of shares of any cIass of a corporation"3o' (in other words, 
only a registered shareholder of shares as indicated in the corporation's share registry) may 
- -- - 
ibid at 348 - 349. 
It was recognized by Profcssor Maclntosh that added cost at most indudes the vaiue of curent brokerage 
costs Iess the present vaiue of the curent brokerage costs that wodd have been incured on a Citture sale in 
the ordinary course of events. 
Ibid at 350 - 35 L. Madntosh acplained that the shareholder who dis~ents loses a i l  6is or her rights as 
a shareholder, incfuding the right to ceceive cibidemis, genedy withiri about one month fiom the date 
when the resoiution adopting the fiindamenta1 change is appmed by shareholders. The date when the 
action appmved by the resoIution is &ectiVe couid conceivabIy be much latex than the date at which the 
dissenthg sharehoider's capitai Ioses its wrning power, 
Ibki at 351 - 355. For instance a Iitany of notices, counter-notices, and deadhes. 
dissent under the CBCA.)" 
c. Oppression Remedy 
The oppression remedy (as addressed in 4.1.5 A(3) above) gets courts involved in 
corporate &airs. Canadian experience with the oppression remedy requires toms to 
interpret what consthtes "oppressive", "udair" or "prejudicial". However, an oppression 
remedy would not be viable in China for the tirne being. 
First, as discussed in 5.5 below, Chinese traditiond culture is a culture 
characterized by disrespect for private property rights and respect for hierarchy and the 
Chinese people are non-iitigation orientated. Without consciousness of proteaing their 
private property rights and their hterests in the corporation, rninority shareholders in 
China are very Iikely to remain subject to the discretion of the majonty shareholders and 
might not be expeaed tu make significant use of Iegal actions to protect their interests 
even if such legai remedies were avaiIabIe. Second, a chilling fact in today's China is that 
legd education and training has not been developed so as to cultivate sophisticated judges 
who comprehend corporate bus in es^."^ Thus, the oppression remedy, relying on courts to 
- 
B ~ u n  and LaasLy argueci that, ifthe registereci shareholders lcfuscd to disent on behaifof a buicficial 
owner, the benencial shareholder wouici have no appraisal rem- under CBCA, but wouid perhaps be 
able to get an order based on equitabIe principles cornpehg the cegistemi sfiareholder to compiy 1vît.h 
the terms of their tnrst arrangement 
See note 232 at 689, suprtr. 
m3 LegaI edocation in China is totaiIy d i n i t  h m  that of Canada In China Iegai educition may be 
conducted by schoois of Iaw in Iarge umversities or by poLitics and Iaw insattutes. Law schools and 
politics and Ianr institutions provide regdisr le@ courses for fbU-tirne students admitteci tbr0ug.h aïï- 
China UnivetSities and CoUeges EmoLIment Examinations (one tÎme per year). Schook of Iaw are 
nipeniised by the MkÏstry of Ed~~cation, wbile politics and law institutions are under the mpenrûion of 
the Mb&q of Justice. The Ministry of Instice ais0 operates the Central Sch001 for Politics and Law 
Management Cadtes? the Centrai Scfiool for Labor Reform Management Cadres* and schwls for thc 
interpret and provide remedies to the "oppressed" shareholders accordhg to vague terms 
under corporate law, rnay not find its setting in China at the moment. 
(2) Fiduciary Duty of Majonty Shareholders 
Though CCL provides for closely-held corporations and publicly-held corporations 
in different chapters and offen specific definitions of these temis, the provisions relating to 
shareholder power in closely-held corporations and public corporations are almost the 
same in both ~ h a ~ t e n . ~ ' ~  As discussed in 4.1.4 above and shown in Appendk UI, it is 
apparent that majonty shareholders in China legally and practically have too much power 
and they can effectively direct corporate business even at the expense of minority 
shareholders' intereas, particuiarly individual shareholders' interests. Therefore, it may be 
advisable to provide for a fiduciary duty owing by majority shareholders to minority 
shareholders and to the corporation in the CCL as a means of moving from simple 
majonty nile to the fair and equitable n i~e .~~ '  
training of judiciai cadres. In ordcr to sati* people's interest in snidying Iaw, some institutions also 
provide evening courses or correspondence courses. 
For an introduction to the Cliinese le@ system and Icgai education, please d e r  to C. Cheng fie. "The 
Legai System in China", onïine: Legai Fonim, 
<http://www.enstarnstarnet/chin~aw~-&CI-9. h W  (date accessed: Juiy 3, 1999) 
nu Anide 38(10) of CCL. 
The only diffixence between sharehoIders' rights and responsibiiities in a cIoseJy-heid corporation and 
those of sharehoIders of a pubIiciy-held corporation relates to the assignment of shares. For sharehoîders 
of c10seiy heid cotporations, share transfi to outside investors must be appmed by ail  mSdé 
sharehoIders of the corporation, 
305 It is noted ihat therc is a controversy here If the existene of Iegai media such as the oppression 
rem@ wouid not work ia China because of the facts mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the provision 
of a fiduaary dnty may also not work at ail for mùiority sharehoiders in 
CCL borrowed the concept of shareholder proposais nom the West, but CCL's 
genenc provision in respect of shareholder proposais does not seem to effectively ensure 
that shareholders can actudIy exercise the proposai right. it states that shareholders of 
public corporations have the right to propose suggestions relating to corporate business.306 
The law does not fiirther dari& whether such a proposal is to be submitted to 
shareholders' generd meetings or to the corporate management. Nor does the law provide 
a specific procedure that shareholders should follow if they want to exercise the 
suggestion right. The shareholder proposal is an important legal device to aliow 
shareholders to bypass management and enhance shareholder communication. It is 
therefore advisable to provide a more detailed and operable provision regarding 
shareholder proposais under CCL. 
This section has provided some generd recommendations for fùrther refining 
corporate intemal control under the CBCA and CCL on the bais of stnking a balanced 
relationship arnong shareholders in Canada and China. The shareholders, who bear the 
greatea economic tisk within a corporation, are the people that one cannot negiect while 
addressing corporate internai control. in addition to shareholders, however, one must also 
consider other corporate participants Iike directors, mangers, and employees when 
studying the subject of corporate internai control. They are to be  addressed below. 
306 Article 1 IO & C U :  
"SbehoIdexs shaiI have the right to examine the articks of association of the Company, the m i m e s  of 
the sharehoiders' g e n d  meetings and the hc id  and acconnting statements, and to make suggestiom 
or inquiries about the burintss operation of f ié  company." (emphasis added) 
4.2 Board of Duectors - Control through Statutory Power 
4.2.1 Power of Directors in Law and Reality 
A Under the CBCA 
Theoretically, the very existence of the board of directon and the statutory power 
that the CBCA confers upon the board of dire~ton'~' make the board the corporate 
decision-maker. This actual decision-making role for the board of directors is a reality in 
the case of closely held corporations or public corporations with high ownership 
concentration, but may not be the case in widely-held public corporations. 
In reality, as Appendix LI-C shows, the board of directors is the corporate decision 
maker in Canadian closely held corporations given that the role of shareholder, director(s) 
and managerid officer is ofien pIayed by one person or by members of a single controhg 
farnily. In the case of public corporations with high ownership concentration, as Appendix 
CI-6 shows a single sharehoIder or a srnail group of controlling shareholden are able to 
elect themselves or their nominees as directon and mangers. Therefore, those 
shareholder-directors will be in a position to direct corporate business. 
However, the board of directors of wideiy-held public corporations usudy is not 
the dtîmate corporate controlIer. As Appendor II-A shows, the Chief Executive Officer, 
for al1 practical purposes, very Iikely holds the dtimate decision power. 
The role actudy played by the board of directon in wideIy held public 
" CBCA S. 102(I). 
corporations is considerably circurnscnied because the board is more likely to lave 
corporate management to managerial officers, a fact confirmeci by Professor Mace in his 
field study in the 1970s.~~' 
In modem public corporations, the role of the board of directors has been defined 
as that of a monitor, rather than a manager, of the corporation An example is the TSE's 
adoption of a set of suidelines in 1994 - Nhere Were the Directors? Guidelines for 
Improved Corporate Governnnce N, Cana& ("Dey Report") - designed to enhance 
corporate govemance in The roIe of the board under the Dey Report is defined 
as 
. . .adoption of a arategic planning process; the identification of the 
principal risks of the corporation's business and ensuring the 
implementation of appropriate systems to manage these risks; 
succession planning, including appointing, training and monitoring 
senior management; a communications poiicy for the corporation; 
and the integrity of the CO oration's intemal control and 
%O management information systems. 
The recommendations made by the Dey Report reflect that in the business reality 
Supra note S. 
3 0 9  Supra note 20 (Dcy Report). The TSE corponte governance guidelines relate to a nuaber of 
Zgnincant governance issue. inciuding thc proper role of the board of directors, the structure and 
composition of the board and its reIattonships with sharehoIders and with management For commentary, 
please see Smith Lyons (Bamsters B Solicitors* Patent and Trademark Agents), 'Commentary: TSE 
Report on Corporate Govcrnancc0*. Online: <http~lhvww..miithlyotl~.calcomment/~.hmi~ (date affessed: 
Aptir 25, 1999); 
EA (Ward) SeIIers, "Final Repon of the Toronto Stock Exchange Commr-ttee on Corporate Governancew 
Ouiin= ~http:I/~~~.law.cornetI.edu/tnjftse-htm> (&te accesse6: Aprii 25, 1999); and D. W- Dnnkwater 
& R L Nathan, -New Corporate Govemance Disdosure Standards of &nadian Stock Exchmges B e c m e  
Enectiven <http:/hw.oslcr.com/R~urces/BoardS~f1l~2~htmj~ (dateacased: A p d  25,1999). 
Sinœ Jme 30, 1995. corporations Iisted on TSE have been repuirrd to pmfOVtde th& shaietiolders with 
discIosure of th& corporate govcniance pranices with teference to the guideluies ofthe TSE cornmittee 
on Corporate Governana in Cam& On lu@ 10, 1995, the Montnal Exchange adviad Iisted 
corporations to comply with its corporate govcfnance guidelines and discIo~uze req-ents &iiar 10 
the TSE's. 
of large publicly-held corporations, directon, other than inside directors, usuaiIy devote 
Little time to corporate daiIy management and do not have sufficknt information to make 
corporate decisions. The board therefore Iargely relies on the senior ofFcers, auditon, and 
advisors to make decisions. Since the board usually meets a few times per year, this 
makes it essentiaily impossibIe for the board to exercise continuhg govemance.31' The 
Dey Report therefore recommended that the responsibility for the day-today conduct of 
business belongs to the management and that the CBCA should be revised to eliminate any 
possible misinterpretation that directors are responsible for managing the daily operation 
of corporations. ''* 
Accordingly, the different business realities of widely-held public corporations, 
public corporations with hi& ownership concentration and closely held corporations invite 
reform of the CBCA provisions which provide uniform standards for the powen and 
responsibility of boards of directors of ail CBCA corporations. 
B Under CCL and FIES Laws 
CCL provides the same statutory power to the board of directors of a closely-held 
corporation as to that of a publicly-held corporation though these provisions are listed in 
different chapters of the CCL. According to CCL, the board of directon of a corporation 
should convene shareholders' meetings and report to the shareholdm about the 
perfiomance of the corporation; cany out the decisions reached by the sharehoIders' 
E K Neam, "Organïzationai Economics and Directors' Conuol" (1996) 26 Cari Bos. L. 1. 106 at 
118-i 19. 
312 Supra note 20 @ey Eteport). See also C. Corner, Canadiun Directomhip Practice 1995: A New Ero in 
Corpomte Goventance (Canada: The Corrférenœ Board of Canada, 1995) at 19. 
meetings; &cide the corporute operation and investment pl- f o d a t e  corporate 
annuai hancial budget plans and final accounting plans; formulate corporate profit 
distribution plans and a plan to sati* any budget defi& make needed adjustments to the 
arnount of the registered capital; formulate plans for the issuance of corporate bonds; draft 
plans regarding mergers, splits or dissolution of the corporation; appoint and remove 
corporate management, including the generai manager; and fomiate the coporate 
finuhentaal management system .3 l3 
As listed above, most of the responsibilities that CCL vests with the board of 
diredors involve making recommendations for the shareholders' meeting to consider in 
reaching decisions concerning corporate strategic matîers. Therefore, the board of 
directors has a strong idiuential power in directhg corporate strategic maners. As to 
corporate daiiy management and operation, they are also aatutody in the control of the 
board of directors. This phenornenon has a close relationship with CCL's two-tier board 
structure which d l  be addressed in 4.3.2 below. 
Widely-held public corporations are rare in In ternis of public 
corporations with high ownership concentration, as Appendix iil-A, DI-B and HI-C show, 
in each case, the board of directors is not the ultimate controiIer. As a controiiing 
shareholder, the state or the legai persons3'5 register their discretion (ofien through their 
nominees on the board) directiy with the corporations. 
Wth regard to foreign investment companies, FIES Laws clearly recognize that the 
"' Anicles 46 and 1 12 of CCL (emphasis added). 
314 Tt is partiy because the Chinese peopCe are used to Saving money rather than makllig imrestments. 
Moreoverv hi@ nsk in Chinese equity markets discomages peopfe h m  putting money mto thas marIrets. 
Supra note LOB. 
board of directors is the bighest authority wiuùn a foreign investment company.316 The 
board of directors of a foreign investment enterprise thus Î n  theory has the power to 
decide al1 matters of the Company. However the business reaiity of ETES is that investon 
(Chinese and Foreign investon in the case of sino-Foreign jomt ventures or foreign 
investors in the case of wholly foreign enterprises) together make final decisions if they 
concem corporate strategic &airs. 
The difference in the respective roles of the board of directors of Chinese public 
corporations and Canadian public corporations derives fkom the dEerent corporate 
management models followed in the two countries. In Chuia, the vast majority of boards 
of directors in theory and in practice never redy make a move beyond the operational role 
of managing (i.e. daily management) toward the strategic role of directing. Strategic 
directing is an inteilectuai and reflective process rather than an operationai one. It requires 
directors to consider how to ailocate the basic resources of people, money, physicai 
property, intellectuai property, experience, research and development and to achieve long- 
term and short-term goals. During China's pIanning economy period, an enterprise is Iike 
a machine that runs on rails dt a speed and to a tirnetable set by the aate and so the need 
for strategic thinking on the part ofthe corporation's directors is non-existent. This is why 
China's socialia society equates the director with a production manager and equates the 
manager with a production engineer. Duectors are never to engage in the strategic 
Article 34 of ImpIementation Regdations of E N  Law and Artide 24 of LupIaoentation Mes of CN 
Law. WFûE Law d o a  not provide internai management organs. It seans that to IO0 per cent fore@ 
firnded companies in China, the Chinese Iawmakm leave all corporate mattas with the foreign investors 
planning but merely to irnplement k3" Aithough CCL adopts the fom of the corporation 
fkom capitalist countries, CCL basically adheres to the management mode left by China's 
planning economy and requires directors to handle corporate daily management. 'ïhat is, 
though CCL introduced the structure of the board of directors3" in its form of 
corporation, the oId management mode left by China's planning economy is still adopted in 
practice. CCL merges elements of a modem corporate structure with China's traditional 
enterprise management. But one cannot give direction if one is "head down", managuig 
business day-to-day and hour-to-hour. The neglea of policy and strategic issues by 
directors in China, in favor of ongoing involvement in day-to-day operations, can not be 
addressed if China's Corporate Laws do not change the corporate intemal govemance 
structure and Iegal framework of property rights. 
4.2.2 Duty of Directors 
A Under the CBCA 
On the one hand, the CBCA delegates corporate management power to the board 
of directors; on the other hand, it imposes fiduciary duties and duties of care, diligence and 
ski11 upon directors to ensure their accountabiIity to the corporation.3tg The fiduciary duty 
under the CBCA requires directors to act "honestly and in good faith with a view to the 
317 B. Garratt, V W n g  and the Learning Boardm fn LU Boisot, East-West Bmness Collaboration: The 
Challenge of Governmce in Post-sociaiist Eitferprises (London and New York: Etoutiedge, 1994) 7 at1T 
318 In stateiiwned enterprises and colIectiveIy owned enterprises diiring Chnia's pIanning economy, no 
structure of board ~CdÏrectors ispmided by enterprise Iaws- 
best interests of the corporation.J20 Duties of care, diligence and skilI requUe that 
directors in exercising their powers and discharging their duties should exercise the care, 
diligence and skill that "a reasonabiy prudent person would exercise in comparable 
tr 321 circumstances . In addition to these duties under the CBCA, diiectors of Canadian 
corporations are subject to other obligations under other laws B e  taxation laws, 
environmental laws, and laws relating to occupational health and ~ a f e t y . ~ ~  
Canadian directors' personal liability in the area of environmental Iaw, workplace 
safety, wages, amounts withheld for income tax purposes, etc. has aiready prornpted 
concems fiom the Canadian business commuaity. It is argued that heavy personai iiabiiity 
for directors causes competent persons to be reiuctant to sit on boards. It aiso results in 
the use of scarce corporate assets to purchase directors' and officers' insurance3" or in a 
number of cases, to create tma fiinds for inducing hem to remain in office.n4 The 
Standing Senate ComMttee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in Canada recomrnended 
in August 1996 (Kirby Report) that directors should be released fiom liability for wrongful 
3x1 CBCA S. 122 (1) (a). 
ni CBCA S. l î 2  (1) @). 
" C. S. L. Hoffmann, "Board Stewardshipw in L. Sama e& Corporote Structure, finance and 
Operations, VOL 10 (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 32. 
Directors' and onicerS insurance is costly, Iimited in scope and subject to hrge deducn'bIes. 
PIease refér to Danids and SM, Huttorr, "The Capricious Cushion: The Impiications of the Directors' 
and Offïcers' Insur;uie LïabiIity Crisis on Canadian Corporate GovefnanceW (1993) 22 Can, Bus, L, S. 
182. and R 1. Daniels, "MUS Boards Go Overboard? An Econornic Analysk of the Effects of Burgeoning 
Statutory Liabiiity on the Roie of Directors in Corporate GoveniacrceW (1995) 24 Can Bus. L. 1.229. 
Wesfar Mining Lrd (Re) (1992) 14 C S R  (3rd) IO 1 at 105. 
"An order was made mider the Companies' Cieditors Arrangement A d  whkh permitteci the debtor 
company to maintain a $4 miIIion trust fund to cover the Iiability of directors under the EinpIopent 
StmdardiF Act (B.C.) and for mtpaid source deductions. The debtor çompany subsecpently apptied to pay 
a m e r  $3-7 milIion to the Director of Emplopent Standards for the payment of vacation pay owing to 
its employees." (the appIicatÏon was disinissed) 
I I I  
payments by the corporation3: unpaid wages3= and breaches of dut.)n provided that 
they have exercised the degree of care, diligence and ski11 that reasonably prudent persons 
wodd have exercised in comparable circumstances to prevent the w r o n g .  a ~ t . ~ "  In 
order to provide directors an effective due diligence defense, the Kirby Report M e r  
recommended that reliance, in good faith, on financiai statements, on the reports of 
experts and on information presented by officers and professionals be included as an 
element of the due diligence. The present CBCA does offer such a defence in certain 
cases. 329 
Further refinement of directofs duties under the CBCA needs to be addressed by 
the Canadian legd community and business community together. On the one hana 
directon' duties under the CBCA should ensure directors' accountability to the 
corporation; on the other hand. director's duties should not discourage competent persons 
from sitting on boards. 
B Under CCL and EEs Laws 
CCL imposes fiduciary duties to the corporation on directors (as welI as 
32s CBCA S. 11 8. 
3t6 CBCA s, L 19, 
327 CBCA s- 122. 
Supra note 279. See a h  Osier. Ho* & Warcourt (Baflisters & Solicitors, Patent and Trademark 
Agents), "Boardroom PeapeanieS - Corporate Goveniance Update: Kirby Cornmittee Report Reieasedn. 
< h~~~~~~.osIercodpubIications/Boardroom~Perspective/kirby. htmP (date accmed: Ime 18.1999). 
JZP CBCA S. 12.3 (4)@). 
supe~sors  and oficers) and subjects them to Iiability for b r e a ~ h ~ ~ '  But the CCL does 
not mention the directors' duty of care, diIigence and skill. In addition, fiduciary duty 
under the CCL, although it appears similar to the concept under the CBCA, is vague and 
difEdt to assess. There is no legai explanation as to what "faiWly peform" means. 
Moreover, the limitation on judges' function in explaining laws under the current Chinese 
legai system leaves the implementation of directors' duty in an uncertain state. With 
regard to FTEs Laws, no provisions ded with directors' d ~ t y ~ ~ '  
In addition, a distinctive feature of CCL regarding directors' duty is that CCL 
provides detailed administrative sanctions332 and criminal KabiIities for directors (as weii as 
supe~sors  and managers) if they violate rules, duties or requirements under CCL." 
Administrative sanctions apply to directors who represent the statdpublic interests. The 
heavy penalties provided by CCL (and other laws like criminai law334) constitute a 
deterrent against potentid illegai corporate decisions. But the negative tone set by CCL, 
at the same time, may discourage good faith nsk-taking activities in China. 
4.2.3 Chair of the Board 
- - 
j30 Articles 59, 123 and 128 of CCL providc that the directors, nipe~sors, and managers shoald comply 
with the articles of association, fiiithhilly pcrform th& duties and maintain the interests of the corporation 
and shotdd not takc advantage of thcir position. fitnctions and powers in the corporation to seek personai 
gains. 
nt But since adoption of CCL. the provisions of CCL aiso applying to FIES determine that directors of 
sino-foreign joint ventures or whotiy foreign owned corporations are subject to the same fiduciary duties 
as provideci by the CCL. 
'3~ "AdmiMstrative sanctions- in Chinese is Xng Zhen Chu Fa 
See chapta LO of CCL 
rw See d o n  3 of chapter 3 of Criminal Law ofthe Peopie's Repuolc of China (Adopted by the Seîond 
Session of the F i  Nationai PcopIc's Congress on IuIy 1, 1979 and amendeci üy the F i  Session of the 
EÏghth Nationai People's Congress on March 14, 1997). 
The above comparative examination of the power of the board of directors in 
comection with the direction of corporate business and the duties of directors in Canada 
and China hdicates that though China introduced the structure of board of directors in the 
CCL and FIES Laws, China's Corporate Laws have not, however, vested in the board of 
directors the same broad decision-making power as the CBCA does. Moreover, 
administrative sanction, a type of Iiability for the head of an enteq~rise~~' during China's 
planning economy. remains in the CCL. The distinctive provisions for personal liabilities 
of the Chair of the board ( i .  e. the Iegal representative, Fa Ding Dai Biao Ren, see 4.2.3 B 
below) under the Chinese laws is an interesthg part of China's Corporate Laws and 
reflects a different corporate intemal control pradce in China. 
A In Canada 
The power of rnanaging the business of the corporation is vested with the board of 
directors. The chair of the board is not given any speciai managerid power by the CBCA 
The chair is considered an officer of a corporation336 and his or her duties umdy include 
presiding at meetings of the board of directors and possibly of the sharehoIders and such 
other finctions and powers as may corn time to time be assigned to h i d e r  by the board 
For an English version, p t w e  SCC Online: Maryland University Schooi of Law, ChinaLaw Website: 
<http:i/~~~.~s.netlchxmIa~vAa~vtmn 1. ht > (da te accessed Juiy 3,1999). 
ns Wead of an enterprise" in China is a k n  caiied "Chang Zhang". 
336 K Sutherland, Fraser S Hamibook on Canadiart Company Lmv (8" ed) (Carrwelfr Toronto, 1994) at 
272-273. 
See JH. Jenkins, Condita of Canadian Meetings (Toronto: Butterwocths, 1983) at 15. 
of direct or^.^ The chair is usualIy a director and, if that is the case, of course the duties 
of directors provided by the CBCA would also be  applicable to the chair- 
B In China 
It is provided under CCL and FIES Laws that the chair of the board is the legal 
representative (Le. Fa Ding Dai Biao Ren) of the corporation.ns The Iegai representative 
of a corporation under Chinese laws is the person who takes charge of and exercises 
authority on behalf of the corporation according to the constitutionai documentation of 
the c~r~oration."~ The c h a s  statutory responsibiiity includes taking charge of convening 
the shareholdets' meetings and ensuring that corporate business is properly conducted. In 
addition, the chair has to convene and preside over the meetings of the board of directors, 
examine the irnplementation of board resolutions; and sign the shares and bonds of the 
c~rporation.~" in practice, as long as actions of the chair are in relation to the business of 
lbid (H. Sutherland) at 273. 
338 Articles 45 (for cfoseiy-hefd corporations) and 1 13 (for public corporations) of CCL. 
Article 37 of the hpiementation Regdations of WV Law and Artide 3 L of ImpIementation Rules of CJV 
Law. 
a9~rtide 38 of the Generaf Principls of Civif Law of the People 's Repu6lic of Chino (adoptai at the 
Fotrrth Session of the Sixth Nationai PeopIe's Congress and effective a s  of fa- 1, L987). 
An explamtion fiom Supreme People's Court mer defined the term "Iegd representatXvetr (fa ding dai 
biao ren) in detaiî: 
a chiefexecntives such as the president or manager or chahmn of the board of d î r e c t o ~ ~  
b. where the chef executivek position is vacant, the vice presÎdenî or vice chabman or vice 
manager as the case may be who fs actuaiïy tesponsibIe for the administrathe mrk af the company, 
c- where the above positions are a i i  vacant, the persons that are actnally in charge d a  Iegai person 
PI- see R R Zhen& Chha's and ConunerciaI Law (Hong Kong llntterworths, 1988) at 3 12, 
the corporation, mch actions are deemed corporate behaviors."' By introduchg the 
concept of legd rep resentative, China's Corpo rate Laws personake corporations. 
Like an agent under Canadian corporate Iaw, the legal representative in China (Le. 
the chair of the board) is Iegaiiy authorked to act on behaif of the c~rporation.~" But the 
Legai representative is subject to greater personai risk than an agent in Canada typically is. 
In addition to fiduciary duty, Chinese laws impose upon the chair various civil liabiiities, 
administrative sanctions (like waniings, reprimands, and probation) and fines in case the 
corporation violates ~aws.~" 
The administrative liability Unposed by Chinese Iaws on a chairman reflects 
vestiges of the enterprise management mode that prevailed under the planning economy. 
During the planning economy period, the person-in-charge of a state-owned enterprise 
usuaily was a govemmentd officer who acted as the aate's representative in managing the 
enterprise. Imposing administrative sanctions on persons who are in charge of state assets 
was one of the ways used to deter the potentiai abuse of managerid power since a 
govemment oficer norrnally would not abuse enterprise managerial power at the risk of 
hislher political status. The additional administrative tiability for the chairman to some 
34t Fan han. The Recording Items of the ArticIes of Association of Joint Stock Company: Comment on 
Article 79 of China's Corporation Lad' (1997) Nanjing University Law Journal No.55-61 @413 
Economic Law and Laour Law) 35 at 37 (Chinese version). 
* Mer to Articles 38.43,19 and 1 LO of the Generd Prirtcrples of Civil L m  of the People 's RepubIic of 
China (adopted at the Fotuth Session of the Sixth Nationat PeopIe's Congress and effective as of Ianuary 
L, L9aT). It provides in detaii the liabîlity that a Iegai reptesentative has for a le@ entity 
WJ Articles 43 and 49 of General Principles of Civil Law of the Peopk 's Reptiblic of China (Adopted at 
the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promdgated by Order No, 37 of the President 
of the PeopIe's RepubiÎc of China on April12, f 986, and eflèctive as of Jannary 1,1987) 
Engtish version is availabte: MaryIand University School of Law, ChinaLaw Website: 
ehttpf /lwww.qissnet/chinaiawAawtran 1 - h m  (date accessed,- Jime 3, 1999). 
Practîdy, because the iiabiiities of the chaitman are sa severe, foreign imrestors in a Srno-foreigu joint 
venture usnaiIy Ieave the position to m e s e  parties whüe a foreign imtestor wilL hoId the position of 
general manager (correspondhg to the position afchief execntnre ofücer in Cana&)- 
extent reflects China's incornpiete economic reform and the socialist roots of i ts 
managerid culture. 
4.3 Outside Directors in Canada and SupervWory Boards in China 
Canadian corporations empIoy a single tier board structure while in China, except 
in the case of FiEs, corporations adopt a two-tier board structure, one for management 
and the other for s ~ ~ e ~ s i o n . ~ "  The monitoring fùnction in the Canadian single her board 
is maidy exercised by the outside d i rec t~n . '~~  
4.3.1 Outside Directors under the CBCA 
A The Function 
The CBCA provides that, in the case of a distributing corporation, at least two 
directors who are not officers or employees of the corporation or its a i a t e s  should sit on 
the board.'* These directors are referred to as "outside directors". 
The primary reason behind this provision is that inside directors (Le. directors who 
are employees or ofncers of the corporation or its af'filiates) are potentidy unable to 
effectiveIy and objeaiveiy evduate the performance of managers or officers because such 
Y" IL isnoted that for closely-held corporations in Chha, the two-tier structure is not mandatory. See 
i@a note 357- 
It is noted that Stnctiy spealùng in theory, a i i  diredors shodd be pdorming the management 
monitoring fwictÏon, not simply the outside directors- 
CBCA S. 102 (2). 
an evaluation codd jeopardize the employee-dùectors' 
corporation.347 Therefore, the main purpose of involving 
own career progress withui the 
outside directon is to effectïvely 
and objectively monitor corporate management348 and provide a check agahst abuse of 
managerial power by corporate decision-rnaker~.~" Thus, outside directors may perform a 
discipline hc t ion  over the management In addition, outside directors may play a 
role as advisors or counsel to corporate management."' 
B The Reaiity 
In redity, the efficiency of outside directors is doubtfbl given the high number of 
overlapping directorships in Canada. The concem over such director ties has focused on 
their anti-competitive potentiai in cases where the corporations on whose boards the 
directors sit are competing c ~ r n ~ a n i e s . ~ ~ ~  That is, if a director is on the board of directors 
" L. Lin "The Enectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Govermance Mechanism: Theoria and 
Evidence" (1996) 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 888 at 900. 
348 RL Daniels & R Morck, Camdian Corporate Governance Poiicy Options (Discussion Paper) 
(Ottawa: Industry Canada, k996) at 24. 
E. F. Fma & M. C. Jensen, "Separaiion of ûwnership and Contml" (1983) 26 1. L. & Econ. 30 1. 
'" ïhe requirement of appearance and presentation Won the outside directors serves as some son of 
discipline for management oficers. See supra note l1  at 40. 
" Since outade directon n o d y  are top managers in their indusaies, their generaI or specific 
expen'ences can provide inside directors and manageriai officers t'additional windows to the outside 
world"_ See note 8 at 40, supra- 
352 Penriings has argueci that interlocking directorates have positive Muences on corporations. Please see 
J. M. Pmnhgs, I'erfocking Directors (San Francisco, Washington & London: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1980) 135 -1 87, 
Theoreticaiiy, interiocking directors eaabIe corporations to obtain better Urteiügence about their 
defiaencies in their transactions wÎtb other corporations, HorizontaL intertocks help corporations to cope 
with the cornpetitive uncertainties that prevaü in oiigopolistic indusüÎeses Vertid interIocks contriïute to 
snperior effectivenesi by circmriventmg the situation that one corporation in a market is comparativdy 
better infomed than its cornpetitors about the matket's parametersparameters 
It Is not ~UOWIL, ho-er, how ofteu dhctors actuany da or can sit on the boards afcompetitors 
of two or more competing corporations, the interfochg director may use one corporation 
as an instrument of command and as a means of communications with other corporations 
on whose boards he or she also sirs. Such intedockkg directorships exacerbate the 
potentid conflict of duties and interests to which al1 directors may be subject. Over a 
century ago, Lord Cransworth pointed out the broad equitable pnnciple relating to such 
confiicts as fo~lows:'~~ 
[N]o one, having such duties to discharge, shdI be allowed to enter 
into engagements in which he has, or cm have, a personai interest 
conflicting or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of 
those whom he is bound to protect. 
Moreover, a study conducted by Lin shows that requinng outside directors on a 
board does not always bring good corporate performance.3" Thus, there has been a long- 
standing controversy in the business and legai cornmunities in North Amerka in respect of 
the effectiveness of outside direct or^.^^' That controversy might explain Parliament's 
cautious attitude toward amendment of the CBCA in this respect.3s6 
C Improvement 
''' tlberdeer Raiha-v Ca v. Blatkie ( 1954). 2 Eq. Rep.. 128 1. 
'* Supra note 347 at 966. 
355 The effiectiveness of ouiside directors k t mntroveniai issue. Two opposing schwis of  thought ex&, 
"manageriai hegemony" and "flectnre monitor". According to the theory of "manageriaï hegemony", the 
board is dominateci by management because of the b k  in the nomination and sekction pmcesss of the 
outside directors, the consvaints on outside directors' abiIity to monitor or discipihie the management, 
and the weak incentives of the outside directors to monifor- According to the theory of " & i e  
monitor", outside directors are motivated to protect sha&oIdersT interests and usuaïiy they are apa in 
decison making becanse they vaiue thar reptation+ or have a direct incentive to monitor if they bave 
equity ownershrp, or business ties with the corporation 
See supra note 347. 
It iS acknOwIedged that whelher or not outside directors are naPsarily a gwd 16uig is a matter of 
some controversy- The aaswer may vary h m  case to case 
The CBCA-styie definîtion of outside director has been criticized by the Toronto 
Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Govemance (TSE Comminee) in its report 
regarding improved corporate govemance in Canada (Dey ~e~ort)." '  The TSE 
Committee goes beyond the traditionai definition of directors as inside or outside directors 
and proposes a concept of "unrelated direct~r".~~* The major differences between an 
outside duector and an unrelated director are: first, an employee or representative from an 
investment bank, law firm or accounting firm which provides seMces to the corporation 
rnay be considered related under the Dey Report, while according to the CBCA's 
definition such person is not related; and second, the Dey Report niggests that, in addition 
to a majority of unrelated directors, a board should also include individuals who are not 
digned with either the corporation or a significant shareh~lder.~'~ In this regard, the TSE 
Cornmittee's recommendation is sensitive to the intereas of minonty shareholders and 
addresses the reality of high ownership concentration in Canada. 
it seems that whethet the CBCA will follow the recornrnendation of the TSE 
Committee on "unrelated directors" largely depends on whether the Canadian legal 
357 Supra note 20. 
3s8 According to the Dey Report (supra note 20), an imrelated director is "a director who is independent of 
management and is free fiom any interest and any business or other relatioaship which muid, or codd 
nasombly be perceived to. rnateriaiiy interfere with the ducctocs' abiIiiy to act with a vtew to the best 
interesîs of the corporation, other rhaa intercstr and rdationships arïsÏng h m  shareholding ... if the 
corporation has a ngnificant sharrholder, in addition to a majority of unrelateci directors, the board shoutd 
indude a number of directon who do not bave interests in or reiationships with eÏther the corporation or 
the signincant shareholder and which fairy reflects the investment Ïn the corporatox by shareholders 
other than the signifiant shareholders. A corporation with a significaut simehoIda shodd have the 
appropriate number of directors wbich are not related to either the corporation or tiie Ei@cant 
sharehoIder," 
Paragmph 5.7 md 5.8 of Dey Report 
359 GuideiUie 3 of Toronto Stock Exchange Guideli~es for Inproved Corporatle Goventance in Crmrda 
C'adim Direcforship fractices 1995: A New Era in Coprate Governioncp (Cana& The Conferenœ 
Board of Canada,1995) at 5 and 19, 
120 
community and commercial community can reach a consensus in response to the Canadian 
commercial reaiity. 
4.3.2 SupeMsory Board under C C L ~ ~ *  
Comparable to the outside directors under the CBCA in China is CCL's 
supe~sory board. 
A The Function 
CCL provides that corporations36' shouid have a supervisory board composed of 
no less than three people inctuding representatives of shareholders and an appropriate 
proportion of the workers."' Directors, managers, staff  in charge of financial &airs of 
the corporation and aate servants cannot act as s u p e ~ s o r s . ~ ~ ~  The proportion of the 
workers who are on the board is determined by the of association of the 
corporation 364 
The major bction of the s u ~ e ~ s o r y  board is to rnonitor the interests of the 
<> are not required to have supervisors or a mpMsory board hbüc corporations are recpred to 
set up a supervÎsory board In closely heId corporations, a mpembory board is reqrrired if the corpotation 
is a large- Ptease seé Articles 52 and 124 of CCL. 
"' SmalI cIoseIy-heId corporations cari have one or two supervisors instead of a supervisory boani 
Artide 52 of CCL. However, C U  does not provide its dekitiorr ofl'maH sizen. 
Articles 52 and 124 of CU. 
Artides 52 and 58 of CCL. 
corporation.365 In exercising such monitoring timction, supervisors have the rigtit to 
examine the finamid affars of the corporation; monitor the performance of the dûecton 
. 
and managers; demand the directors and managers correct their acts in any case where 
their behavion damage the Uiterests of the corporation; propose interim shareholders' 
meetings; and other nghts if provided by the articles of association of the corporation. In 
addition, supe~sors  hould attend the meetings of the board o€diectors with non-voting 
s t a t ~ s . ~ ~ ~  
Introduction of supervisory boards under CCL foilows Continental practice and in 
particular the practice in West Germany where the two-tier board structure has been 
highiy d e v e ~ o ~ e d . ~ ~ ~  But CCL did not completely follow the German model. The two-tier 
board structure adopted by German companies requires a supe~sory  board to control the 
basic business policy of a corporation and a management board to manage corporate 
affairs. In 1976. pressured by trade unions, worker representation on the boards of larger 
German companies was increased to 50 per cent. The German example was widely 
followed by Holland, Sweden, and  rance.^^' The provisions regarding the supe~sory  
board under CCL, however, does not give the supe~sory  board the power to controI 
" Supra note 86 at 214. 
366 Articles 54 and 126 of CCL. 
It is pmvided under ANcIe 53 and Artide 125 of C U  that the term of the office of the supe~sor shonld 
be th= years. Consecutive terrns are albwed if the supeMsor reeiecîed upon expiration of the tern 
'" For a brief of Gnmany A u ~ c h t s m t  (supeMsory board), ree W. CC. Kester. "Gover~ance. Contracting, 
and hestment Horizons A Look at hpan and Germanyw in D, EL Chew eb Shcdies in InterncationaL 
Corporare fiance and Gavemance Systemx A Compmson of the US. Japan and Europe (New York, 
Oxfordr Mord University Press- L997) at 236. 
WhiIe the Canadian one-tier board structure ccdects the Engiish approach, the Chinese two-tier board 
smicture d a t e s  the Conthentai Etzropean Approach which is adopred in Gamanyf Anstria, Koïïand 
and is permitted in France, 
368 Supra note 3 4  at 71. 
fimdamentai business policy of a corporation nor does it provide a specific compuIsory 
ratio for worker representation on the supe~sory  board. 
B The Reality 
The provisions regarding the rights and responsibiiities of the supe~sory board 
under CCL do not result in supe~sors '  active involvement in corporate &&S. A number 
of reasons account for the passive role of corporate supe~sors  in China Fust, 
representatives of workers have employment relationships with the corporation. 
PracticdIy it is Ïmpossible for worker representatives to rnonitor directors or managers 
given their concerns for their own job securïty. Second, the independent status of the 
supervisory board is problematic since the supervisors are employees or shareholders of 
the corporation. Third, the efficiency of Uivolving workers and shareholders as 
supervisors is doubtful since most of them Iack the tirne, expertise, and training necessary 
to evaluate corporate managers. Fourth, CCL does not provide that the supe~sory board 
has the right to elect or remove directors, or to take actions on behaif of the corporation 
against management. The right of the supe~sory  board to demand that directors and 
managers correct their misbehaviors does not have any effect due to the absence of any 
effective legai remedy. That is, if directors or managers fail to correct their acts in 
accordance with the stxpervisors' advice or if the board ignores a proposai from the 
supe~kors to convene the interÏm shareholders' meetings, there is r d y  no legai recourse 
avaiIable to the supe~sors. FdUi, in cases where the state is a majority shareholder, it is 
observed that the supemÏsors Iack incentive to monitor the management team since such 
supervison do not have eq* ownership in the corporation nor does the corporation 
provide any incentive de vice^.'^^ Sb&, in reaiity, rnost supervisors are working part time, 
have no office facilities in the corporation and generally foff ow the instructions of the 
board of directors or the general manager of the corporation. It is said that the working 
reports of sorne supervisory boards are dictated by the chairman of the board or the 
generai manager!37o 
C Improvement 
The monitoring tùnction of the Chinese supemkory board wîII not be effective 
unless s u p e ~ s o n  are vested with substantiaI powers to act as a check against managers 
and directors. The Issues listed in the preceding paragraph must be addressed if the 
supe~sory board is expected to play an active role in monitoring corporate decision- 
makers in China Only when the business cornmunity and/or Iegal community in China is 
aware of the defects contained in the existing supe~sory board structure under the CCL 
can fùrther improvement of China's two-tier board structure be expected. 
4.3.3 Recomrnendations 
As has been seen, the one-tier board structure adopted by the CBCA with outside 
directors perfiorming the hct ion of oversight of corporate attairs is the same board 
structure found in US corporations. rn China, however, except Ïn the case of foreign 
36P Lei tr<lR 'Improving the Corporation Law on Mechanisms of ChcdBng Po- mder Corporate kgai 
Person institutionm (t997.6.4 - 47) Legai Science (Northwestern Potitics and Law Coiïege lournat) (in 
Chinese) at 32, 
investment enterprises, corporations adopt a two-tier board system, one for management 
and the other for supe~sion, a system similar to Germany's two-tier board ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ ' ~  
A board with outside directors performing oversight of corporate management bas 
certain advantages. First, outside directors may objectively andyze corporate 
performance since outsiders wiil be Iess dependent on the inside directors (who are usually 
members of senior management) and iess infiuenced by the presence of senior 
management." Second, outside directors tend to provide neutral counsel and advice. 
This is based on the assumption that inside directors are committed to Company tradition 
and old ideas. Through the uuluence of and the perspective provided by outside directors, 
corporate management can adapt to technological advances, cornpetition, and econornic 
change as well. On the other hand, it has been argued by some that outside directors 
cannot actudly perform nich effective oversight at ail given that outside directors devote 
tittie time and energy to their monitoring duties. They may not have suffitient knowledge 
to effectively oversee management since they do not have access to the same detailed 
corporate information as managers have.3n 
However, theoretically, a number of reasons support a split of the board into a 
managing board and an oversight or supemDso board. First, with a clear personai and 
institutionai split between management and monitors, a distinct distriiution of 
nt The hostile British reaction to Gennan's two-tier stmc~tfe heips to e x p h  why Canadian corpomte 
law did not adopt the concept of the supervisory board The EngineerÏng EmpIqers' Federation in 
London stated thak "the idiction of such a theory wodd be d e s t n i h  of the genmü efficient operation 
and wealth-creating activïty of private enterprise in Britainw Cited by L. C. B. Gower. Gower 's Prkiples 
nfiMorem Company Law. 4h ed (London. Stevens & Sons, L979) at 71 h m  hployee Pctrticipution 
(1974) at 3. 
372 Supra note 19 at L IO, 
m C. J- Meier-Schatz, "Corporate Govemance and Legai Rnles: A Transnationai Look at Concepts and 
Problems of Intenial Management Control" (1988) 13 J- Corp. L 43 1 at 469. 
responsibüities and powers is created which in tum, may promote effi~iency~"~ Second, 
such an institutional separation allows the board of directors to act more independentiy 
without being intluenced by senior managerial officers (e.g. the Chief Executive OEcer). 
For instance, the management and mon i to~g  divisions wili separately prepare the board 
meeting agenda to discharge their respective responsibilities. 'ïherefore, the two-tier 
board system provides the basis for an explicit funetional specialization of monitors and 
managers. 
However, the two-tier board system is not without weakness in praaice. Fust, 
because of the split between management and supervision, the members of the supeMsory 
board, reiïeved of operational responsibilities and focused on Mlling their monitoring 
duties, may arguably have less time to invea and have less corporate information. The 
split of management tiinctions into two boards may itsetf have an impact on the corporate 
data ffow. Monitoring corporate management, especiaily in a large public corporation, 
requires a considerable amount of time, information and cornmitment. Part-time outsiders, 
haIf-hearted in commitment, and with severe Iimits on their access to data do not 
necessarily enhance the monitoring tùn~tion."~ Second, the Iegislative concept of a two- 
tier structure, which creates an independent monitoring organ to controI the executive 
management. is difficult to convert into corporate reality since a mandatory two-tier 
structure in public corporations is not able to break up the "natural" internai power circles 
of large ~r~an i za t i ons .~~~  
No matter whether a corporation has a singIe tier board structure or a two-tier 
374 Ibid at 464, 
ns Supra note 373 at 465. 
Ibid at 366 - 467, 
board structure, the fùnction of monitoring (as a checking and balancing power) shouId be 
exercised independently From the management. The principal objective of a corporation is 
to pursue corporate profit and enhance shareholder gain through its business a~tivities.~" 
ui achievhg this objective, the board's role requires it to be accountable for the success of 
the corporation by taking responsibility for management.37s ui this sense, it is advisable to 
split the function of monitoring and management within a Company regardless of whether 
it has a single tier board or a two-tier board structure. There is no universai structural 
model for achievhg an optimal division of these two bnctions since every country has its 
unique statutory and cuItural traditions and its own business redity. 
377 Ever since the appearance of the modern corporation, the= has been a long-term controversy reiating 
to the proper objective of the corporations. Though the earIy public corporations were set up for public 
purposes ( e g  ton bridges), the capitaiist theory of rnaximizing capitaiists' w d t h  Ied to corporations 
organized For the enrichment of the corporations. As the Nobel Pnze-winning economist, Milton 
Friedman stated, "A singie. objective goai Iike profit maximization is f x  more easily monitored than a 
muItipIe, vaguely defined goal Iike the fair and reasonable accommodation of ail affied interests. It is 
easier, for exampie, to teII if a corporate manager is doing what she i s  supposed to do than to teii if a 
university president is doing what she is supposed to do." (cited by A k Sommer Ir. "lt Ai1 Cornes Dom 
to Money , Face it: A Board's Main Goai is Corporate Profits" online: U A  Section of Business Law, 
Business Law Today (JanuaryIFebniary 1 999 < httpYf~.abanetorg/busIaw/8-3rnoneyhtml~ (date 
accessed June 14. 1999). 
The Organization for Economic Co-opemtion and Deveropment (OECD) in its Aprii 1998 Report -tes 
that "Most industrialized societies recognàe that generating long-term economic profit (a meastm based 
on net revenues that takes into accoant the cost of capital) is the corporation's primaiy objective. In the 
bng nm, the generation of economic profit to enhance ~ h o ~ k v d u e ,  üuough the pursuit of sustained 
cornpetitive advaotage, is necessq  to attract the capital reqmnd for prudent gmwth and perpetuation" 
Supra note 18 at 27. 
Within the academic professor M M Blair in her ûwnersir'i, md Contml: Rethinhng Corporate 
Govemmce /or tihr Z r  Cenmty (Washington D.C.: Bmohgs Institnte, 1995) argoes that the 
corporation ought to take into account the interests of empIayees, suppliers, customers, cornmunities, 
long-term interests of sharehofders as well as short-term inte- the intensts of the state and so on, 
nu Supra note 22 at 28. C i h g  Report of the National Association of Corporate Dlrectors Commission on 
Director Professlonalism at f (November 1996). 
The comparative examination 
the roIe of the chair of the board and 
of the power and duties of the board of directors, 
the monitoring hc t ion  performed by boards under 
the CBCA and China's Corporate Laws as well as in the business ceaiity of Canada and 
China reveais that, though China introduced the stnicture of the board of directors based 
on models used in capitalist c0untries,3~ the traditionai management mode1 Ieft by C h a t s  
planning economy is stiU codified under China's Corporate Laws. Rather than granting the 
board of directors actual decision-making power, CCL vests the board with a hi& degree 
of influencing power in corporate strategic matters. Compared with Canadian Iaw, 
China's Corporate Laws have not seriously addressed the issue of duties of the directors. 
But the distinctive provisions deaiing with personai Iiabilities of the chair of the board 
contained in China's Corporate Laws reflect vestiges of the enterprise management mode 
under China's planning economy. As to the monitoring tiinction of the board, the 
comparative audy indicates that China's two-tier board structure under the CCL does not 
seem to enhance corporate efficiency to any grater degree than Canada's single tier board 
structure. 
This comparative examination of the roIe of the board in corporate internai control 
hrther indicates that, adhering to a sociaiist regime, China's Corporate Laws try to meld 
the western management mode whh the enterprise management mode ori@dy developed 
under a planning economy. 
4.4 Managerid Of'ficen - Controt through Manageriai Expertise 
379 ~ o t e  that there was no structure Like the board of direaorr in state-oumed or coiiectidy owned 
enterprises 
There is no general dennition of the term "officer" under the CBCA Officers are 
those people designated as such by the directors. 
The role of managerial otficers in corporate operations under the CBCA and 
China's Corporate Laws is often not paid much attention in the statutes themselves. 
Praaicaily speaking, managerial officers in the larges and most financialiy important 
corporations in Canada enjoy virtually free reign in determinhg the corporation's destiny. 
4.4.1 Power of Otticers under the CBCA and in Reaiity 
Although the board of directors is vested with the statutory right to manage 
corporations according tu the CBCA, the business redity of modem corporations is that 
day-to-day management has been delegated, to a nibaantid extent, by the board of 
directors to manageriai ofticers, panicularIy in large widely held public  corporation^.^" 
But it should be noted that under the CBCA, not ail the powers of the board can be 
deIegated to the officers. The powers that cannot be delegated relate tu tiuidamentai 
corporate changes and major business decisions, such as making changes to the by-laws 
(which are subject to shareholders' approval)~" approving hanciai staternents, a 
management proxy circular, a take-over bid cirdar or directors' ciradar, issuhg 
securitles (except on terms aiready approved by the board); d e c h ~ g  dividends; and 
purchashg or redeeming shares of the corporation-3" 
The extent of such deiegation Mnes depending on the siP and circmnstances of the corporations The 
board of large corporatioos may deïegate more authority and fespo~lsl'biiity to the management The board 
of maîi or dosely-heId corporations may becorne involved wnh more detaiied bo9aeJs of the corporation, 
The reason directors deIegate daiIy manageriai power to the M-time officers is 
Iinked to the officers' professional managerid skilts and knowledge about the corporation, 
and to the fact that the officers work hl1 time for the corporation, while the directors do 
not. Corporate officers' powers may aiso be expanded as a result of the workings of the 
proxy system. The proxy systern can either be employed by dissenting minority 
shareholders or by the management for accumuiating votes. Most shareholders of large 
public corporations do not have an interest in attending and vohg at the shareholders' 
general meetings. The management thus seeks to have a management nominee appointed 
as the shareholdds proxy with dl proxy solicitation expenses borne by the c~r~oration.~" 
The result usually is that the passive majority of shareholders simply endorse the doctrines 
of management. This creates the oppominity for management (that is, senior corporate 
officers) to control the corporation's strategic business. 
Therefore, in a Canadian widely held public corporation, the managerid expertise 
of corporate officers allows them to control corporate daily management. Further, the 
existence of a sip-ficant number of passive shareholders and a management controUed 
proxy system permits this same group to direct corporate arategic business. AccordingIy, 
the senior manageriai officers are more Iikely to be the uItimate corporate controllers of a 
widely held public corporation. Appendk II - A üIustrates this business reality. 
It is found that in a high ownership concentration public corporation in Canada, 
the presence of a single shareholder or a srnaII group of shareholders (exercising either 
regal or effective controi) and the fact that such "coutrohg sharehoIders" have 
contniuted substantiai capital to the corporation mean that thek concerns over the 
corporate business are more likeIy to be  addressed by corporate managers at least with 
respect to strategic management of the corporation. It is even possible that the controllii 
single or group of shareholders are also managers Appenda II - B illustrates this 
business reality. 
In terms of closely-held corporations in Canada, since managerial officers are often 
also its shareholders. shareholder-managers are the uitimate controIIers of these 
corporations as well. Please see Appendk LI - C. 
In recognition of managerial otticers' power in managing corporate matters, the 
CBCA extends fiduciary duties to otficers. Therefore, the corporate officers ninction as 
agents of the corporation and at least at the level of senior management, owe a fiduciary 
obligation and dut .  of care, diligence and ski11 to the corporation and are treated in the 
sarne way as directors in this respect.'" 
4.4.2 Powers of Officers under CCL and FIES Laws and in Reaiity 
CCL provides the sarne powers to officers of closely-held corporations and 
publicly-held corporations.38s in addition to the right to attend the board meetings as non- 
voting attendants, and other powers stipulated by the articles of association of the 
corporation or delegated by the board of directors to the oEceq  CCL provides in detail 
that managers in Chinese corporations have to be in charge of the d d y  operation of the 
corporation, implement board resolutions, organize the irnpIernentation of the annual 
- 
3w CBCA s 122 (1). 
See also, Cmadia~i Aero Service Ltd v_ 0'hfaIf.q et al,, f 19741 S C k  592, JO DL& (3d) 371 (SCC-). 
jS5 ArticlesesSO and L 19 of CCL 
business pians and investment plans of the corporation; fornulate plans for estabIishment 
of the internai management organs of the corporation; formulate the basic management 
system of the corporation; fomuiate specifïc d e s  and regdations of the corporation; 
recommend the appointment or dismissai of the deputy managers and ofpersons in charge 
of the financiai &airs of the corporation; and appoint or dismiss management personnel 
odier than those to be appointed or dismissed by the board of directors. It seems that CCZ. 
provides a hi& degree of inffuencing power to managers and expects them to give 
suggestions to the board in respect of daily corporate management. in the meantirne, CCL 
requires the managers to be responsible for daily corporate operations. 
As to managers in foreign investment cornparies in China, FIES Laws provide that 
the general manager and vice generd managers together are responsiile for the day-to-day 
management of E s .  But uniike CCL, the FIES Laws do not detail the responsibilities of 
the managers.386 
In each of the three types of public corporations in China, as shown in Appendix 
ELA, B, and C, in generd, manageriai officers are not ultimate controlIers. Mead, their 
principal d e  is to impiement corporate decisions. 
In tems of closefy heId corporations in China, nrch as foreign investment 
companies, as demonstrated in Appendk iII - D, only the general manager (or vice 
general managers) will be in charge of corporate daiIy management:" other junior 
managers wÏIi impIement management decisions. 
Farna and Jensen have defked the decision-making process k terms of four 
m6 Amde 38 of UnpIementation R d e s  of W Law and Artide 32 of Implementation Ruies of CN Law. 
The d e  of generai managers and vice g e n d  managers wü£ k addressed in 4-43 bdow. 
Institution - generation of proposais for resource utiIization and 
smicturllig of contracts; 
Ratincation - choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented; 
hplementation - execution of ratified decisions; and 
Monitoring - measmement of the performance of decision agents 
and implementation rewards. 
Managers in Chinese public corporations and closely-heId corporations (except the 
generai manager or vice general manager in FiEs) are handling the implementation 
process. 
With regard to the duties of managerial officers, they are subject to the same 
fiduciary obligations as are the directors under CCL.~*' 
4.4.3 Chief Executive Officer in Canada and General Manager in China 
Managerial officers are able to influence the board through insider directors Sitting 
on the board. The influence of managerid officers can reach its pinnacle when the 
corporation's cchif executive officer (in the case of Canada) or generd manager (in the 
case of Chùia) aiso takes the position of chair of the board of directors. It has been found 
that in Canada the combination of chef executive officer and chair of the board of 
directors is more Iikely to be found in smail corporations than large  corporation^.^^ 
OveraiI, 34.5 per cent of Canadian corporations have the chief executive oEcer as the 
' EI. Fama & MC. Ieweh "Separation of Ownership and Cornln (1983) 26 1. t. & Econ 301 at 303. 
389 See 4.2.2.B- 
'" Supra note I3 1 a1 235. 
ûne interesthg phenornenon is that corporations with a combined CE0 and diairmeen have a r & W y  
iarge percentage of insicle ditectors, while corporations with iodependent Caanmerr are found to have a 
reIativdy Iow percentage of inside directors. 
chair of the board. In over 83 per cent of Canadian corporations, the chief executive 
onicer is also a member of the corporation's board of direct or^.^^' The combination of 
generai manager and chahan in foreign uivestment companies in China is rare.)" The 
reason is that there are greater risks associated with the position of chairman (Le. legal 
representative) in China, as has already been addressed in 4.2.3 B. However, the 
combination of general manager and director is the nom in Chinese corporations. 
There have been suggestions in Canada to split the positions of chief executive 
officer and chaiman of the board.'" The rationaie behind such proposais is relatively 
straigh~owward: the board of directors can oniy effectively exercise the tùnction of 
monitoring senior management to the extent that it is independent from management. It 
wouid seem, however, that the benefit of splitting the positions of chief executive officer 
and chairman of the board wouId Vary from case to case. Currently there is no uniform 
answer to the question of whether there two positions should or should not be held by the 
same person. 
4.4.4 Summary 
The role of managerid officers in corporations varies with different types of 
corporations in both Canada and China. The comparative examination of manageriai 
"' Supra note 127 ai 13. 
'" No detaiied dam howwer, is available- 
393 Oder* Hoslain & Harcourt (Barristem & Soiicitors, Patent and Tradefnatk Agents) Boardmorn 
P e n p t b s  Corporate Gowmanœ Update, "Chair and CE0 Shouid the ROIS be Spiit?" 
<hnp:l/www.oder.comIpublicatio~OardfOOmmPerSpective/gavfebW-2. html (date accessed. M y  15, 
1999)- 
otficers' powers of decision-making in Canadian and Chinese corporations demonstrates 
that in Canada, the senior managerial officer (such as the Chief Executive Ofncer) very 
Iikely wields ultimate decision power in widely-held public corporations and shareholder- 
managers may be corporate controUers in public corporations with high ownership 
concentration and in closely-held corporations. In China, managerid officers in public 
corporations more ofken play a role confined to Unplementing corporate management 
decisions and the general manager in closely-held corporations is the decision-maker in 
terms of corporate ddy management. 
The relatively modest role of manageriai officea in China is closely connected with 
the enterprise management mode that existed under the planning economy in which 
managers were not cailed upon to decide enterprise strategy or daily planning but rather 
were expected simply to carry out state plans. 
The hi& degree of influencing power granted to corporate managers of Chinese 
public corporations represents a hdf-way management mode1 between Canadian 
managerial discretion in the direction of corporate business and the Chinese sociaiist 
management mode1 which does not require mangers to make management decisions. 
4.5 Employees - Control through Collective Influence 
Employees' influence on corporate control can be effected in two ways. One is 
that employees can become shareholders of a corporation by purchasing shares of the 
corporation This point has been addressed in 4.1.3 above. The other way in which the 
empIoyees can exert thek intluence on corporate decision makuig is through unions or 
through theu representabves on the s ~ p e ~ s o r y  board (in the case of Ch). The second 
point is to be examined in this sedon. 
4.5.1 Under the CBCA 
The fa& that workers form an integrai part of a corporation is essentiaily ignored 
by Canadian corporate laws. The CBCA is dent on the issue ofemployee participation in 
the corporate decisionmaking process. Canadian law-maken seem to be reluctant to 
provide for workers' participation in corporate management. 
The reason for this rehctance to provide for employee participation by statute 
might be related to the refatively low level of union involvement historicaüy in corporate 
decision making in Canada. In 1994, Dr. Wagar conducted a survey of Iabor unions 
across Canada examining their involvement in employer decisionmaking and strategy, 
human resource policies, and the Iabor-management climate. The survey indicated that 
"there was strong evidence that organizations were not integrating quality management 
with a culture focusing on employee The survey demonstrated reIatively 
low support for the statements th& emplo yee participation in mategic management 
detisions is encouraged and that top management was committed to employee 
inv~lvernent.~~~ Therefore, neither under Canadian corporate law nor in business rrality 
do employees, as a collective, have a substantiai power of innuence over corporate 
management- 
'% T. K Wagar, Ldor-Management Retarions in C m a d ~  A Suney of l'non Oncers (Canada- 
industriai ReIations Center, Q u m ' s  University. 1996) at t. 
From a legal theoretic point of view in Canada, the relationship between 
employees and the corporations that employ them is governed by the employment 
contract, rather than corporate Iaw. But the reality is that the tme relationship between 
employees and their corporate employers goes beyond contractual relationships. 
Employees depend upon their employen for their livelihood, and the existence and success 
of the corporation, in tum, depends upon their Iabor. They are, in fact, "members of the 
Company for which they work to a far greater extent than are the shareholders whom the 
law persists in regarding as its proprietors. * 3% 
4.5.2 Under CCL 
The right of employees to be represented on the supewisory board and to 
participate in corporate decision rnakuig is codined in the CCL.~'' Aithough workers do 
not have the right to vote at board meetings, it is cleariy provided by the CCL that when a 
corporation decides issues reIating to saiarÏes, welfare, working safety, working 
conditions, labor insurance and so on, the corporation should solicit in advance the 
'%Supra 34  at 10-1 1. 
Professor C.C. Nicholls of FacuIty of Law OF Daihousie University has f i e r  mggesteci that there is a 
fùndamentai idedogicai issue here In Canada, it seems h t  the ody proprietaxy right that has thus far 
been clearly sanctioned by the IegisIators and the comts is an ownership right fiowing h m  acquisition of 
property with capitai. Canadians Iitwmakers do not get appear to recognize propn'etary or quasi- 
propnetary rights ff ownig h m  the contribution of Iabor, rather than cipitaï. to an enterpise. 
'" The duai board style and labor paniciption in corporate decision making in China folIow the mode1 of 
Germany. HoweverZ they are différent fiom the German system, 
According to Codetennination Act of 1951, one half OF the duectors an the corpomte board in the cod 
and steeî industries is to be eiected as employee representatives, The Works Constitution Act of 1952, 
which appties to all o k r  ütdusûies reqtrires that one-- of the directors k employee representa* 
See K I. Hopl "New Ways in Corporate Gov-ce: European ExperÏmmts with Labor Representation 
oa Coqmate Boards'' ( (984)  82 Mich. L. Rev. 1338 at 1350, and I. P. Keeping Gwd 
Company: A Sh<dy ofCorporate Gmrnance in Fie Cmtries (United States: M o r d  Unniemty Press 
Inc N.Y., 1994) at 15. 
opinions of the union and workers. The union and representatives of workers3" shouid be 
invited to attend relevant meetings as non-voting participants.399 When management 
studies and decides "major corporate issues" and formulates "important corporate rules", 
opinions and suggestions from the union and workers should be heard."' CCL however 
does not provide what constitutes "'major corporate issues" and "important corporate 
des". It is obsewed that, in reality, ody those maners relating to job security, salaries, 
weüiire, and wocking conditions are to be CO-determined by the workers (through their 
union or representatives of workersM1) and the board. 
4.5.3 Under ETES Laws 
It  is provided under REs Laws that while the board of directors decides issues 
relating to rewarding or disciplining employees, the salary system, we~fkre,~* labor 
protection and insurance, representatives corn the union should attend the relevant 
meetings without voting rights to express the concems and opinions of the ~orkers.*~ 
" In China, the union is an organization organized according to laws and reguiations ~Iating to unions 
and participated in by Iabor. See Artide 7 of Labor Law of rhe People's Republic ofChina ( e f f i e  on 
lanuar). 1, 1995). The fimd contributed by corporations and the function of unions are governed by the 
Trade Union Law of the People's Republk of China. 
While representatives of workcrs are elected by all workers of an enterprise according to corporate 
i n t d  rutes- Such eiection may or rnay not k hdd reguiariy. Worker representatives once eIected can 
negotiate with management any matters that pmposed by ai1 workers' meetings. 
399 Article 55 (for closcly-held corporations) and Anide 12 1 (for pubtic1y-held coiporatious) of C m  
*a Article 56 (for dosely-held corpontions) and 122 (for publicly-held corporations) o K ( Z  
Supra note 398. 
"WeUare" is a generai term under Chioa's Corporate Lam It may indude medicai Mare. houhg 
subsidy, andloi- chiIdren's education subsidy, etc. 
For example. Artide 98 of the ImpIementhg Reguiations for the Law of the People's Repiblic of 
China on Sino-foreign EQnity Joint Venture Enterprises (Zhong HM Ren Min Gong He Guo Zhong Wai 
GeneraiIy, emp1oyee.i colIectct?re influences on the corporate management of both 
FIES and corporations under China's Corporate Laws are modest. These influences are 
usually related to employees' interests Oike salary, welfare, labor protection, etc.) in the 
 corporation^.^^ Theoreticaily, employees in CCL corporations have greater influence 
over the management than do employees of FIES. The reasons are connected, first, with 
the very fact that REs do not have supe~sory boards, and thus employees of REs lack 
an institutional check on the power of the board of directors, that employees of CCL 
corporations enjoy, and second, with the fact that Chinese employees can never be owners 
of FiEs under current ETEs ~aws."' 
4.5.4 A Comparative Anaiysis 
The mode1 that the CBCA adopts, with essentidly no labor involvement in the 
corporate decision-making process, appears to retlects an underlying philosophy that the 
involvement of workers in corporate aiTiairs wouid likely jeopardize the long-term finire 
of the bus in es^."^ On this view, labor unions and management should be separated in 
He Zi Jing King Qi Ye Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li) (prnmulgated by the State Corncil on September 20, L 983 and 
amendeci by the State Council on Jmuary 15, 1986 and on December 21, 1987) and Anide 71 of the 
Impternenting Rules for the People's RepubIic of China on WhoIIy Foreign~wned Enterprises (Appmved 
by the Stafe CounciI on October 28. 1990. pmmigated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade on December 12,1990 and effectNe h m  December 12,1990). 
It is pmided under the FEs Laws that in order to enniti: the union has fiuids to operate, FiEs most 
aiiocate certain h d s  to the union each month, 
Article 99 of Implementation Replations of EJV Law. Article 72 of Implementation Ruies of WFOE 
Law- - Neither UV Law nor U V  Law provides that Chinese iiimduals may be a party to sino-fore@ equiry 
joint ventures or sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures. 
ArticIe I of EN Law and Artide 1 of CJV Law. 
A b m d  igOe arises h m  this statement, That is, whether or not it Q pmper for the board of directors 
to express@ consrnsrder the mterests of employees (amoag ohers) in making deagons" in the best mterests 
order to maintain the integrity of the collective bargaining process. The rigtas of 
employees and managerial discretion should be preserved by ami's length negotiation 
conhed to the terms of employment. 
The mode1 that CCL and FIES Laws adopt including labor participation in the 
corporate decision-making process tends to ensure that the ïnterests of employees are 
taken uito account in management of the corporations and that empioyees share some 
responsibility in corporate decision r n a l ~ i n ~ . ~ ~  In the eyes of Chines law-makers, the 
interests of workers in the corporation, though different Corn the interests of shareholders, 
are as important as the interests of investors. The Chinese labor market is Iess liquid than 
the capital markets, so that switching jobs is not as easy as selling stock (especidly in the 
case of those workers who have developed firm specific skills for whom the chance of 
mobility in the labor market is ~ l i r n ) . ~ ~  It is dso hoped that such a regime can, to some 
extent, curb manageriai dishonesty and dirninish disharmony between labor and 
management. [t is expeaed that, through Iabor representation, employees will become 
more productive and have a strong sense of cornmitment to their corporations. 
The provision of labor representation under CCL and FIE Laws is deepIy rooted in 
of the corporation". In the case Teck Corporation Limited et ak v, MiIIcv, P rice, Harmbowe, Gibbeson, 
Cmudiarr fiphration Lfd and @on Mines Lrd (N.P.L.), 11 9731 2 W.W.R 3 85 (B.C. Sup, CL), the court 
stated, in obiter, that direetors shouid not bc found in breach of their fiduciary duties if they consider the 
interests of employces: "If today the directors of a company were to consider the intercstr of its employees 
no one wodd argue thai in doing so they were no< acing bona fide in the intemas of the tompany 
itseKw(at 425). 
Since the Iabor market is not as [iqpïd as the capital marke~ eqxcïaiïy for those w o h  who have 
deveioped some specific skiiis, the chance of mobilitg Ï n  the Iabor market is s h  On the other hand, a 
tradicioaai poht of view is that a company in China amally pmvides an employee a Hé-long job. 
Thefefore, the mterests of empfoyees are specïficaiïy addnssed by China's Corporate Law. 
" The otha side of the eqtration, thougb is that ifworkers bave devdoped ski[S they cannot be replacexi 
by the corporation arcept at high CO& AccordlngIyv managers wüî h m  an mcentive a> voIuntariiy 
accommodate some employees' wishes to prwent them h m  @tting 
this country's politicait historicai, ideological, economic and cultural values. Wth a long 
period of a d h e ~ g  to a socialist system, and statdpublic ownership dominance in 
economic Iife, a management mode characterized by codetermination with workers in 
state-owned enterprisesag is maintained under CCL and FIE Laws. Such CO- 
determination with workers has been deemed a type of socialia democracy. Socialist 
ideoIogy has for a long time advocated that everybody has a right to work and a sociaiist 
country s h d  have fiil1 employment. These have become deeply rooted assumptions in the 
minds of Chinese workers and managers alike. On the other hand, the social 
unemployment benefits system in China is not well deveIoped. Therefore, employee 
interes& especially job security, are given much greater aîtention by the Chinese 
govemment through China's Corporate Laws. 
[t shouid be noted that aithough employee participation rights exist under CCL and 
FIES Laws, the role that employees play in corporate policy making in Chinese 
corporations is modea. Firstly, the laws €d tu eaablish quaiification standards, 
procedures for the election and removai of workers' representatives and a ~amework 
under which workers can provide input on important corporate matters on an ongoing 
basis. Labor's right to representation on the s ~ p e ~ s o r y  board is provided in ambiguous 
statutory wording and without any real means of enforcement. Secondly, Iabor 
representation in corporate management efficiency concems because moa worker 
representatives Iack managerid knowIedge. Thll-dIy, since the supe~sory  board exercises 
its rights coiIectively, h the absence of any provision as tu the ratio of labor representation 
oa the supenisory board under the CCL, it is doubtfbi whether the workers' mterests can 
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be meaningfùily addressed by the supe~sory  board in reality."' Fourthly, the narrow 
nature of employees' concems implies a modest role for labor representation4'' 
A comparative examination of empIoyeeg coflective influences over corporate 
internai control in Canada and China indicates that employees ofCCL cornpanies and REs 
generally have greater innuences than their counterparts in Canada It fiirther 
demonarates t hat corporate control practices under China's Corporate Laws maintah 
certain socialist doctrines. 
4.6 Summary: Corporate Control - From An Interna1 Perspective 
Corporate intemal control is a complicated issue. Legally speaking, corporate 
internai control depends on what a country's corporate law provides in respect of 
corporate intemal structure, the powers vested with corporate participants by the 
corporate Iaw and the provisions of a corporation's constitutionai documents. Pradcally 
speaking, corporate intemal control is complicated and varies widely from corporation to 
corporation. 
The rationaie underlying those features of a counuy's corporate Iaw deaiing with 
corporate structure is closety connected with that country's histoticai, poIiticai and 
economic development, Iegd tradition, ideology and the culturai values of its people. As 
"State-owned enterprises practice democratic management through congress of workers and staff and in 
other ways in accordance with the law." 
4t0 Fan, lian & Jiang, Daxing, On Corporate L m  (Nanjing, Cauia: Nanjing University Pubüshmg 
House: 1997) at 483, (Chinese version). 
"' Generaily, workers are concemeci about their job semrity, saIary and and wodring conditioag 
whether their ski& are transferabIe or not, and whether more training or edncaîïon are avaiIa61e. But 
these issues constitute oniy a portion of the issues that m m  be adchseci in corporate poky making 
to the provisions under a corporation's constitutional documents, they are a f'unction of the 
degree of strictness of corporate law, the expectation of investors at the Mie  of 
establishg the corporation, and the professionai skiIIs of the drafters of nich 
documents.J12 On the other hand, business reaiity is in a aate of flux. Corporations, in 
order to survive within the modem competitive commercial environment, have to improve 
their performance. Proper corporate intemal control can be one means of achieving 
improved performance. 
Legal provisions under the CBCA provide for the possibiiity of a unanimous 
shareholders' agreement as a method for tailonng a corporation's management structure 
and providing shareholders with direct control over a corporation.313 However, in the 
absence of a unanimous shareholders' agreement, the board of directors is given the 
statutory power to manage a corporation."' Moreover, the CBCA permits the board to 
delegate part of its manageriai power to corporate officers. This corporate intend power 
distriiution is iIIustrated in Appendix Il - D. 
Though this "one-size fits ail" corporate intemaf control structure under the CBCA 
fails to recognize different corporate decision-making modes in different types of 
corporations in business reality, it acknowledges the shareholders' position in corporate 
internai control. SharehoIders, as capitdists, have absolute power in rnanaging 
corporations provided they act unanimously. It appears that the CBCA's corporate 
internai control mode1 is based on capitai. However, the corporate internai control mode1 
"' Waere the coprate Iaw of a country p h d e s  specinc prcsnÏbed f o m  for a corporaîÏoaTs 
constitutionai documents, the professional skiIIs of cirafters wilt not be a factor. 
4'3 CBCA s.102 (1). 
is not an absolute capitalist modei, especiétily in terms of legal remdes provided by the 
CBCA for p r o t e h g  mïnority shareholders (and other stakehoiders dso) during the 
course of corporate decision-makÏng Therefore, on the whole, the CBCA adopts a 
modified capitaiia model of corporate intemal control. 
Legal provisions under the CCL provide for the shareholdeh meeting as the most 
poweA1 organ in a corporation4" and recognize the board of directors as the highest 
authonty within a foreign investment c ~ r n ~ a n ~ . ~ ' ~  China's Corporate Laws m e r  
recognize the p ~ c i p l e  of one share, one vote and majority rule. It seems that, in terms of 
corporate intemal control, Iegai provisions under China's Corporate Laws adopt many 
features of capitalism. However, in addition to a number of legai provisions based on 
capitalist doctnhe- China's Corporate Laws also emphasize protection of state interests 
within corporations even at the expense of disregarding independent corporate persondity. 
Further, minonty shareholders (particularly individual shareholders) are discriminated 
against by China's Corporate Laws. Moreover, the modest positions of boards of 
directors and manageriai officers in Chinese public corporations indicate the vestiges of 
the enterprise management model from China's sociaiist planning economy. Nevertheless, 
labor participation in the corporate decisionmaking process typicdiy refleas the impact 
of sociaiïst doctrine upon corporate intemal control. 
nie mix of caphdist and socialist doctrines in the Iegai provisions regarding 
corporate internai control under China's Corporate Laws reveals a modined sociaiïst 
jt5 Articles 37 and 102 of CCL. 
'" McIe 34 of ImpIementatïon Regulations of ETV Law and Artide 24 of hpiementation Rules of U V  
Law. 
mode1 of corporate internai control a mode1 combining sociallst enterprise management 
under the planning econorny with features of modem western corporate management. 
CHAPTER 5 CORPORATE: CONTROL FROM AN EXTERNAL PERSPECTIW 
The preceding chapter has offered a comparative examination of corporate control 
in Canada and China 6om an intemal perspective by examiring determining/controlling or 
iduencing powers exercised by shareholders, directors, managerial officers, and 
employees under the CBCA and China's Corporate Law and in Canadian and Chinese 
business reality . 
As the definition of corporate control indicates (see Chapter 1), these 
determining/controlIing or influencing powen over policies or management of a 
corporation do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in, influenced by, and in tum 
influence, the societai values of a country. Therefore, in this chapter, the issue of 
corporate control will be addressed from an extemal perspective through a comparative 
examination of the role of the state, market, creditors (focusing on banks) and culture in 
influencing corporate management in Canada and China. 
The State 
1 State Control over Incorporation 
By abolishing the notion of incorporation as a grant nom the prerogative powers 
of the Crown, the presem CBCA adopts a regime of hcorporatioa as of ~ght.J'7 This 
regime eliminates any discretion on the part of the registrar to refùse to issue a certincate 
*'? Svpm note 12 (Dicicesson Report) at 18 - 19. See also CBCA r 8. 
of incorporation provided that al1 necessary filings have been made in accordance with îhe 
CBCA. Therefore, govemmentai control over the creation of corporations is restncted 
and the incorporation procedure has become effective and convenient to business people. 
Uniike the incorporation practice in Canada, in China, the govemment tightly 
controls the establishment of corporations through approvd procedures specified by 
China's Corporate Laws and ot her administrative regul ations. To incorporate a pub licly 
held corporation (a Iiaed or unlisted corporation), approvais from both the local 
govemment and the central govemment are required.'Ig If incorporating a listed public 
corporation* stricter pre-conditions (relating to such matters as minimum asset 
requirements and a history of profit-making of the enterprise applying for listing) are 
required. In addition, an annuai quota ~~stern*'~ for issuing shares to the public is 
employed by the central govemment for the purpose of strictly controlling the shares to be 
issued to the public each year. The issuing shares quota system will be discussed in 5.2.1 B 
beIow. 
With regard to setting up a foreign investment enterprise (a sino-foreign equity 
joint venture, a sino-foreign cooperative joint venture, or a wholly Foreign owned 
"* LiSted corpontions refcr to corporaUons l i s ta i  on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, or Foreign stock cuchanges- 
Artide 77 and Article 15 1 of CCL. 
Article 73 of CCL provides the prcconditions that a public corporation must sat ie  More it can be 
incorporated. 
m e r  to 5.2-1 B below 
in terms of incorporating domestic closely-heid corporations (ie Iunited liabïüty corporations under 
CCL), the incarpontntg procedure is more Iike that ofthe mCA Upoa meeMg conditions pnM& by 
the C U  and registration with the state registration authority- the limited Iiability corporation is 
established 
enterprke), examination by, and approval fiom, an authorized state organ is required and 
this requirement is strictly adhered t~ . ' ~ '  
The approval procedures for incorporation in China make the process of gettbg 
incorporated uncertain and unpredictable. Approval largely depends on administrative 
officers' discretion. M e r  getting approvals, every corporation has to register itself with a 
state organ, the state administration of industry and commerce or its local branches, in 
order to obtain a business license. The business license of a corporation will spe* the 
business scope of such corporation as approved by the approval authorities. Any business 
activiaes beyond or in violation of the specified business scope are prohiited and a 
corporation engaging in such prohibited activities will be penalized by relevant Chinese 
~aws."' 
The incorporation style under the CBCA indicates the Canadian govemment's 
efforts to facilitate business people's use of the corporate rnechanism4* and its reliance on 
the market to exetcise quality control in the creation of corporations. China's strict 
control over the creation of corporations reflects this countiy's fiagiIe market which Iacks 
The pre-conditions For cstablishing a closeiy-hefd corporation are set out in section one of Chapter Two of 
CCL; for a publicly-he1d corpontion, section one of Chapter Three of CCL; for a listed corporation, 
Anicle 152 of CCL; fior a sino-forcign cquity joint venture, Chapter Two of hplernentation Reguiations 
of EW Law. for a sino-fore@ cooperative joint venture, Chapter Two of ünpfementation Ruks of  C N  
Law. and for a wholly foreign owned corporation. chapter two of Impkmentation Ruies of WFOE Law- 
ArticIe 3 of UV Law. 
ArticIe 8 of rmpfementing Regdations ofWV Law. 
Article 5 of CJV Law. 
Artide 6 of Implementing Rulcs of CJV Law. 
Artide 6 of WFOE Law. 
Article 8 of Implementing RuIcs of WFOE Law. 
Anide IL of CCL Artide L I  OC IqIementaaon Regdations of WV Law. Artide 8 of 
implementation Ruies of CJV Law. 
*CL Supra note 42 (Diderson Report) at 2. Citing K W. Baüantine, BuIIantrine on Corporations 
(Chicago: CaiIaghan and Company. 1946) at (Ci 42, 
the strength to screen out misuse and abuse of the corporate mechanism by investors. The 
Chinese system relies upon prohibitive legd provisions rather than facilitating corporate 
Iegislation to protect the interests of the public. The incorporation approach under 
China's Corporate Laws is similar to the pre-CBCA system of incorporation by letters- 
patent that provides public officials discretion in determining the contents of a 
corporation's constitution. Whether the regirne of incorporation by aate approvai can 
achieve the goals of minimizing fraud and abuses, protecting public interests, and ensuring 
heaithy development of corporations as stated by Chinese lawmakers remains to be 
appraised." But it is without doubt that Chinese state power over the creation of 
corporations is much more signiticant than Canadian govenunent power in this area. 
5.1.2 The RoIe of the State in a Corporation's Life 
There are two means by which a state can exert controlling or iduencing power 
over a corporation. First, the state may directly participate in corporate decision- making 
by establishing state-owned shareholding companies or purchasing shares of a corporation. 
Second, the state rnay exen influencing power indirectiy over corporate policy through 
domestic iaws, regulations, policy and international agreements (especially in connection 
with tax and trade) to which the nate becomes party. This seaion will focus on the state's 
The Law Cornittee of the NationaI PeopIe's CongressC Repart of Examination and Diffosson on the 
Chinese Corporation Law (M) (Quan Guo R a t  Da Fa Lu We Yuan Hui Guan Yu "Zhong Hua Ren Mm 
gong He Guo Gong si Fa (Chao An)" Shen Yi Iie Go De Bao Gao) mec- 17,1993) stated tbat the regïme 
of ÏncorporatÏon by approval is for preventing h u d  and abuses of corporations. 
See aisot Supra note 59 at 18 and Supra note 60 at 465: a dkussion of abuses af the corporation form 
during 1986 to t 992 before the promu1gatiorr of China's Corporation Law. 
influencing power over corporate policy *ou& domestic corporate law in Canada and 
Canada principaily adopts a capitaiist system." Capitaiism as a system involves 
constraints on govemment, and these constraints are determined in large part by the 
requirements of business since, ideologically, capitaiism is based on the recognition of 
private property rights. Adhering to many essential capitalist principle~'~~ and a belief in 
the protection of pnvate property rights, the Canadian govemrnent aims in its corporate 
law to provide a "fiamework policy" that ailows Canadian business to thrive within a 
proper legai and institutional enviror~ment.~~ According to Michael Porter: " 
. . . [g]ovemmentts proper role is as a pusher and challenger. There is 
a vitai role for pressure even adversity in the process of creating 
national competitive advantage.. . Sound govemment policy seeks 
to provide the tools necessary to compete, through active efforts to 
bolaer Factor creation, whiIe ensuring a certain discornfort and 
strong competitive pressure. 
It is noted chat othcr laws. For instance* tax laws. may have significant influences over corporate 
business. In the casc of China the Chinese governrncnt has employed tax incentives and designeci tax 
holidays and concessions to attract foreign capital to China's Swai Economic Zones and other opening 
areas. For a description of the SpctiaI Economic Zoncs that attract foreign capital Mi to Supra note 72. 
as It is not dear. however. that Canada is a purely "capitaiût" counw. More often, it is descfibed as  a 
mixed economy which blcnds cIcrncnts of capitaiism with eIements of k a l i s m .  The Canadian 
heaithcare synem. for euample. seems to embody more socialin that capitalin principles. 
" In Canada. the corporation was designed primuily as a vehide for raising and using capitai in the 
pumit of profit. Thcrefore. it rv;is primarily intmded to serve the inter- of capitaiists (Le. 
sharehoIders). 
However. it is increasingly rccognizcd that the corporation may aIso need to take accunt of other 
"stakehoIders". 
C" I@a note 429 at 3. It is noted that though the govemment of Canada rnay not intedere sipificantiy 
with individual business strate= through the CBCA, nmrtheless, many other forms of governent 
regdation, iike enviconmental rcgulations, heaith and sfety regitlations. and prodnct safety ceguiationg 
have a signifiant impact on business conduct In this sense, it may be said that Canada has adopted a 
m&ed capitalkt -stem in its politicai and economic Mi 
" Michael Porter* The Cornpetifive .4dvmtage ofMatiom (New York The Free Press, 1990) at 681. 
Cited by R J. Danicis & R Mo* supra note 348 at 3-  
The Canadian government puts the promotion of prosperity and employment at the  
heart of the govemment's agenddW But the Canadian government uses other methods 
(rather than administrative interference) to achieve its goals. The Canadian govemment 
seeks to build "a supportive domestic economic policy framework", works for improved 
access for Canadian products abroad, and aims to develop "an open, f ~ r  and predictable 
set of rules governing trade and in~earnen t" .~~  Under this aate policy, the govemment of 
Canada hopes to pave the way for expanded opportunities for Canadian business so as to 
prornote the country's goals of low unempIoyment and rising prosperity. Thus, direct 
administrative intervention fiotn the state in Canadian corporate affairs is minimal. 
China basically adopts a socialist ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ '  The socidist system involves 
constraints imposed upon the private sector rather than upon the govemrnent. Adhering 
to a sociaiist system and a beiief in the protection of public property rights, the Chinese 
ir 432 govenunent's policy for corporations is to regulate and "standardize . The purpose of 
standardizing corporations is to integrate the ptivate sector economy iato the socialist 
system. China's Corporate Laws embody the hope of the Chinese government of 
providing an econornic structure for this private/sociaIist integration and so utiiize private 
and public capital to pursue the sotialist aim of &Il empIoyment and prosperity. 
" Canada Canada in the IVorid: üovemment Statcment (Ottawa: Goverment of Canada. 1995) at IO. 
"' Since the euinomic d o m  beginning in 1979. and the adoption of "sociaiist market economf. it rnay 
be hard to describe China as a purely sociaiist country- 
= Anide 1 of CCL "This law is fornulateci in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Repubtic 
of Caina in order to meet the needs of establishmg a modem entqrise system, to srandwdiite the 
organization and actMties of companies, to protect the Iegitimate rights and intet.ests of cornpanies, 
sharehoIders, and creditors. to maintain the socid economk order and to prornote the devdopment ofthe 
soÜaiïst market economy." (emphasis added) 
For instance, employees' interests within corporations have been paid parûcular 
attention by China's Corporate Laws. In addition to Iabor-management CO-determination 
provisions under China's Corporate Laws, as mentioned in section 4.5 above, China's 
Corporate Laws further provide cornpulsory provisions for corporations to fund unions 
every month in order to ençure that unions in Chinese corporations have fiinds to organite 
certain activities relating to colIective weifare.'ln The state policies are more ofien 
expressed through corporate laws and reguIations in a compulsory, prohibitive and 
negative way and often expressed in a way that limits the corporation's business freedom 
so that the state can align the corporate business with state policy. Thus, to comply with 
aate policy, corporations must frequentIy promote employrnent at the expense of 
corporate efficiency. 
As an economic structure, the corporation plays a key role in detennining whether 
the Chinese govemment can achieve its socialist aims. Therefore, the aate is eager to 
exert its will on corporations for the purpose of achieving aate policy goals. [t is without 
doubt that in China the state exerts more state policies to iduence corporate decision- 
making than does the state in  anad da.''^ This leads to corporate control practices under 
" "Collectkc welfare". i.e Ji Ti Fu Li. No definition is provideci by Chinese law. PractidIy, it r e f i i  co 
faciiities pravidcd by a Company for its employas for enhanmg employees' interest in work or imptovùig 
employees' h d t  h erg. mding room. gym and so on used by emptoyees. 
Article 72 of lmplementation Ruies of WFOE Law and Article 99 of hptementing Regdations of UV 
Law. Thesc articles provide that a forcign invernent company shaU activeiy support the work of its 
unions and in accordance with the Iaws of the People's Repubtic of China on Lahr Unions, pmvide them 
with the nacssary premiscs and facilities for office work and meetings and for use in orga-g 
coiiective welfarp culturai and athletic activities for staff and workers A foreign imestment company 
must each month alIocate Iabor miion h& at the rate of 2 pet cent of the total pay cf their staff and 
workers. Such b d s  are to be used by their rabor unions in accordance with the measures for the use of 
Iabor union IWids fonnulated by the AIE Chha Federation of Trade Unions. 
4~ It is noted that in China, when corporations seek to amend certain provisions in their cunstitutional 
documents, in addition to o b t d n g  the consent of their sharehoIders, they must aIso obtain the apprwal 
of the reievant state organ This cequi~ment for app- of amendments corresponds ta thé reqziirement 
of incorporation by statc a p p d  in China 
China's Corporate Laws that embody a combination of modem corporate control features 
of western countries' corporate laws (in order to attract private capital into China's equity 
markets) and elements of the traditional socialia mode1 of enterprise management (in 
order to maintain continuity with sod i s t  doctrine)."' 
5.2 The Market 
Extemally, in addition to the state, the market is also one of the vital factors that 
influences corporate control. However. it was not untii the 1970s and 1980s that law and 
economics scholars realized that markets also played important roles in disciplinhg 
corporate conducts and influencing corporate decision making.u6 These markets include 
the capital markets (debt and equity markets), the corporate control market (Le. takeover 
"' Another argument made to support statc interference with corporate business in Cbina is that to some 
extent, a relativciy strong staic influence in a corporation's Me d e s  sense in today's China. The fess 
efficient the underlying market mcchanisms to rcgdate corporations, the greater the need for govcrnment 
rcgutation. Thus, thcrc 1s a srgnificant rolc for the state to play in Chinese corporate Ife during the period 
of building China's market cconomy. Such a strong mie for the state dso maka sense considering the 
fact that China has a large numbcr of unsophisticated indMdu&s buying and seiIhg shares. These naive 
investors (who gcnerdly lack profcssionai investment advisors) are unabIe to assess the nsks involveci 
with investing in China's immature market Many individuaI Chinese imestors are uriaware that the- 
may jeopardizc their financial Future by placing their IXe savings in schemes o f f i g  highiy voiatik 
returns and fail to give e c i c n t  wcight to the pom-bility of thetr imrestment becoming worthless. They 
are more easiiy infïuenced by mcdia and. thus. are apt to take a stake in corporations that wii1 never resdt 
in adequate returns on their investment, These facts contn'bute to an environment in wbch the state has 
considerable room to inteivene in the marketplace. The state, by regulating or rometimes over-reguiating 
the marketplace is capable of discouraging inchiduais fmm dewioping schemes dai*gned to mislead 
unsophïstiuted investors, prevcnting artficiai market manipulation and helping to channe1 private 
investor firnds to I e s  rïsky investmcntsc 
a 6  See cg R Gilson, "The Case Against Shark RepeIIant Amendments: Strnctural Limitations on the 
Enabhg Concept" ( 1982) 34 Stan. L, Rev- 775 
See L A Briddey. "Managcrid Goals and the Comt System: Some Econoxuic uisights* (1988) 13 
Crut - US, LJ. 77 at 8 1. 
E, F, Fama " A g e n q  Probterns and the Thcory of the Fim" (1980) 88 J. POL Econ. 288 at 295. 
Actuaiiy, the argument rclating to the d e  of rhe takmver market (or the market for corporate conml) 
emerged eariier See, KG. Manne- "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Controiw (1965) 73 J- POL 
Ema I IO and AA Berk  T h e  Prim of Power. Sale of Corporate Control" (1965) 50 Corn& LQ. 628. 
market), the product/seniice market, and the manageria1 seMce market. In addition to 
these markets this thesis will dso address the infitxence of media coverage upon corporate 
decision-making. 
5.2.1 The Capital Market 
The capital market conmas of the market for equity and long-term debt."' The 
capital market can discipline managerial behavior. Management has to consider the tems 
on which capital will be supplied to the corporation. No corporate managers want to take 
aeps that will increase the cos  of financing the c~r~oration."~ 
This section focuses on the equity markets in Canada and China and their 
respective impacts upon public corporations in the two countrïes. Debt markets, and their 
respective influences upon Canadian and Chinese corporations, are addressed in section 
5.3 below. 
A The Equity Market in Canada 
The equity market in Canada is composed mainiy of Canada's five stock exchanges 
and an eaablished "over-the-counter" market. Among the f i e  stock exchanges (that is, 
the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Montreai Exchange, the Vancouver Stock Exchange, 
the Alberta Stock Exchange and the Wmipeg Stock Exchange), the Toronto Stock 
It is noted that the market Tor short-iem debt is usuaiIy tefened to as the money market 
S. Pn,w% Finunciut iCla*kets, ï/nsrutïons t I m m e n t x  Corporate Govername in an Ijxwnationaf 
Perspective: A Survey of cbqmrate ConrroI ~Mechanisnrsdmong Lmge Firms in the US, Ci-K. Juparr m d  
Gennony (Cambridge, MA & Odord Blackwetl Pubiishers, 1995) at 6- 
Exchange (TSE), is the most influentid stock exchange in Canada The TSE is the 9" 
largest securities exchange in the world based on market capitalkation, accounting for 
over 80 per cent of the value of shares traded on Canadian stock e ~ c h a n ~ e s . ~ ~ ~  
Nomithstanding that the TSE's principal bc t ion  is the listing of cornmon shares, it aiso 
permits investors to make equity investments through listed proprietary derivative 
produas, t m t  units, closed-end funds and other equity-linked products.w Canadian 
investors purchase equities directly and dso mdirectly through mutuai funds."' Unlisted 
shares of public corporations may also trade actively in the so-called "over-the-counter" 
market in Canada. 
The Canadian equity market principaily involves trading in shares of two types of 
corporations. The first type is the public corporation, the shares of which typically trade 
in markets characterized by a large Boat of publicly traded securities, hi@ liquidity and 
significant institutional shareholdings. The other type is the smaifer public corporation 
which typically has a much smaller Boat of publicly traded securities, relatively low 
liquidity, and low institutionai owner~h i~ .~ '  Canadian equity markets are dominated by 
the Most trading in the shares of illiquid public corporations with few 
1. R Lloyd (from Blake. Cassels & Graydon). "Canada's Capitai Markets" online: World Legal Fonun. 
~http://www,worldegalfo~~~llco.uk/canaWartid& O 183. htrni> (date accessed- Jme 28, 1999). 
Ibid. 
" Ibid As of Decembcr 3 1, 1996. there were ma 950 fiin& in Canada imresting in a bmad range of 
domestic and foreign equities as welI as debt and otber finanCid instruments. The Zmestment Fun& 
Wute of Canada recentIy reported that totai assets under management by lnstitute members amounted 
to CM273 biiiion, and that these assets were held tbr0ug.h over 30 miIlion accounts- 
" S u p  note 124 at 817. 
insatutional shareholders occurs between retaiI i n v e s t ~ a . ~  nie predominant 




corporate ownership concentration. As pointed out in section 4.1.3, one of the 
characteristics of Canadian corporatioris is high ownership concentration. As shown in 
Appendiix II - B, a corporation with highiy concentrated ownership is normdy govemed 
by a single shareholder or a small group of shareholden or thek nominees. The fact that 
many Canadian corporations have controlling shareholders implies that the market for 
those corporations' shares will be relatively illiquid since the tme public Boat wi11 be 
relatively small. 
However, one c m o t  overlook the large sources of capital represented by 
chartered banks, life insurance companies public and private pension funds and mutual 
funds in the Canadian equity market."' The very existence of institutional shareholders 
and their large interests in public corporations has attracted the attention of Canadian 
tesearchersM6 Since institutionai shareholders have access to sophisticated in-house 
market professionals, they have the expertise and ability as well as the incentive to monitor 
the corporations in which they have invested. Their presence, accordingiy, offers a very 
real hope for the effective monitoring of large public corporations. (Please refer to 4.1.7 A 
(3) above.) 
The equity markets may generalty provide some discipline over corporate decision 
making through the share pncÏng mechanism. In a welI finaionhg equity market, the 
544 Supra note 265 (IG- Machtosh). 
US R M. Tory (hm Toq Tory DesLamiers & Binnington), 'Corparate Fice  in Canadam, onIine: 
Worid Legai Fonun, ~httpYi~~~.worldlegalfo~co.uklcanadalaRicIes/I 997 t O0 167- hûuP (date 
accessed: Iune 28, 1999)- 
*Supra note 133. 
prices of shares of corporations shouid reflect the reIative operational efficiency of such 
corporations.4J7 A mature equity market is the ideai instrument through which to transIate 
the effectiveness of corporate management into the pnces of a corporation's shares. Share 
prices, then, fiinction as one of the indicia of managerid perfomiance, and cm be used as a 
benchmark by which to motivate corporate controllers to maximize corporate profits. 
Stock exchanges aiso play a regulatory role by requiring publicly-held corporations 
to adopt sound corporate govemance practices. The TSE, in order to promote sound 
corporate govemance in Canadian public corporations, published the Dey Report, a 
iandmark midy on corporate governance, in 1994.u8 The TSE requires iiaed 
corporations to disclose and explain any merence between their corporate govemance 
practices and the guidelines in the Dey Report, though it does not expressly require listed 
corporations to adhere to these guidelines. Five years after the publication of the Dey 
Report, in order to assess the extent to which the corporate govemance practices of listed 
public corporations reflect these guidelines. the TSE and the Institute of Corporate 
Directors issued a follow-up study on 635 TSE-listed corp~rat ions.~~ The TSE has thus 
been helping to define proper corporate intemal control standards for corporations, 
investors and the Canadian equity markets. 
J4f A neœssary pre-condition for nich direct re£ïection of operationai alciency in share pricing is that ai i  
materiaï information reIathg to the corporation is rapidIy and propedy disciosed without distortion, 
Supra note 20. 
449 Supra note 2 1, 
It appears that institutional shareholders, the share pricing mechanism and stock 
exchanges dl perform a disciplinary fiinction in influencing corporate coatrol practices in 
Canada. 
B The Equity Market in China 
It was not until the 1990s that an equity market in China was established. Ln 1990, 
China established the first national stock exchange - the Shanghai Stock Exchange. At the 
end of the year 1990, there were 13 tisted public corporations in China. Later, in 199 1, 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was set up. Shortiy thereafter, the two markets were 
unified and tùrther standardized through a sophisticated over-the-couder cornputer 
network - the National Securities Trading Automated Quotation System (NSTAQS). 
Through NSTAQS, more than five thousand brokers and dealers scattered across China 
are able to buy and sel1 both equity and debt securities. Though at the end of 1997 there 
were 10,000 publicly-held corporations in China, only 745 of those were publicly listed 
and traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock ~xchan~es.'"' 
The introduction of a secunties market into China was not without controversy. 
As andyzed in 3.2 above, unlike the refoms undertaken in Russia and moa of Eastern 
Europe, which saw social ideology relinquished during the process of privatization, 
economic reform in China has had as its distinctive feature the presenmtion of sociaiism. 
Sociaiism is characterized by the dominance of the statdpubiic economy. However, the 
secUnties markets in the West are dominated by the private sector. The conceru of the 
Chao Feria "Shehoidîng System: Basic Organàatioa Fom of Modern Enterprises" (1998). Chma 
Secirrities, chttp Y/www-c hinasecnritl~~.corncn/enp/IiCneng~mwe~4htm> (date accessedr Apnl 3 , 1999)- 
Chinese govenunent, in permitting the introduction of eqyity markets in China is obvious: 
that private economy may graduaily erode the statdpublic economy in China 
Prompted by the shonage of capitd and the lack of incentives to improve 
enterprise management, the governent finally introduced the corporate form of business 
organitation in the 1980s and an equity market in China in the early of 1990s. From their 
inception, these expenments with the corporate foim and the establishment OF a securities 
market were based on the officiai presumption that date enterprise management couid be 
upgraded simply by adopting modem corporate foms and diversifjing shareholding while 
preseMng the state's controliing stake. In order to employ the devices of corporations 
and of securities markets found in the West  while at the same time prese~ng socialism, 
the Chinese people created equity markets with "Chinese characteriaics". In other words, 
the public economy plays a dominant role in the Chinese equity market. 
As anaiyzed in 4.1 above, Chinese corporations have a high concentration of 
statdpublic shares. The unique share classification structure in China reflects the state's 
concem over the position of the aatdpublic economy. The extraordinary shareholders' 
rights provided by CCL and the nedect, conscious or unconscious (see 4.1 above), of 
minority shareholders' interests, strengthen the power of the majority shareholders (i.e., 
the state or other public sector actors). 
With regard tu the equity market in China, the dominant position of the public 
economy is maintained through the shares isstring quota system and the restrictions pIaced 
on trading. 
(1) Issuïng Shares in the Primary Market: The Quota System 
The Chhese govenunent maintains high state/public ownership of shares tbrough 
its shares issuing quota system. In briec relevant national authorities set a figure, or 
quota, for the aggregate offering pnce of issuance of al1 shares in the whole country 
during a year. The quota then is ailocated to provinciai govenunents, ministerid 
authorities, and municipalities directly administrated by the centrai govemment,"' usualIy 
on the basis of local economic development. mer receiwig its issuance quota, the local 
authority wi11 conduct an examination of ail applicants for incorporation of a public 
offering corporation or for a public offenng of secunties accordhg to China's Corporate 
Laws and other laws and regdations If the local authority determines that an applicant is 
quaiified to issue shares, it then agrees to assign the applicant an issuance quota and 
approves the application for offering. This local approval is then submitted to the central 
govemment for a finai approvai. Upon receipt of approvais Eom local and central 
govemments, the applicant may, if it wishes, appiy to have its shares Iisted oii the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Mer examination and approvai by the stock 
exchange, the corporation can then make a public offiering. 
The weaknesses of the shares issuhg quota system are obvious: employing 
ap p rovai procedures for incorporations and pu& offering s tends to be highiy politicd 
and unpredictable. The quota system provides a mechanisin for administrative control of 
the seninties market and accentuates the market's political c o n t e ~ t . ~ ~  AU these offerings 
" Four cities, Beijing (the upitai of China), Sbangbai Tianjing and Choug@g, are the municipalities 
directiy administrated by the central government. 
*n W. D. Hoimes, "China's FÏnanüal Worms Ïn the Globai W e t "  (1997) 28 L & P o 6  kt? Bus- 715 
at 752- 
are subject to plans formulated and admllustrated by the govenunents.4" A number of 
state authonties jointly decide upon the plans for annual shares issuance and the totd 
number of corporations to be listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchmges. 
Each province is given a quota of new listings. The selection at the provincial Ievel is in 
p ~ c i p l e  based on local industrial bureau' recommendations and the overd balance 
between industrial sectors. The finai decision then lies with the cennal govemment. In 
this regard, which corporations can be incorporated and Liaed is decided by the state plan. 
Actually, on average, 70 per cent of every corporation's shares are owned by the state and 
legd Therefore, owing to the state policy of cornmitment to sotialism, the 
maintenance of the dominant position of statdpublic ownership in the equity market, and 
the carefui administration of the share issuing quota system, the primary market for 
Chinese equity secunties is strictly controlled by the govemment and maintains a socialist 
character. 
(2) Share Trading on the Equity Market 
China's capital market to a large extent is illiquid. The reason for this ilIiquidity is 
that aate shares and Iegd person shares cannot be mded (unless approvai fkom the 
relevant state authority is obtained) on the secutities market under m e n t  Chinese 
4n By restricting access «, the r0rma.i nationai share markets, the quota system actuaiiy pushes nonquota 
aaMÏes Uito ather venues, for example, securîties trading centers set up in major cities ami sponsor& by 
locai governments and the tocai PeopIe's Bank of China. 
Fang, Liufang, "Comments: China" (L997) 28 L. & Poly CntT Bus. 897 at 897- 
For the defrrrition of person*, see supra note 108- 
regulations.J55 It is estimated that around 70 per cent of shares in China's equity market 
are owned by the state and Iegd persons."s6 This means the tme public float for Chinese 
corporations is relatively srnail. Moreover, regdations provide that an individud 
shareholder cannot purchase more than 0.1 per cent of the outstanding shares of a Iisted 
corporation.J57 Further, capital markets in China are characterized by an absence of 
institutionai shareholders. Insurance companies, for example, are prohibited fiom 
investing in the securities market:5g as are pension fund~ . '~~  
The secondary market is overwhelmed by household individual investors. Moa of 
them Iack sophistication, knowledge, time and investing sawy, and are less likely to 
monitor the corporations in which they invest. [nstead of engaghg in long-terni 
investment, many of these individuai investon are engaged in short-tem speculation. 
"' Article 36 of Provisionai Reguloriohs on the Ahinisnarion ojlsuing and Trading ofStoch (issurd 
by the State CounciI of the People's Republic of China on ApnI 22, 1993). 
iM Anothef estimation made by Vandegrift is kt, of the outstanding shares for any corporation. oniy 20 
percent can actuaity k traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange A shares 
and B sharcs mpectïvcIy account for 18 percent and 2 percent within that 20 percent of traded shares. Of 
the remaining non-uading se-ties, nationai, provinciai and I d  govments hoid 30 percent, state- 
owned enterprises and domestic institutions own 45 percent, and issuers and their emp1oyees hoId 5 
percent. See supra note L f 8. 
It has also been estimated that more than 98 percent of  Chinese public corporations' shares are not 
tradabie in the market @en the Iargc mrmber of non-tradable -te shares and employee shares. See supra 
note 122. 
457 Supra note 207. 
"' Article 104 of Insurance Lm of~he  PeopIe's RepuMc ofChirra (Ratdieci at the LJfh Session of the 
Standing Cornmittee of the EÏghth National PeopIets Congress on Iune 30, 1995, and promdgated by 
Presidentiai D-e No. 5 1 for ùnplementation commencing on Octokr L, 1995). 
459 Article 4 of 1990 Notice oflabor hfinistry Concerning Shngthening th@ Papent and Mimagement 
ofPension (Lao Dong Bu Guan Yu Jïa Qiang Lao Bao Xian Ji h De Zhen Guan He Guari Li Gong Zuo 
De Tong Zhi), 
The highIy reguiated equity markets for both primary offerhgs and secondary 
trading ensures the continued controlling position of public ownership in China's equity 
market. The predominant position of the state/pubtic in shareholding corporations and in 
the equity market ailows the managers of former state enterprises :O continue to operate 
without effective nipe~kion. ln the meantime, the illiquid eqpity market is volatile and 
wlnerable to manipulation for reasons reIated to its smalI size and the extent of 
administrative controls. The government sometimes directly intervenes to prevent a 
collapse of the securities market given that it is a source of capital that helps drive China's 
economic g ro~ th .~O 
The highly regulated equity markets not only increase agency costs but also 
facilitate officiai corruption. The share issuing quota system makes public offerings 
depend on the discretion of oficials. The unjustüied prohibition againa individual 
shareholders hoiding over O. L per cent of the outstanding shares of a listed public 
corporation is a sign of discrimination against private shareholders and private economy. 
560 The fotlowing example iIIusvates state intervention in China's stock market: 
"In Juiy 1994, the Shanghai market sank to a record Iow dose on M y  29 to finish at 32834 points. The 
Shenzhen A index crashed through its [O0 starting Ievd for the second time in its fow-year history, 
dosing at a record Iow 95.34 points, On Friday, h iy  29, a€ter an emergency meeting in Beijing among 
CSRC (China Securities Rcguiatory Cornmittee) oEciaIs, State Council aides and o&aaIs h m  the two 
stock exchmges, the goverment decidcd on a rcscue plan, The CSRC's rescue plan measnres, ptastered 
on the fiont pages of the officiai press the next day, included a freeze on ail new shzue issues hdd mr 
h m  1993 for the remainder of the year, They dso hinted at allowing joint Chinese-foreign liuid 
management firms limiteci access ta the market on a trial basis, To address the proôlem of a la& of 
institutional investors, Ive have opted for the creation of Chinese and miued invesunent hnds capable of 
attracting foreign capitai,' said Liu Hongm. chaimm of CSRC. A third measure was to ease credit to the 
govement's most important d t i e s  and imestment firms- B&ed up brokerag= another aspect of an 
empowered investor base, wouid be able to intervene in the market, " 
See I- Ma, "China's Economic Reforms in the 1990s" onüne: 
<http: /~mernbers .aoI .~0m/~ew/c~p3~ htm> (date accessed: June 26, 1999). 
HoweverZ to some extent, intervention in tais new-bont hi& risk capitai market is necessary in te- of 
protecihg investors For instance, in order to pment fiaud and corruption in the capitai market, in 
November 1996, China SecUnties Regdatory C O ~ O ~  (CSRC) issued a set of d e s  nquking 
brokerage firms to obtain Iicenses to participate in stock bmkering activities. In the meantime, tüe CSRC 
punished several brokeragcs for iii@ securities transactions. Now the issne is to what extent the 
govermuent may exercise its power to intervene in the capitai market 
Through the share isming quota system and restrictive regdations on the share 
trading market, the Chinese govemment controls China's equity market. This state 
intervention together with the relatively small size and illiquidity of the equity market, 
means that the share pnce mechanism which pIays a disciplinary hct ion  for Canadian 
corporations may not exercise the same fiinaion in China. China's infant stock exchanges 
and lack of institutional shareholders fiirther suggest that the influence of equity markets 
upon corporate control in China is not significant. 
5 2.2 The Corporate Control (takeover) Market 
TheoreticalIy, a weU fllnctioning corporate control market serves to encourage 
strong managerial performance since weak management will cause share pnces to f i  and 
Iead to a takeover bid followed by a replacement of management. The corporate control 
market, therefore, provides a mechanisrn for displacing inefficient corporate controllers 
and rnaintaining a high share price."' 
The corporate controi market in Canada is not active compared with that of the 
US?* The main reason for this merence may be that Canada has a high ownership 
concentration in coq~orations.~~ The predominance of controlling shareholders rnakes 
hostile take-over bids f u  tess l i k e ~ ~ . ~  Mergers and acquisitions are, accordingiy, more 
Iikely tu b e  completed by negotiated transactions. There are a number of other means by 
461 Supra note 436 (KG. Manne) 1 IO rit 1 12-1 13- 
a S u p  note 124 at 887. 
* ~ e f i  to 4.1.3 of this thesis 
Supm note 124. 
which takeovers may be thwarted as an effective mechankm of corporate control. Fust, 
existing corporate management is well equipped to take strategic actions to hinder hostile 
take-over bids such as putthg in place poison pills, arnending constitutionai documents of 
the corporation, initiating Iegai challenges to bids, and so on to. Second, it is costly for 
prospective bidders to conduct the research necessary to determine which corporations are 
under-perfomng relative to their potential. But once the research is done, any takeover 
bid made on the basis of such research immediately signais to other potential bidders that 
they should dso take notice of the target corporation. Thus, the inability to keep take-over 
bids secret may create an obstruction to the market for corporate contro~."' Third, it is 
observed that small shareholders of target corporations have an incentive not to tender 
their shares unless the value of the bid sufnciently reflects the expeaed increase in 
profitability under new management."6 
China also has an inactive takeover market. One reason for this is the hi& 
ownership concentration of Chinese corporations. In addition, restrictive legal and 
regdatory provisions which prohibit individuai sharehoIders from holding over 0.1 per 
cent of outstanding shares of liaed public corporations make it impossible for any private 
investor to take control of a public corporation. The regdatory requirement that state 
shares and IegaI person shares must be non-tradable aIso conmiutes to an inactive 
takeover market. Finaily, the small size of the capital market in China and direct 
Supra note 438 at 48. 
* Ibtd 
admùiistrative intervention in the market operate to prevent an active merger and 
acquisition market fiom developing in ~hu ia~ '  
5.2.3 The ProdudService Market 
The producthe~ce market cm affect corporate control due to the fact that a 
corporation's share pke is closely connecîed with the price, quality and marketability of 
its produas and s e ~ c e s . ~ ~  Moreover, if a corporation is not run efficiently and able to 
produce marketable products or s e ~ c e s  at cornpetitive pnces, the corporation will face 
the danger of insolvency or bankruptcy. 
Cornpetition in the produa or service market varies Eorn case to case. Big 
corporations with strong brand names built over a long corporate history may dominate 
the specific product or s e ~ c e  market temporarily even though the corporation, at any 
particular point in time, is not effectively nui. Under Chinese state policies which 
encourage corporations with controlling aate shares to expand their market shares and 
discourage them from becoming banknipt, ineficientiy operated corporations may 
ïhe nate governmcnt from time to time issues notices to bar transfii of a controlling interest in some 
state-owned corporations. See supra note 352 at 764. 
It appears, at first bIush, that takeover transactions are prohibiteci in China's eqmty markets. However, 
mergers and acquisitions do exist in China U d y  such transactions occur between state-owned 
enterprises upon approvai of the reIevant sute authority, 
a In stating this criterion. 1 have exchdeci certain cooditions~ Le. perfiormance of the whole industry and 
the assumption that the coeng behavior of most people or end-users is static. That is, one c m  ody 
draw a ihk berneen praduct QuaIity and share priœ if consumer prefefences are assumed to be constant, 
To use a simple example, a Company m;ry produce the worId's most hi& guality prodnct, for instance, 
widgets. But if consumers suddeniy stop bnyiag widgets, h m  anyone, that corporation's share price wiI i  
fa evea though the quality of its products Îs e x d e n t  'Terfiormance of the whole Inditstryn is getting at 
a d a r  point, If a cornpany is nt a dechhg Ïndustry, s6are prias  may faIi even if that partidu 
company's products are e x d e n t  
continue to occupy the market. Such policies, then, act as impedunents to the discipline 
fiinaion that might otherwise exia in product/sem*ce markets. 
In Canada, product/se~ce markets have always been competitive, and in recent 
years have become increasingiy so. Adoption of the NAFTA has pushed Canadian 
corporations hto a broader competitive market in North Amenca and forced them to 
improve corporate performance by exposing them to greater international competition. 
China, on the other hand, needs no trade agreement to provide Chinese companies access 
to a large market. !ts population of over 1.2 billion people makes China the biggest 
consumer market in the world. For now, however, competitive forces in China are 
primarily domestic. China is still waiting outside the door of the World Trade 
Organization. Therefore, temporady, the threat of cornpetition from the global 
product/service market is generally much less than in 
5.2.4 The Managerid Sewice Market 
To professionai managers, the market value of their services within and outside the 
corporation is decided by their ability to maxiMze the profits of the corporation. Outside 
the corporation., the extemai managerial service market assesses the vaiue of managers by 
o b s e ~ n g  the performance of the corporation with which they are currentiy associated. 
Professionai managers may be motivated by the prospect of increasing the market value of 
their seMces to other corporations that may seek to empIoy them, and thus have a stake 
in maintaining their reputation as profit generators. Inside the corporation, junior 
a It is mted that th- is considerable domestic competithe pnsnnc in Chma, cspeàaIIy among foreign 
imrestment compgnies and behnreen sate-owned companies and foreign imrestment companies 
mauagers monitor the performance of senior managers by utilking their "firm specinc 
information".J70 Because top management positions in corporations are usuaily filled 
interndy, ambitious individuais seek to climb higher h the corporate hierarchy. However, 
the competition of the manageriai Iabor market mÏght not have such effieas in companies 
where managers hold substantid voting share~.~" Thus, in public corporations with high 
ownership concentration, if controffing sharehoIders act as managers, the managerial 
s e ~ c e  market might not have an effective discipiinary fùnction for them. 
The Canadian managerid seMce market is not very cornpetitive (especidy in the 
new knowledge-based economy penod) compared with that of other developed 
countries." But, as a developed country. the Canadian managerial s e ~ c e  market is 
likely superior to that of China, a developing country. 
The manageriai seMce market in China may not act as an incentive for improving 
corporate intemal control in Chinese corporations because first, there is no real fear of job 
Ioss for under-perfoniiing Chinese managers because of a shortage of managerid talent in 
China; second, because most Chinese managers are only beginning to l e m  how to manage 
profit-making businesses and accordingly, are far from havhg the skills needed to 
"O Supra note L28 at 19. 
n' There are two issues herc Fim, in corporations where there is a large contmUhg shareholder. who is 
aiso a senior manager, junior managers wiîi have Iess incentive to monitor senior managers with the hope 
that they cm outperform those managers and therefore be prumoted, because no matter how weU they 
perform, if the senior mangers are aiso the controiiing sharehoiders, no such promotion is pos4'bk The 
second issue is that if senior managers are (wedthy) controlluig sharehoIders, they may have Iess 
incentive to perfarm since (1) they have plenty of money and are not as attracted by the possriiiity of a 
better job at another fÏm; and (2) if  they hold substantiai sbares, they are not ai risk of king "fÏredn by 
the shareholders- 
The 1994 Wodd CompeiitMness Report fanked Cimada 19th out of 4 1 atmaies (23 deweloped and 18 
fess devefoped) on the management factor- 
industry Canada, ~tlimagement SkiII Deveio~menr in Cmda (Canada: Occasionai Paper Number 13, 
Decemûer 1995) at 5. 
distinguish themselves fiom other managers:= and third, because an ambitious manager 
wodd not necessarily bs promoted in China since the state has contrai in corporations and 
the state is currentiy more concemed to see managers prevent corruption than to 
maximize profits. 
5 -2.5 Media Coverage 
Media coverage aiso plays a role in disciplining corporate controiiers' business 
behaviors and affects corporate decision making &en that corporations compete for 
favorable media coverage, and reputation ef5ects or embarrassment may serve as an 
incentive to corporate decision-rnakers for avoiding poor corporate performance and 
disciplining their misbehavion. The threat of adverse media coverage might be a more 
significant deterrent to the Chinese since the traditionai culture of "saving face" has been 
deeply rooted in the Chinese peop~e.474 Chinese managers and corporate controuen are no 
exception of this. 
The concept of "saving hce" in Chinese cuIîure is not just avoidmg embarrassment 
in public situations. In China, face is a complex rem tbat is associated with trust, with 
f d y  members, wîth respect and socid status." Once it is destroyed, the person might 
473 Most Chinese managers, piaced dongside western managers ofeqnhdent &cial rank, piay mote the 
rok of a first-Iine supenrisor in a western manufacturing plant in terms of their managerÏai discretion, 
See M. Boisot, "The Lessons h m  China" in U Boisot ed, Emt-west Business Collaboration: The 
ChaCienge o ~ v e m a n c e  in Post-sociaht fiterprises (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) at 30. 
475 An amde diicnssmg dohg business in China and Chinese cuiture, incIudÏng "s;rvMg &cew can be 
retn'eved h m  W- Gertmenïaa, "CuitUral Insights on Dohg Business in Chma, Concepts of 'Fa& and 
'Trust' are Just the Beghîng, The Graziadio Business Report, û n h ~  U M t y  of Maryh&, Schooi 
of Law, China Law Site: < h t t p d / w w w W W W q k n e t / ~ a w ~ d . h t m >  (date aaeseck Iune 26,1999)- 
not have value in Chinese society. For shareholders, crediton and employees, corporate 
failure is an outcome which entails devastakg financial hardship, and in the case of 
directon and managers, profound personai embarrassrnent and detriment to self-esteem- 
The detenent power onginated fiom traditionai culture cannot be underestùnated. In 
order to maintain respect, managers and other corporate controliers wilI have strong 
incentives to discipline themselves. 
5.3 The Creditor - Bank (the Debt Market) 
A bank usuaily has two reasons for intervening in the business of a corporation. 
One is that the bank may have equity ownership in the corporation. The other is that the 
bank may be a creditor of the corporation. ui other words, banks serve as the 
corporation's debt market? In this section, I will address the latter situation in the 
context of considering the issue of corporate control from an extemai perspective. 
5.3. I In Canada 
The interests of a creditor and a corporation conflict if the corporation pays 
unlawfitl dividends to sharehoIders, or improperly reduces capital so as to render the 
corporation insolvent, or purchases its own stock out of capitaLm 
Of course banks are onIy one source of debt capitaL Corporations cm aiso bomw moaey fmm othcr 
institutions or in the capital markets by way of pubic issnes of debt i n m n t s  such as debennrres 
m Supra note IO at 175. 
For a profit-making corporation, the infiuence of bank creditors in the form of 
intervention in corporate affàîrs is slim Firsuy, for banks, the r e m  on their loans to 
corporations is fixed according to certain contractud arrangements. Secondly, banks' 
debt claims would rank above the interests of shareholders in the event of insolvency or 
bankruptcy of the corporation. Thirdy, banken lack the expertise and time to be involved 
in corporate business. Participating in corporate &airs, udess the corporation is in 
financial distress, in a banker's eyes, is too c o ~ t l ~ . ~ ' ~  FinaiIy, for banks, the risk of defauIt 
wii1 be largely reduced thtough diversification because usudy banks [end money to a large 
nurnber of c ~ r ~ o r a t i o n s . ~ ~  
To a corporation with serious financiai problems, banks might be wiIiing to take 
interventionkt action to prevent corporate controllers tiom gambiing with creditors' hnds 
and pursuing a hi&-risk and hi&-retum strategy which could be good for shareholders 
(who, after ail, have nothing to Iose once a corporation is on the brink of insolvency and 
have the possibaity of recovering some value) but potentidy contrary to the creditors' 
hterests." 
"' B.R C h e f f i .  Company Law: Theow Structure and Operation (Great Britain: Clarendon Ress, 
Oxhrd, 1997) at 76. 
Ibid at 75. The pmbIem with the diversificatiou argument m the case ofdebt as op@ ta equity is 
ihat, at best, it mcans that Ienders c m  be insulateci fmm complefe finaniai coiiapse by Iendirrg to large 
n u m h  of b o m m  who are not Iikely to aii default on th& obiigations at once However, dehttits are 
st i i i  costiyv because unlike the case of diversitied eqyity hoIders wha m-ght Iose money on one imrestxuent 
but make txp for it on another, the maximum return for de6t-hoIdets is fixed So debt-6oIders. even if 
divefsified, stiE need to be more concen~ed about ÎndMduai defauits and insolvenues than diversiiied 
eqyity holders 
However, there is no good reason for wanting to see banks take a significant 
interventionist role in the aEairs of a corporation with no serious financiai problems. First, 
banksl rights to intervene in the management of a solvent Company wiU be iimited by the 
te= of their Ioan arrangements. Banks might perform a usetirl monitoring function 
during the iife of a loan arrangement; however, not every strategy that banks favor would 
necessarily be a good management strategy Eom the perspective of shareholders and of 
corporate growth in generai. Second, the reai weapon banks have in their fight against 
irresponsibie corporate borrowers is the thereat of demanding repayrnent, r e n d e ~ g  
borrowers insolvent or placing them hto bankmptcy. But the risk of such bank discipline 
on managerial performance is that it could cornpel managers to become more 
conservative, that is, less interested in pursuing profit-making strategies and more 
interested in preserving the company's assets. Such conservative attitudes of management 
might not ultimately be desirable for either sharehoidea or bankers since, in the long nin, 
both shareholders and bankers benefit fiom the prevdence of a weU run corporations 
which are generating profits suficient to s e ~ c e  bank Ioans and dimibute dividends to 
shareholders. 
The influence exercised by banks over corporate management varies fiom case to 
case, with the extem of such iduence generally being proportionate to the amount of a 
corporation's outstanding Ioans and the financial situation of the borrower. In generd, 
however, there is no good reason for wantkig to see banks take a significant roIe in 
interferhg with corporate management either in weii nm corporations or in corporations 
with serious hanCid problems. Research conducted by Industry Canada in 1996 f m d  
no convincing evidence to support a broader role for banks in Canadian corporate 
govemance."' 
China's banking market is an oligopoly with the state banks occupyùig the most 
prominent position.Jn During China's planning economy penod, since al1 the banks were 
owned by the state. and al1 the enterprises were either state owned or collectively owned, 
there were no commercial Ioans between the state banks and state enterprises. The banks 
simply allocated hnds to enterprises according to certain state plans. With the recent 
economic reform and the diversification of business ownership, financial reforrn, including 
bank reform, has begun in China starting kom 1995. 
Briefly? the function and responsibility of the Chinese central bank - the People's 
Bank of China - was established in 1995.~~ The People's Bank of China, under the 
leadership of the State Council, is equipped with indirect tools for the conduct of 
monetary poiicy and for the exercise of its supervisory fbnctions over other banks and 
non-banking financiai institutions in f hi na"" Other state banks in China were required to 
et Supra note 348 at 57. 
' ~ 2  %y 1993, China's banking -stem mainiy consined of the fioiIowing speciahd banks and non-bank 
institutions: (1) the Agridture Bank; (2) the Bank of lhina; (3) the Construction Bank; (4) the indnstriai 
and Commercial Bank; (5) Rurai Crcdit Cooperativ~~ (6) Urban Credît Cooperativw* (7) the Bank of 
Communications, ((8 the China Intcrnationd Trust and liivestment Corporation; (9) Guangda F Ï Ï c e  
Corporation; and ( 10) the PeopIe's 1-ce Company. 
" i 995 Law of the People's Republic of China on PeopieZ Bank of China (Mopted at the 3" ses si or^ af 
the grn ~ationai People's Congres on March 18.1995, pmmoIgated by Order No.46 of the Ptesident of 
the PeopIers Republic of China on March L8,1995, and &&ive as of the date of promulgation), 
UU Article 2 of 1995 L m  of îhe People's Republic of Chino on People'sBunk of Chtntz- 
be commercidized and capitdized beginning from 1995.- The four state speciaIized 
banks (that is, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, China Industrial and Commercial 
Bank, and China AgïcuIturaI Bank) have been required by Iaw to vansform themselves 
into commercial banksf6 Three policy banks were established in 1994 for separating 
policy Iending fiom commercial   end in^?^ In June 1995, the first commercial bank aimed 
at providing financial s e ~ c e s  for private corporations, Minsheng Bank, was set up in 
China. 
Under China's planning economy p bas$ since the needs of people and enterprises were met by direct 
aiiocation from the statc the= was no device required for the management of savuigs and investment. 
People's Bank of China was in charge of the state financial systern- Its department, Bank of China, 
managed China's foreign cxchange transactions. The Ministry of Finance used the oniy other bank, the 
Bank of Construction, for the management of long term credits to finance the state-planncd projects. No 
stock market and other financial intermediaries were available at that tirne. There were some reforms of 
institutions fonising on cndit control during the 1980s and earIy 1990s More the promulgation of the 
1995 People's Bank of China Law. 
For a bnef introduction, sec D. WaiI, -Financiai Market Reform" (1998) 1 1 China Review, Online: Great 
BritaÎn - China ccntcr, <http:f/~~~~.gbcc.orguk/WalID.htm> (dateaccessed: A p d  23, 1999). 
" 1995 Law of the Peoplr's Republic ofChinu on Commercial Banks (adopted at the 13" Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the 8" National People's Congrest promuigated by Order No47 of the President 
of the People's Republic of China on May 10, 1995. and effective as of Juiy 1, 1995)- 
The four speciaIized banks were handling around 90% of total bank assets and two thirds of al1 furancial 
assetS. 
A phenornenon that 1 cannot ncgiect in addressing China's banks ts the high personal savings rate in 
China, The vaditionai Chinese cuIture of high swings in househoIds and of avoiding persanal debt l ads  
to a high accumulation of private deposits in state banks. nie swings rate in China is about JO per cent 
of incorne TOM savings dcposits in China cxcced 8 trillion Renminbi (about USII triifion). See A 
Neoh, "China Strengthens Ets Markcts" (January 14 1994) Oniine: Far Eastern Economic Retiew 
<httpY//www-feer.com/Rcstrictcd/ind~-business. html> (date accessed: Jme 17, f 999). 
The high savings rate @ v a  the Chinese private sector the ability to produce high leveis of ixtvestment 
capital. It is the wealth represented by these private savings that the Chinese govenunent waats to tap in 
order to fuod Chinese Uu(ustrics- High private saving is also one of the reasons that Ied to the incepiion of 
faws rehthg to the incorporation of enterprises and the establishment ofa secmities market. 
For the brief, refer to "Decision of the Communist Par& of China Central Committee on s o w  b e s  
Conceniing the Estabiishment of A SoQalist Market Economic Structurew (adopmi on Navember 14, 
1993 by the ï'hïrd PIennary Session of the L4t.h Centrai Cornmittee of the Chinese CommuuÏst Party) 
(1993) 36 Beijing Review No. 47, Nov.22-28 12 at 20, 
Policy banks were established during China's hanciai refonn to take over the aIIocation of state credits 
which were carrïed over fmm the old-nyle pIarutbg mechanisn The three poiiq banks are the State 
Devdopment Bank, which was created by merging the six inmitment companies nnder the State Plannmg 
C ~ ~ s s î o n ;  the AgrïcuïtUfiU D~leiopmem Bank of çhiaa: and the Export-hprt Banlt Tneg werr to 
base assumed ai i  the poiicy based Iending actiuities formerIy handIed exciusnrely by the speaalized banks, 
By 1998, more than one hundred foreign banks had established branches or 
representative offices in China. However, few of them have been permitted to access the 
Renminbi (Chinese currency) inter-bank market. AU of them are subject to tight 
restrictions on the scope of their business. The first sino-foreign investment bank in China 
was approved for establishment in 1995.'~~ 
With the transformation of state banks into commercial banks, the oid capital 
allocation systern has ended and loan agreements must now be signed between corporate 
borrowers and their banks. But actually, the disciplinary influences exerted by banks upon 
corporations are slim given that in China commercial banks are largely owned by the state 
and most corporations dso have a high concentration of state ownership. Refonn in the 
banking area, to some extent, just means that aate commercial banks wiii not help rescue 
insolvent corporations because they are now making loans on the basis of commercial 
considerations only . 
5.4. I In Canada 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 above, the evoIution and refinement of Canadian 
corporate Iaw have been iduenced by British company law and American corporate Iaw. 
However, it is uncertain whether Canadian courts have had a strong or modest infiuencing 
power over corporate governance. 
- - 
" This bank was a joint venture behveen a Chinese finanaai institution and Morgan StanIq. 

Influenced by English and US judgements, the traditional approach of Canadian 
courts was that business decisions were internai management matters for the directors and 
the majority shareholders, and the coun would not interfere with them as long as the 
decisions were made honestly and in good &th 
While the "intemal management nile" or "business judgement d e "  is stiti very 
rnuch alive in Canada, the CBCA affords courts great discretion when hearing cases 
retating to the oppression remedy. The Dickerson Report envisioned that the judiciary 
should have a relatively broad role in corporate matters: 493 
... the ben means of enforcing a corporation law is to confer 
reasonable power upon the dleged aggrîeved party to initiate le& 
action to resolve his problem, making the Draft Act Iargely self- 
rnforcing, obbviting the need for sweeping administrative discretion 
and harsh pend sanction, and, at the same tirne, forcing resolution 
of the issue before the courts, which have the procedures, the 
machinery and the experience that enable them better than any other 
institution to deal with such problems.. . (emphasis added) 
The Dickerson Report hrther clearly identified the stanis of courts in protecting 
minority interests in the co rp~ra t ion :~~  
... the rernedies provided in the Dr& Act recognize that 
corporation law - and particularly the duties of ofticers, directors 
and dominating shareholders of corporations - is in a very fluid 
state, reflecting the uncertoin roIe or identity of the business 
corporation in contemporary society. For this reason we have 
fiequentiy estabIished ody very broad quality standards of conduct, 
. . . permining the courts to determine whether there has been &Iure 
to comply with those standards, that is, to c o h u e  to develop the 
common law of responsibility of corporate management 
unhampered by the Iegd fetters created at a the when courts were 
- 
41 Supra note 42 (Dickerson Report) pam476 at 158. 
preoccupied with enforcing "democratic" structures - particdarly 
voting power - as the one reai object of the Iaw. (emphasis added) 
It seems that Canadian courts' influence upon corporate management generaily 
arises fiom their decisions taken to protect minority shareholden (or stakeholders) and the 
Iegal precedents such decisions establish. 
Thus although the "business judgemenf' and "internai management" d e s  are 
based upon a principle of judicial non-interference in intemal corporate affars, the 
oppression remedy has actually been drafted to encourage judicial solutions that can be 
extremely intrusive. The oppression remedy is stilI, relatively speaking a new innovation. 
It remains uncfear at the moment to what extent Canadian courts will be prepared to 
"rewrite" the business judgment or intemal management rule over time, through their 
aggressive use of broad oppression remedies. Thus, whether the Canadian courts will 
have a significant or relatively modest influence over corporate control has yet to be 
detennined. 
5.4.2 In China 
Broadly speaking, China adopts a civil law ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ ~ '  Iudges under a civil Iaw 
system are not allowed to make law through the hct ion  of interpretation. In addàion, a 
judge is not bound by earlier j u d i d  decisions in similar cases. 
4* The Civil Iaw system historicaily was deveIoped in continentai Europe. h is a kgal rystua wÏth an 
anphasis on detaiIed stanitoxy codes. Iudges in civil law countrks scttIe disputes acnirding to principIes 
laid d o m  in a country's ~Mitten statutes- The writtert statutes ofien specifY in detaiI the Iegal rights lad 
obiigations of citizens and tegai persons. in cases where written statutes do not specfncdy cover the 
point in dispute, the judge wiU tiry to appty generat principles a n d m e  set out therein 
China's Iegal system is also intermingled with its sociaiist doctrinal requirements. 
The Chinese Constitution stipulates that the people's courts are the judicial organ of the 
state and are responsible to and report to the National Peoples' Congress and its Standing 
~ornmittee.'~~ The Standing Cornmittee of the Nationai People's Congress has the power 
to interpret ~aws.'~' In pradce, the Standing C o d e e  of the National People's 
Congress either promulgates regdations to interpret laws or delegates its interpretation 
power to the Supreme People's Court to interpret questions involving the spedic 
application of laws and decrees in court trials. The interpretation made by the Supreme 
People's Court regarding the specific application of laws and decrees in court triais is 
called "judiciq interpretation."JgY ludiciary interpretation is different fiom case law in 
Such interpretation does not involve citing or relying upon judgments in 
eartier cases. [t is rather like a sumary of certain legal principles. Except for the 
Supreme People's Court, no other lower courts in China are authorized to issue judiciary 
interpretations. They may use, however, many avenues of receiving advice and direction 
from the Supreme People's Court on questions of law. 
The specific function of Chinese judges is not enumerated by the Chinese Iaws. 
Practicdy, the major function of a judge is to collect evidence and examine witnesses so 
as tu fhd out the facts. The duties ofjudges are to hvestigate, mediate and adjudicate by 
5% See Artides LU and 128 of the 1993 Coh.iilution of the People5 Repubk ofChino. 
" See Article 67 (4) of the 1993 Consritutio~i of the People's Republic of China. 
'- ùi Chinese, Si fa jie shi. 
For a comparative study of Chincsc judiciûl interp~tation and the pfecedent syaem of c o m m  1aw 
countries, please d e r  to G. Keqiang and T. Kasuaq "chines Judiciai uiterprebtioa and Its CornpanSon 
with Reoedent of Common Law CountrieS (1995) 1 I. of Chinese and Comp. L at 128 - 141 aad S. 
Zongllng, wJudiciai Prccedents in China Today: A Comparative Study of Law" in (1994) Ana P a S c  L. 
Rev, at IO9 - 1 15. 
a hearingSw R C. Brown has briefly desmied the Chinese legd system and judges in this 
way: "' 
WhiIe certainly there are Chinese traditions, sociaiist doctrinal 
requirements in the legd system, the fact of its system behg more 
inquisitorial than adversarial, its 'trials' not being recognized as a 
single event, its judges playing a larger role in collecting evidence 
and exarnining witnesses, the dierent role of lawyers (with Iittie 
cross-examination and littie pre-trial discovery) no jtries, merely 
describes the traditional civit law approach as much as in Chinese 
approach. 
Under this legai system, the courts in China naturally have littie influence in China's 
corporate matters. In addition to China' s IegaI system, other factors account for the fact 
that courts have little involvement in resolving corporate disputes. First, China's 
Corporate Laws Iack legal remedies (such as the oppression remedy or appraisal remedy 
provisions round in the CBCA) for shareholders or stakeholders. Lack of defhed legai 
remedies discourages parties from submitting corporate disputes to the courts. Second, 
the courts in China lack a tradition of being involved in resolving corporate disputes. 
China has had a reiatively long period of a planhg economy. State enterprises were the 
nom within the planning economy, and there was no need for state enterprises to 
MO It is noted that rnediation ody exists in the contcxt ofàvil ows. ui terms of niminaI cases* judges are 
not alIowed to mediate. 
The conciliatory d e  played by the peopIe's c o r n  during the process of a civi1 action is a unique fanire 
of the courts' fiinctioa Though the pnrnary hction ofthe court is to conduct a triai to settie disputes 
submitted CO it, the court is also empowered to act as conciliator at different stages of the pmeedîngs. 
Thediore, a potential iitigant who approachs the people's court with a view to trial may end up with 
conciiiation by the court. Please see Chapter Vm Mediation of Law of Cid  Pmceduro ofthe People's 
Repu6iic ofChina (Adopted by the fourth session of the seventh National People's Congres on 9th ApriI 
199L) AvaiIabte online: MiiryTand University School of Law, ChinaLaw Website: 
< httpY/www.qis,net/c hinaIm/iawtnn I -htm, (date accessed: fune 7.1999). 
"' R C. Bmm, DndersrMdig Chinese Courtr and Legai Prucesx L m  wirh Chinese CharacteriSn-CT 
me Bgue, London & Boston: Kiuwer Law hternational, 1997) at m i  
approach the courts for resolving enterprise matters. Instead, the govemments (centrai or 
local Ievels), through their administrative organs, served as mediators. niough under 
current economic reform there is increasing diversity of corporate ownership in China, the 
continuing dominance of state intereas in corporations rnakes significant changes in court 
attitudes unlikely. Third, the lack of a tradition of court participation in corporate dispute 
resolution in turn Ieads to the phenornenon that the judiciary in China is not 
knowledgeable about business matters and corporate management. Fourth, according to 
China's traditional culture, Chinese people are shamed from accessing Iitigation. The 
concept of judicial process hi~toncally was almoa unknown and a Confucian preference 
for harmony made Iitigation a shamefd undertaking for parties to a dispute. hstead, 
mediation was viewed as the better means to settie civil disputes.5o2 0 2 s  point wiii be 
firther explored in the 5.5.2 below. 
5.5 The Culture 
Corporate control does not operate in a vacuum It is shaped by, and in tum 
contnbutes to shaping, specific culturai and historïcai forces. The purpose of this section 
is to expIore how culturai values in Canada and China shed light on corporate controI 
mechanisms in Canada and China 
5.5. I Canada 
- - 
502 Confiitianism is rooted in Chinese cuitme- Confucius, the founder of the doctrine (Le, Coafucianism) 
advocated ihat people should not access Ltigation Pe-on, meciîatio~ compromise and negotiation 
are the means to settie disputes. Plmse see Confbcnis, Conficius Anaiecrs online: UnivetSity of 
MaryIan& SchooI of Law, Chïnalaw Web Site, <httpff~~~.qisnet/chinaIaw/Search1~htm~ (date 
acœsxt June 26, f 999). 
For historïcai reasons, Canadian culture shares certain sùniIarities with the CuItures 
of other countries mainly Great Britain, France and the United States. The European 
people, particularly the British, and Arnericans, have been remarkably successfiil over the 
last two hundred years in the fields of economic development, industrialibation, science, 
and prornoting the notion of a European mord order (whether this was advanced in terms 
of law or trade practice). The spread of European languages, and the predominance of 
European conceptual analysis in both the physicd and social sciences greatly shaped the 
Canadian cuiture. The Canadian case law system was no exception, and was greatly 
influenced by judiQal decisions in Bntain and ~mexica. '~~ Capitaiism is the main economic 
ideology shared by Canada, Western Europe and Amerka It is an ideoIogy based on the 
recognition of private property rights. A social system based on capitalism therefore 
places a high priority on the protection of private property rights and recognizes 
"nonaggressive contractual exchanges between private property ~wners". '~  The business 
corporation by its nature is a capitalkt instmition. It is the private property of investors 
that is fundamental to the structure of the corporation. Therefore, the existence and 
development of corporations are iinked to the objective ofpurming profits and expanhg 
shareholders' weaith. The duties and Iiabilities imposed on boards of directon and oEcers 
by the CBCA reflect, among other things, lawmakers' desire to irnprove corporate 
It is noted that ai the time of Confedention. dechions from Canadian provincial c o a ~  couid be 
appeaied to the judiciai Cornmittee of the Privy Corncil, in London, UK, For a fbd dechion, The Judïcial 
Cornmitteers supenor appelt te~dict ion over Canada did not encf mitil 1933, for nimma[ appe;ils- and 
1949, for civil appeafs The Supreme Court of Canada stands today as the hnaI arbiter af Iegd disputes in 
the Canadian @diaai system, and now enjoys the status &court of Iast cesort, 
See The EarIy Begirmings of the Courtn, The Supreme Corrrt of Canada <httpYbww.scc- 
csc,gc.~rochdengIisMitmYBe~htrn> (date accesst& August 2 1,1999)- 
performance and increase shareholders' value.5o5 The operation of corporations folows 
the rule of capitaiist democracy: majority d e .  
Closely co~ec ted  with capitdism is individualism. hdividualism regs on the 
premise that society does not have the right to restrict the individual's freedom to pursue 
happiness as he or she chooses to define it, subject to necessary constrah to prevent one 
individual Eom encroaching upon the rights of other individuals. The individuai has the 
right to ~el~fulfillrnent, to self-actualization, and to the seeking of a personai identity.'" 
Influenced by this individualkt idedogy, the CBCA, by abolisbg administrative 
discretion and reducing state intervention, creates a Eee and flexible business environment 
for people who inteod to maximize theu own property interests through business 
corporations. 
In addition to sharing a cornmon cuiture with Europe and the U.S., Canadians, 
over many generations, have built a distinctive and unique Canadian cu1ture that 
distinguishes Canada tom other countries. Based on a cosmologicd conception of 
Schafer has summarized the characteristics of Canadian culture as: 
the intimate ecoIogicd relationship that Canadians have with the 
naturai environment; the need to continuously create new communications 
technologies; the need for public-private cooperation; the abiliry to make 
coricessFions. comprom~ses and work colIaboratrve&y the willingness to 
Y>S It is noted that the CBCA dm imposes certain üabilities upon diRetors in comection with employee 
wages and in cekition to atficr mtters such as improperiy reducing capital or paying dividends and for 
providing unIawfirl financial assistance. 
h4. M Patricia, ideologtcui Perspectives on Canada (Tomnto: McGraw - W Pyemn Limiteci, L975) 
at 12. 
507 D. P. Schafer. The Chamer  ofCrnadian Cuhre (nkkhaq Ont: Wodd Cdtnre Project, 1990) at 
55, 
The cosnologial conception of cuItua &ers to "the ordemi wholeW- "''Che whoIew ders to eveqthing 
that in the cosmos - animai. vegetabk mineral and bnmarr; and "ordered" Mers to the specinc way 
in which the component parts of the whoie are woven together around a central organizing prinapIe or 
mut to produce an inkgratcd entity, 
search for mity fhroug. eqziatity and diversily rather t h  through 
assimifation und homogenzzation; the cornmitment to a caring society with 
a high degree of materiai prosperity, human compasion, and social 
secunty; and etched on a much Iarger canvas, the capacity for cultural 
creativity and innovation. "* (emphasis added) 
Canada in part because of the sparseness of its population and the vastness of its 
temtory, and in part because of the cejection of the Amerkm econornic and social 
rn~del ,~ '~ has developed a Iiberai democracy in which government initiatives in the 
economy have been more readily accepted than they have been in the US."' One of the 
characteristics of Canadian culture, as summarized above by Schafer, is "the need for 
public-private coo peration" . In Canada, the creation of virtually every significant 
communications, economic, engineering, and social endeavor has arisen Eom 
collaboration between govemments and private commercial ~or~orations.~" Such 
cooperation both manifests and cultivates the ability of Canadians to compromise, make 
concessions, and demonstrate flexiiility and collaboration. This may explai& at least in 
part, why Canadians tend to access Iitigation less than the U.S. people do and why the 
case law system in the area of corporate matters in Canada is less developed than that of 
the  US."^ This may also explain why it has been said that Canadian people can "search 
508 lbid at 64- Schafer hirther cq~lained that although these characteristics are discemile in other 
societies, no other country possesses uiem ai1, or possesses thern in the same degree as Canada does. Ixt 
this sense. they may be said to consitute Canadian cuitmai values. 
M9 The American mode1 here refén to a system in whîch private enterprise, rather than state enterpris, is 
principaiiy reiied upon for the creation and dcvciopment of virtually al1 signiflcant commurücations, 
economiq engineering and social endemors. 
"O Supra note 506 at 45. 
"' Supra note 507 at 68. 
n z  T'ha are, of course, many othcr msons that Canadians may appear to be less litigioas For instance, 
mitil recentiy, Iawyer contüigency fies have been forbidden in Canada (but not in the US); more-, Î n  
for unity through equality and diversity rather than assimilation and homogenization", and 
why Canadians have historically demonstrated a cornmitment to recognizing the rights, 
values and traditions of othen. '13 
The high degree of human compassion in Canada, as pointed out by Mr. Schafer, is 
reflected in the fact that Canada has one of the most advanced systems of medical 
insurance coverage, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, equarizaîion payments. 
regional subsidies, and fmily allowances in the world.'" And this same hi& d e p e  of 
human compassion in Canada may also help to explain Canadian lawmakers' concem 
about minocity shareholders' interests within the corporation. By equipping minority 
shareholders with legai weapons such as the oppression remedy, appraisai rights and 
cumuIative voting, Canadian legislators have provided such shareholders with the tools 
they need not only to protect their own interests, but ais0 with which they can influence or 
indirectly direct, corporate business. 
In bnef Canadian culture, with capitdism and individualism at the centre, has 
corne to value concession and human compassion. These values. in tum rearict the 
development of an absoIute (or pure) capitaiism in Canada With regard to corporate 
control in Canadian corporations, generally shareholder democracy based on capital is stiIl 
the findamental basis of corporate internai controI. But at the same tune, Iegd 
protections for minority sharehoiders provide an important baiancing force which acts as a 
check against absolute majority rule. 
Canada, unsunesshil Iitigants must pay the cmts of the s u d  party (that is not generaiiy k case Ï n  
the US)- 
51' Supm note 507 at 69 - 70. 
5.5.2 China 
China is a country with a long history. The influence of China's long past and the 
present state of flux during this reforming age al1 interminde with some western concepts 
of capitalist democracy in today's Chinese culture. The language, the folklore, and the 
praaices of government, business and interpersonal relations, and shareholdmg practikes 
together become a part of today's Chinese culture and influence the way that corporations 
are contmlIed. 
Coficianism is a distinctive feature of traditional Chinese society advocated by 
Confucius almost two thousand five hundred years aga."' The philosophy of 
Coficianism deepiy influences the behaviors OP today's Chinese pe~ple. In addition to 
China, the East Asian countnes and areas like Japan, Singapore, Korea, Vietnam, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, ail absorbed and refined Confiician values and concepts of auth~rity."~ 
The c haracteristics of Confiicianism c m  be surnmarized as foUows: 
(1) nie respect for age and hierarchy and an emphasis on obligations rather than rights 
within a society; 
51 5 Corrfucius was an itinennt Chinese scholar, phüosopher, and tecnuer over 2,500 yean ago, in a time 
known as that of the Spring and Autumn period- The China of thïs time was not rmited, but was a 
colIection of mail nates, at rvar or in dispute with one another, or suuggiing with barbarian uiba. 
Confucius set out with hwnility, rcsoIution, and energy to find a d e r  for whom he couid work to adciras 
the great politicai questions of al1 ages - stability and order- However* his enthuskm and success as a 
Icaurrr did mt immediately yield the resuits he sought It was not untiI the end of the 2"6 Cmnay BC, 
that Confbcianism won recognition as the officiai creed of the nation 
He emphamed vimie. leaming and rituai as the means of enniring that people iived in harmony with the 
natwI order. whtch was a150 a moral order. China's long history Iargeiy detefmmes the reputahou of 
Corrfitciris today- Those wrîtings, howwer. which are a s c r i  to him or his influence have set a number 
of parameters tvhich have been the dominant philosophica2 sogal and politid force in the evolntion of 
Chinese civilbation over more than two thousand years* His thoughts were coiïected in the book 
Anatects* 
Mer to in-O note 5 17 at 3. 
5T6 L W. Pyç risia~t Power md P~fitics: 7 % ~  Culnuol D i m e ~ o ~ z s  of Aurhoriiry (CambrÏds 
Massachusetts & London: The BeIknap Press of Harvard UxüvefSity et.ess, 1985) at 55. 
The orientation towards groups; 
The importance of personal relationships; 
The preservation of face; and 
The emphasis on mle by Wtue (with an emphasis on humanity), rather than the 
law. 
The Confucian philosophy of respect for age and hierarchy cultivates the Chinese 
to respect authonty and favor centralized decision making. The Chinese people have a 
high acceptance of hierarchy. This acceptance is embodied in China's administrative 
system. It also can be reflected in models of corporate control in China. A major feature 
of corporations in China is the high degree of statdpublic ownership concentration. ï h e  
state or public institutions, at the top of the corporate hierarchy, are well protected by 
extraordinary shareholders' rights and majority rule under CCL. The state's interests in 
corporations are well secured. Minority shareholders, on the other hand, most of whom 
are individuai shareholders, lack legal remedies to protect themselves. They more ofien 
have to comply with the majority shareholders' corporate decisions. However, the 
unbalanced reIationship between majonty shareholders and rninonfl shareholden in 
corporations has been accepted by the Chinese people. Most Chinese people seem to be 
accustomed to respect this corporate hierarchy and do not appear to fulIy appreciate that, 
as one of the capital contributors, a shareholder has the right to protect his or her own 
hterests against possible infigement by the corporation. 
The respect for hierarchy Ui turn leads Chinese peopIe to place greater emphasis on 
obligations within a society rather than upon rights. A conse<[uence of a sophisticated 
emphasis on obligation developed over many centuries is a complex network of those 
obligations which crosses al1 IeveIs ofthe society. The emphasis on obligation becomes a 
major currency which faditates political, social and community actMty. In some ways 
this currency is more vaiuable and powefil than the monetary currency."' It is one of the 
reasons that the awareness of private property rights has been so slow to develop in 
Chinese society and why Chinese lawmakers neglected minority shareholders' Uiterests in 
corporate decision making dunng the time of drafting the CCL. 
The orientation toward groups educates the Chinese people to have a 
consciousness of mutualiy interacting pressures to ensure that dl rnembers are caught 
within the network of obligations and share both responsibüities and rewards. This 
emphasis makes it dificult to develop systems to iden* and reward performance on an 
individual basis. Such orientation toward group s favors labor participation in management 
and sharing responsibility for corporate decision making This orientation swely 
contnbuted to the decision by Chinese lawmakers to borrow the German two-tier board 
strucnire for corporations. 
The importance of personai relationships is the heart of Confucian philosophy. It  
emphasizes that one exists in reiationship to others. The western starting point of 
individuaiisrn is alien to the traditional Chinesc people. Fie  relationships were recognized 
in Confùcianim, namely, relationships between sovereign and subject, father and son, 
oIder brother and younger brother, husband and d e ,  and fiend and tnend.s'g As with the 
order of nature itseIE these relationships, even those between fnends, were constructed in 
hierarchicai terrn~."~ The importance of personai relationships, especiaüy the relationship 
*' R Little & W. R e d  The Corficta~c Renaissmcce (Sydnq The Federation Press, 1989) at 55. 
Note that in anùent Chinese society? women did wt bave any social natus. That is why the 
relationships descriid by Confucius are centred npon men, 
M H Bond ed The Psychofogy of the Chinese People (Hong Kong, Oxford & N. Y.: Mord 
University Press? t 986) at 2 15. 
outside an individual's immediate family, within the context of business relations, binds 
people together both within and between business orgaNZations and connects business 
people with govemment agencies.s20 
The preservation of face (that is saving "face" as mentioned in 5.2.5 above) causes 
the Chinese to attach much greater importance to the views others hold of them than is 
found in other cultures. That is why the media may have some fûnction in the disciplining 
of Chinese corporate managers. To some extent, however, the preservation of face 
restncts individuai initiative and the evduation of personai performance. 
The emphasis on rule by v h e  rather than by law is deeply refiected in the 
wording of Conkcius, "lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties and the 
people will try to keep out of jail but will have no sense of shame. Lead the people by 
virtue and restrain them by the rules of deconun, and the people will have a sense of 
shame and moreover, will become good.""' Such phiIosophy is oriented toward shame 
through its ernphasis on socid noms and by reference to ideai types as models of 
behavior. The emphasis on d e  by virtue maximizes the harmony and cohesion in society 
and tends to ensure that cornpetition is pursued within a fiamework of estabiished 
ceremony and courtesy that preserves social consensus. Such a major weakness in the nile 
of Iaw may be little understood by westerners. in western legal professionais' eyes, the 
Chinese Iegd system is relativeiy backward. There is a complete absence of case reports, 
few judges, arbitraton and lawyen in proportion to its large population, few statutes, few 
- - -  
ID I. Child & L. Markoczy, Wost Country Manageriai BehaMor in Cbmese and Hungarian Joint 
Ventures: Assessmerrt of lompeting Expfanations" in M. Boisot ed Emt- West Business Callaboration: 
The Chaffenge of Grnemance in Post-sociaht Enterprises (London and New York Routiedge, 1994) 25 
at t36, 
"' The wording was collecteci into AnaIectsects Sec note 519 at 205, supraQ 
Iaw schook and littIe Iegai fierature. Mediation and compromise are the traditional 
channeIs for dispute settlement. Since Confircia'sm is basicaily a phiIosophy of harmony, 
peace and conci~iation,~ the influence of ConfÙcianisrn upon law for several thousand 
years has made the Chinese people reiuctant to approach courts for asserting their rights. 
Mediation and compromise not only prevent one's "face" 6om being destro yed, but 
maintain tiendship and other invisible advantageous business relationships. 
Unlike Canadian culture, Chinese culture is grouporientated and essentiaiiy hostile 
to individua~ism.~" This group-orientation and essential hostility to individualisrn finds its 
setting in socialism. Conhcianism and sociaiism both emphasize the aate and society and 
minirnize the merits of individuais, compared wÎth the ernphasi-s upon the individuai 
favored in liberal-dernomatic capitdist States. The non-development of capitaiism in 
China aiso means that there has been no alliance of merchants or trades to baiance the 
state authorities. 
Fifty years of socia~isrn~~ in China have woven a fabric of values and beliefi that 
can only be called cultural even though Chinese sociaiism was built upon a pre-existing 
" E. Lee, Commercial Dtspurrs SettIernent in China (London, N.Y.. Hamburg, and KK: Lloyd's of 
London Press Ltd) at 2. 
See L. W. @e. "The Statc and the Individul". in B. Hook ed The bdividuuf cmd the Stute in China 
(U.S.: Ciarendon Press, Oxfiord, 1996) t6 at 17. 
s24 The Ïxnbalancc in the cclattonship bctwccn the state and Ïndividnals pmvides both the nnicîurai and 
the cnltural bases for the human ri@& pmcticcs which now the most contentious issues betweext 
Chnia and the ~vest, espccialIy the U. S. 
Zt3 When faiking about socialism, it seems that 1 cannot avoid Marx and Manasn, Manr made a great 
contniution CO the socid sciences by e m p M g  the relationship between the distnintion of power and 
weaith in a socicty and that socicy's pmailing ideas and vaIues. Max emphasized that owuership of 
property is the most important eIcmcnt scparating the cIasses in a society. The ripper classes, th@ few 
in number* coniroIIed most ohmIth in a society- Thdore, the means of liveIihood and the very üves of 
the workers are controiIed by the uppcr cIass. The le@ mechnian of the state operated in Iarge measure 
for the benefït of the upper dass. The only way to change t h  situation, in Marx's vicu, was through 
vÏoIent o v d r o w  of the upper cIass by a workers' moIution See K, Mim, CüpituL (London: IM Dent 
Sons, Ltd, 1934). 
base of compatibte values and expectations. One of the key functions of a corporation 
(even a private corporation) in China is to fùlfill, on behaifof the aate, the sociaiist pledge 
of full employrnent. Although it is within management's power to hire and fire employees 
under China's Corpo rate Laws, managers of China's corporations and foreign investment 
companies find it almost impossible to exercise the nght in practice without a Iengthy 
haggle with either the local Iabor bureau or the industrial supervisory bureaucracy. Job 
security is a reward for loyalty rather than for The practice of democratic 
centraiism and the CO-determination style in China's Corpocate Laws have promoted a 
passive, responsibility-avoidance style of corporate intemal control. Local managers and 
directors avoid making individuai decisions and accepting responsibility for their actions. 
While Confùcianism educates the Chinese people to nay in a social context 
composed of a hierarchical goup and emphasizes the importance of obIigation, socialism 
continuously teaches the Chinese people the philosophy of collectivism, as opposed to 
individudism. These philosophies Iead to the aatus ofcorporate control in today's China: 
individual shareholders never can hoId majority shares and thus never cari be the ultimate 
corporate controllers. That is to say, the private sector economy can never hold a 
predominant position wi t hin corporations under current Chinese Iaws and reguiations. 
Not surprisuigIy, Pro fesso r Hop pe regards socidism as "an instinitionalized inteference 
with or aggression against private pmperty and pnvale propexty c~a i rn s . "~  
- - 
Under the gnideline of Marxism. the Chinese Commimist Party overthrew the gaveniance of the 
Nationalism Party and eslabtished socialism in today's China in its e6om to apate a classIess Jociety in 
Chma in fiitnre, that is no upper CI= soaety- Ail things in a communist Society are owned in cornmon: 
there is no private propew and no formal government Marxïst theory helps exphin the Chinese 
peopIe's Ilidifference ta pnvatc pmperty rights, 
lZb Supm note 3 L7 at 35. 
Supm note 504 at 2. 
During the process of diversifjing ownership, China cm Ieam and benefit Eom 
Canadian cultural values wÏth regard to the ability to compromise and make concessions 
without loss of recognition of the rights of others, in particda. the rights of private 
property owners. Confùcianism and socidkt theory about compromise between the state 
and its people require individual private interests to be assimilated by date interests. This 
kind of compromise can be a huge impediment to building a credible capital market and 
attracting hnds from the private seaor in China. China is moWig toward recognition of 
private economy in its public economy system. But such recognition shodd be based on 
equality rather than assimilation and homogenization. In this regard, China's Corponite 
Laws will help prevent the state and its public economy from encroaching upon the private 
economy by enhancing the protection of private property rights. For this reason, legd 
remedies proteaing minority shareholders should be included in the CCL. 
Confucian theory conceming hurnanity and socialist theory c o n c e k g  fÙii 
employment in a society a b  can be enrkhed by incorporating certain ideas from the 
Canadian culture regarding human compassion. Rather than eroding corporate efficiency 
by requiring tùll employment in corporations, hmanity should be based on promoting 
effective and efficient corporate control so as to improve social weffare as a whole. 
However. leaming from Canadian cultural values does not mean an abolition of 
this country's own culturaI values. B is beyond dispute that human fiiltiIlment is more 
likely to corne corn the observance of obligations and productive actïvity than from an 
indulgence in exploiting rÏghts coupied wÎth the consumption of the hits of other people's 
acti~ty. '*~ An over-emphasis on individu&= negiects the fia that the natrnat order of 
Supm note 517 at 106. 
one's Iife is a progression from dependence in childhood and education in youth, to 
productivity in adulthood, followed by more mature responsibility in age? Maybe a 
middle ground, half-way between ConfÙcianïsm and individuaiïsm; socialisrn and 
capitdism, is appropriate to China. 
The complex extemal environment in which corporations operate exerts 
cornpticated influences upon corporate decision making. Each country has its own state 
situation, markets, banking system, Iegal system, and cultural values. There is no one 
mode1 for creating and facilitating an extemal environment for Unproving corporate 
control that is suitable for every country without regard to those criticai distinguishing 
characteristics and underlying values. 
CEAPTXR 6 CONCLUSION 
The cornparison of corporate conno1 practices under Canadian federal corporate 
Iaw (CBCA) and Chinese national corporate law (CCL and ETES Laws) within 
distinctively different poIiticai, economic and social backgrounds shows the complex 
interpIay of intemal and extemal forces in shaping corporate decision-making in Canada 
and China. 
The hiaot-ical oveMew of the development of Canadian corporate law in the 
context of Canadian economic development demonstrates that, refined in a stable social 
environment, the CBCA has been much influenced by traditionai British Company law 
doctrine and US modern corporate Iaw. China's Corporate Law, created during the age of 
China's economic reform aimed at building a socidist market economy, has been much 
infiuenced by the Chinese govemment's desire to employ the structure of the business 
corporation to facilitate the pooling of pnvate capitai From foreign investors and Chinese 
individuai investors under the socidist regime. 
Using the CBCA as a touchstone, through this comparative study, a number of key 
observations have been made. Firsf share structures provided by the CCL are s ida r  to 
those provided for under the CBCA, however, the unique ~Iassification of shares in China 
according to an inveaor's identity reftects China's commitment to a socialia regirne by 
providing a mechanism to monitor the amount of private capital in the Chinese equity 
market- 
Second, the Canadian and the Chinese corporate markets are dominated by 
cIoseiy-held corporations, and public corporations in Canada and China both have hi@ 
ownership concentration. Hi& overlapping ownership and imeriockmg directonhip are 
&O characteristics of the Canadian corporate market China appears to tend to diversify 
its corporate ownership market through employee ownership. 
niird, with respect to shareholders' controlIïng or influencing power over 
corporations, the comparative examination shows that sharehoIders' democracy, under the 
CBCA, is based on capital without sacrüicing fair treatment for the min~rity shareholders. 
Minonty shareholders are provided significant legal remedies under the CBCA. In China, 
CCL provides shareholders extraordinary statutory ~ghts to determine corporate matters 
(particularly in the area of corporate strategk matters). ln this sense, it thus appears that 
CCL accepts shareholders' capitalist democracy. But some specid provisions under the 
CCL indicate that socialist doctrine cannot completely embrace capitdim withui the 
structure of the corporation. 
Founh. while the CBCA adopts a one-tier board structure, CCL adopts a two-tier 
board structure for publicly-held corporations. Professionai managers on the board are 
given a high degee of controlling power over corporate matters in Canada (unless there is 
a unanimous shareholder agreement providiig other~ise), '~~ but managers can ody have 
iduencing power over corporate flairs in China. The separate supemisory board in 
Chinese corporations does not seem to resuIt in a more efficient oversight hction than 
that performed by outside directors on Canadian boards. nie distinctive administrative 
sanction liability for directors and chair of the board and the relatively modest role of 
board of directors and manageriai officers in Chinese corporations indicate that the vwtige 
of the enterprise management mode1 that prevded under China's planning economy 
persists under China's corporate Iaw. 
CBCA S. IO2 ( I). 
FiRh, ernployees in Chinese corporations are influentid (particdarly in areas 
relating to employee's interests in the corporation, like sdary, welfare, working conditions, 
and safety protection) under China's Corporate Laws, while the CBCA seems to pay M e  
attention to empioyees."L 
Sixth, corporate intemal controL cannot be isolated from a corporation's extemal 
environment. This comparative study has indicated that law s and administrative fadities 
in China intervene more in corporate &airs than in Canada Through a share issuing 
quota system, the Chinese governent controls the arnount of private capitd on the 
Chinese capital market. Encorporation in China requires governrnental approvd while it is 
a right in Canada. The reason for greater administrative intervention in corporate &airs 
can be linked to China's fiagile capital market, p rodudse~ce  market, and managerid 
service market, and to the restrictive role judges play in the Chinese Iegd systern. 
Traditional Contiicianism, emphasizing respect for hierarchy, obligations (rather than 
rights), orientation towards groups, and a disrespect for private property rights dl 
contribute to a corporate control practice in today's China which is totaiIy different from 
that of Canada where the prevailing culture emphasizes private property rights and 
individudism. In Canada, there is far Iess government administrative intervention in 
corporate matters and greater reliance upon markets and other non-IegaI institutions to 
regulate behaviors of market participants. 
The above observations from both mtemai and extemal perspectives Iead to the 
concIusion that corporate control practices under the CBCA refy more on contractual 
arrangements than on mandatory statutory provisions, give professionai managers 
S i E  An exception is in the CBCA s-119- Directors are jointiy and severdy tiable to empIoyees of the 
corporation for ttnpaid wages (that is, not e x m g  six months wages). 
sigaificant discretion and equip minority shareholders with a high degree of protection 
through formai legd remedies. Canada's corporate controI practices, therefore, represent 
a modified capitaiist model, a model facilitating business without sacrificing equity and 
f~mess. 
China's Corporate Laws introduced the economic structure of the corporation into 
China and borrowed certain corporate controt scperiences from western capitaiist 
countries but without sacrificing China's socialist regime. China's corporate control 
practices, therefore, represent a modified sociaiist model, a model merging modem 
corporate control and traditionai socialistic enterprise management. 
Corporate control practices vary across nations and cultures to rneet changing 
conditions. There is no universai mode1 of corporate control available to improve 
corporate performance within ail competitive environrnents. Nor is there an ideai mode of 
corporate control that every country or corporation should emulate. Nevertheless, tiiis 
general comparative study of corporate control under the CBCA and China's Corporate 
Laws aims to further an exchange of ideas for improving corporate performance in Canada 
and China. 

Chief Executive ORcer r Illustration: 
Chief Executive Oficer holds the ultimate 
deci sion power. 
The mananerial ofticers, though employees 
of the corporation, are hired professional 
managers. 
Board of Directors exercises no real decision 
power and serves as "rubber stamp" for 
the management. 
Shareholders are passive investors. They 
either sel1 out the shares they are holding, 
or keep silent in case of di ssatisfaction to 
the management. 
Emplovees are implementing daily operation 
of the corporation according to the instructions 
issued by the officers and have no participation 
in the corporate management. 
Canadian publicly-hcld corporations: 
Business Reality of Type A Corporations 
(widcly hdd corporations) 
This type of corporate intemal power distribution more oflen exists in Canadian largest and financially important 
corporations. With Chief Executive Officer holds the final decision power, full-time managers effectively appoint 
the board of directors and select themselves management positions. Shareholders are the constituency as the 
"necessary ~ b b a r  stamp" in accomplishing managers' long-terni managenal goals. (NOW 





Other Sharehol ders \ 
Canadian publicly-held cwporations: 
Business Reality of  Type B Corporations 
(pu Mie corporations with high ownership 
concentration) 
Corporate deci si on-making power 
i s  in the hand of single shareholder 
o n &  sharehol ders. 
The controlling shareholderlshareholders 
either legally control the corporation (own 
directly or indirectl y 50% of voting 
shares) or effectively control the corporation 
(own directly or indirectly 
20% - 49.9% of the shares). 
Board of directors note: a single shareholder 
or a small group of controlling shareholders 
very like elect themselves or their nominees as 
directors and managers. If so, they have 
controlling power over the corporation. 
Managerial ofIlcers implement the strategic 
planning issued by the controlling 
shareholder/share holders. 
Other shareholders are passive investors 
and generally have no real power. 
m s  are implementing dail y operation 
of the corporation according to the 
instructions issued by the officers and have no 
participation in the corporate management. 
Illustration: 
It i s  the most numerws corporations in Canada. 
Most of them are small family-nin corporations. 
A distinct feature i s  that the role of 
Shareholder? Director, and Mananerial Officer 
is played by one personffamily . Such 
persodfamily not only holds all the shares of 
the corporation, but also el ects himsel fkersel f 
as director and participates strategic and 
dail y management of the corporation. 
The corporation may hire other people as 
Employees. Employees generally have no 
power at al1 in this type of corporations.(tw) 
Canadian closely-htld corporations: 
Business Roality of Type C Corporations 
(particularly small suc closc corporations) 
 NO^: B.  Weliing, Corporale Luw in h a d a :  The Governing Prlnciples (2nd cd.) (Toronto & Vancouvcr; Buticworths, 199 1 )  at 303. 
CBCA S. 102 (1): 
"Subject to any unanimous shareholder 
agreement, the directors shall manage 
/ \ the business and affairs of a corporation." 
Board of / Directors \ 
Managerial Officers 
Employees 
CBCA s. 12 1 (a): 
"Subject to the articles, the by-laws or 
any unanimous shereholder agreement, 
the directors may designate the offices 
of the corporation, appoint as oficers 
persons of full capacity. specify their 
duties and delegate to them powers to 
manage the business and affain of the 
corporation, except powers to do anything 
referred to in subsection 1 15(3). 
Canadira Corporations: Tho Legal Theory 
Under CBCA 
III - A. ( Shareholder ( ~ t a t e a  




the area of labor related 
Cbincse Public Corporations: mat ters 
Business Redity of 5 p c  A Corporations 
(corporations with high ownership concentration 
on the sida o f  the strtc) 
Illustration: 
Currently, most public corporations 
in China are not purely private 
corporations. This chart reflects the State 
(represented by central or local people's 
governrnents) legally controls (directly or 
indirectly owns over 50% voting shares) or 
effectively controls (own directly or 
indirectly 20% - 49.9% of the shares) 
the corporation. 
Other Shareholders like Leeal Persons Share- 
holders or Individual Investors as minority share- 
ho1 den have little control ling power. 
Board of Directors generally has no mal 
power and more often follow the state 
deci si on. 
Manaaerial Onicers play the function of 
implementing corporate decisions. 
Supervisory Board tends to be passive since 
certain defects contained in the provisions 
under CCL. 
Emplovees have certain influences in the area 
of certain labor related rnatters (e.g. employ- 
ment, labor safety, salary and welfare, ect.) 


III - a, 
Illustration: 
Board of Directors is legally provided 
as the highest organ in the corporation. 
But in reality, since the structure of sino- 
foreign investrnent enterprises in China is 
like a limited partnership in the west, it is 
the investors, i .e. the Chinese and foraian 
investors, who exerci se power. 
Managerial Officers 
Labor influences in the 
ï ' area of labor related 
Cbincst Closcly-held Corporations: mat ters 
Business Reality of Type D Corporations 
(sino-Foreign investinent enter prise in China) 
Board members are appointed by investors. 
The number of directors that each party 
can appoint is usually according to the 
capital Chinese and foreign investors 
con tri bu ted, 
General M a n a ~ r  as a head of Managerial 
Officers i s responsible for day-to-day 
corporate matters. Managerial Onicers 
repon to the General Manager. 
Employees generall y have limi ted 
influence power to corporate decisions. 
Employees through the trade union in the 
corporations to influence the corporate 
decision in the area of labor related matters. 
III - E, 
Labor influences in the 
area of labor related 
matters Chines@ Corporations: 
Tbc Lcgal Theory Under CCL 
(puMic and doilely-held corporations) 
Illustration: 
In theory, according to CCL, Shareholders' 
Meeting is the highest organ in the corporations. 
According to CCL, the Shareholders' Meeting 
handles corporate strategic matters. 
Supervisory board, composed by the share- 
holders and employees, is  the supeivisory 
institution which supervise the board members, 
managerial officers and their delegates. 
Board of Directors has recommendation power 
to the shareholders' meeting in the area of 
corporate strategic rnatters. Legally, under CCL, 
It is basically in charge of daily corporate 
matters. 
Manaaenal Officers implernent the dail y 
operation of the corporation in accordance with 
CCL. 
Emplovees have certain influence power to the 
corporate decision relating to Iabor matters. 
Illustration : 
III - F, 
Board of 
Di rectors \ 
General Manager 
Labor influences in the 
/ area of labor related 
mat ters Chincm Corporations : 
The Legal Theory under FIES Laws 
(sino-foreign investmcni enterprises in China) 
Board of Directors i s  legally provided 
as the highest organ in the corporation. 
General Manager as a head of Manaaerial 
Officers i s  responsible for day-to-day 
corporate matters. Managerial Oficers 
report to the General Manager. 
Emplovees generall y have 1 imi ted 
influence power to corporate decisions. 
Employees through the trade union in the 
corporations to influence the corporate 
decision in the area of labor related matters. 
Legislation 
A. Canada 
Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c. C-44 
B. China 
Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China 
Law of the People's Repubtic of China on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign Cooperative Joint 
Ventures 
Law of the People's Republic of China on WholIy Foreign-owned Enterprise 
Implementing Regdations for the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Venture 
Detail tmplementing RuIes for the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Chinese-foreign Cooperative Joint Venmres 
Detailed Impiementhg Rules for the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Wholly Foreignswned Enterprise 
Constmition of the People's Republic of C hina 
1986 General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China 
199 1 Civil Procedure Law of the People's RepubIic of China 
International Treaties 
Canada-United Stated Free Trade Agreement, December 22-23 1987, 27 1.L.M 281 
(entered into force January 1, 1989) Ordine: York University Library, Business and 
Govemment Publications Lbrary <http~f~~caml.yorku.ca/deptdgdas/ft-mnt,htm> 
(date accessed: August 8, 1999). 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementaton Act (1988, c.65). onhe: 
Department of Justice of Canada ~http~/canada~Stlce.gc.ca/FTP/ENiLaw~- 
10.6- (date accessed: August 8, 1999) (ht modined: Apd 3 9  1999). 
North American Free Trade Agreement Betweea the Governeut of Canada, the 
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 7 December, 1992, 
Can. T.S. 1994 N0.2~32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) odine: NAFTA 
Net ehttp ://www .nafta.net(n&agre. htm> (date accessed: August 8, 1 999). 
Books 
Ballantine, K W., Bal'antine on Corporations (Chicago : C hdlaghan and Company, 
1946). 
Baskin, I.B. & Miranti, P.J., A History of Corpurate Finance (Cambridge & New York: 
CambrÏdge University Press, 1997). 
Becker, GS., The Economic Apprwcit to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976). 
Berle, k A .  Jr. & Means, G.C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1932). 
Blair, M.M., ûwnership and Cmtrol: Rethznking Corpurate Governance for the 21" 
Cen- (Washington D.C. : Brookings Institute, 1995). 
Boisot, M., Eart-West Business Collaborafion: The Challenge of Gouemmce in Post- 
socialst Enteprises (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). 
Bond, M.H. ed. The PsychoZogy of the Chinese People (Hong Kong, OKford & University 
Press, 1986). 
Brooks, S., Who's in Chmge? The Mired Ownership Coporattun in Cima& (Canada: 
The Institute for Research on Public PoIicy, 1987). 
Brown, RC., Ilrderstunding Chinese Courts and Legal Process: Law with Chmese 
Characteristcs (The Hague, London & Boston: KIuwer Law uitemational, t 997). 
Charkham, J.P., Keeping Good Company: A Stuc& of Coporaîe Govemance in Five 
CounMes (United States: Oxford UniversQ Press Inc. N.Y., 1994). 
Chefis ,  B K ,  Compcusr Law: Theory, Shuchrre and Opemion (Great Bntain: 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997). 
Chew, DH., Srudes in fnrem0mI Coprate F h c e  and G o v m c e  System: A 
Cornparrison of the US, J i p n  und Europe (New Y 0 4  Oxford: M o r d  University Press, 
1997). 
Corner, C., Canadian Directorship ~ractice 1995: A New Era Ur Corporate Governunace 
(Canada: The Conference Board of Canada, 1995). 
Crane, G.T., Ine Polirical Economy of China's Speczuï Economic Zones (N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, hc., 1990). 
Dickerson, RW-V., Howard, IL., Geta, L., Proposais for a New Business Corporutiom 
Law for Cana& vol. 1 (Ottawa: Monnation Canada, 1971). 
Fan, J. & Jiang D.X., On Coprate  Law (Nanjing, China: Nanjing University Publishing 
House: 1997). 
Fuicasah, K, Wall D. & W u  M., China's Long M d  lo an Open Economy (OECD, 
1994). 
Gower, L.C.B., Gower's PrincipIes of Modern Company Lmv, #' ed. (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1979). 
Chai, I.C.H., Cfitna: Tr - th  IO a Mmket Economy (New York: Oxford University 
Press inc., 1997). 
Fan, Jian & Jiang D.X., On Corporate L m  (Nanjing, China: Nanjing University 
Publishing House: f 997). 
Hook, B., Ine IndMidul and the Sfate in China (U.S.: CIarendon Press, Oxford, 1996). 
Hoppe, H-H, A Theory of Socirilimr und CapitalÎm (Boston, Dordrecht & London: 
Kluwer Academic Publis hers, 1 989). 
Iacobucci, F., Pilkington, ML. & Prichatd, J-R-S.., Ciuzadim Business Corporations: An 
Anabsis of Recent Legislutive Developments (Agincourt, Ont.: Canada Lawbook, L 997) 
Jenkins, J.H., Comhct of Candian Meetings (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983). 
Jiang, P. & Fang L.F., eds. New Edition of C i s e  m Corpormim Law (China: Law 
hblisbing House, 1994). 
Katz, AW. ed., Fmnciirtiom of the Economic Apprmch to Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1 998). 
Lee, E., Commercial Disputes SettIement in China (London, N.Y., Hamburg, and H X :  
LIoydrs ofLondon Press Ltd.). 
LittIe, R & Reed, W., The Conjkcian Renaissance (Sydeny: The Federation Press, 1989). 
Mace, ML., Directorsr Mph mrd Ream (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate 
SchooI of Business Administration of Harvard University, 1971). 
Millstein, LM., et ai., Corporate Govemmce: Improvïrtg Competitiveness and Access ro 
Capital in GloOalMmkefs (OECD, 1998). 
OBnen, HL., Russell, D.A, NicholIs, C.C. ed. Cares aM! Maerials on Busriress 
Associiztionr Law (Halifax: FacuIty o f  Law of Dahousie University, 1998-99). 
Osborn, C.F. & Schmutz AW.  ed. Selected Articles on Corporate Law (section of 
coporution, bmnking und business lm) (U.S.A. : American Bar Association, 1 977). 
Patricia, M.M., Ideulogka1 Perspectives on Canaab (Toronto: McGraw - Hill Pyerson 
Limited, 1975). 
Pennings, LM., InterIockig Directors (San Francisco, Washington & London: lossey- 
Bass Publishers, 1980). 
Prowse, S. Financial Mm.kesp Iktiîutions & Ihstmments: Coporate Govemance in m 
Intemutiond Perspecriw: A Swey of Coporate Conirol Mechanisms Among Large 
Finns h the US.. IIX, J i p m  and Gennany (Cambridge, MA & Oxford, UK: Blackwdl 
Publishers, 1995). 
Pye, L.W., Asian Power dPo[i! ics:  n e  ~ultwuL DimemllSlom of Autfiotity (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts & London: The Belknap Press o f  Harvard University Press, 1985). 
Riskin, C., China's Politicai Economyr nie @est for Deveiopment Since 1949 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
Rohrlich, C. Law md Practice in Corporate Control (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 
1933). 
Saran, L. ed. Coporute Smchcre, Finance und Operatiom, vol3 (Toronto: The Carswetl 
Company Limited, 1984). 
Schafer Dl?, TIe Chwacfer of Canadian Culme (Markham, Ont.: World Culture 
Project, 1 990). 
Sutheriaad, 8, Fraser's Hmdbook on Cunadim Compmiy Law, 8& ed. (CarswelI: 
Toronto, 1994). 
Taylor, GD. & BaskeNilIe, PA, A Cimise Hiktory of Business in Cm& (Toronto, 
Mord & New York: Mord University Press, 1994). 
The Amencan Law institution, Principies of Corporate Gmermnce: Amz&lysis md 
R e c o r n m ~ u ~ ~ ~  (St Pat& Mmn: American Law riistmbe Publishers, 1994). 
Tétrault, McCarthy, Dirctors' Oflcers' M e s  md Liabilities ril Cm& (Toronto & 
Vancouver: Buttemortbs, 1997). 
Wager, TH.,  Labor-M'unagement Relations in Cm&: A Survey of Unton û#icers 
(Canada: hdustnd Relations Center, Queen's University, 1996). 
Welling, B., Corporate Law in Canaah: The Goveming Principles. 2nd ed (Toronto & 
Vancouver: Butterworîh, 199 1). 
World Bank, China: Sociaïist Economic Deveïopmmit, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: World 
bank, 1983). 
World Bank, China: Reform and the Role of the Plan in the 1990s (Washington D.C.: 
n ie  World Bank, 1992). 
Zhang, G.L. & Zhou M. eds., ErpIaining on Corporate Law (China: hiblishing House of 
People's Court, 1993). 
Ziegel J. S. ed. Studies in Canadian Compmiy Lm (Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1967). 
Ziegel J.S. et al., Cares und Materah on Pwtnerships and Canadiaan Business 
Corporations, znd ed. (Toronto : The Carswell Company Limited, 1 989). 
Articles 
Baillie, J.C., "Comments of a Business Lawyer on RuIes Governing Boards of Canadian 
Public Corporations" (1996) 26 Cm. Bus. L.J. 127. 
Beck, S.M., "An Andysis of Foss v. Hrrl(iwIt' in I.S. Ziegel ed. Studies in Canadian 
Company Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) 
Berle, A.A. Jr., Tontrol' in Corporate Law" (1958) 58 Colum. L. Rev. 12 12. 
Boisot, M-, "nie Lessons from China" in M. Boisot ed  Eas-West Business 
CoIIaboration: The Chailinge of Govemmce in Post-socialst Enterprises (London and 
New York: Routiedge, 1994). 
Brickiey, LA, "Managerid Goals and the Court System: Some Ecooomic Insights" 
(1988) 13 CUL-U.S. L.I. 77. 
Bruun, A & Lansky, M., "The Appraisal Remedy for Dissenting Shareholders in Canada: 
1s it Effective?" (1978) 8 Man. L. J. 683. 
Child, J. & Markoczy L., "Host Cou- Managerid Behavior in Chinese and Hungarian 
Joint Ventures: Assessrnent of Competing Explanations" in M. Boisot ed. Em-West 
Business CoIZabortztiOn: Ttte Chalenge of Govemance in Post-sociuIist Enterprises 
(London and New York: Routiedge, 1994). 
Daniels, RJ. & Halpern, P., "Too Close for Cornfort: The Role of the Closely Held 
Public Corporation in the Canadian Economy and the lmplementations for Public Policy" 
(1996) 26 Can. Bus. L.I. 1 1. 
DanieIs, RJ., "Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economk Anaiysis of the Effects of 
Burgeoning Statutory LiabiIity on the Role of Directors in Corporate Govemance" (1 995) 
24 Can. Bus. L. J. 229. 
Daniels, RJ. & Hutton, S.M., "The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of the 
Directors' and Officers' Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Govemance" 
(1993) 22 Cm. Bus. L.J. 182. 
Daniels R & Maclntosh, J., "Toward A Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime" 
(1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 863. 
Easterbrook, F.H. & Fischel, D.R., "Limited Liability and the Corporation" (1985) 52 LI. 
Chi, L. Rev. 
Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C., "Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983) 26 1. L. & 
Econ. 301. 
Fama, E.F., "Agency Problems and the Theory ofthe F h "  (1980) 88 1. Pol. Econ. 288. 
Fang, L.F., "China's Corporatization Expenment" (1995) 5 Duke L Comp & Int'l L. L 49. 
Fang, L.F., "Comments: China" (1997) 28 L. & Pol'y IntT. Bus. 897. 
Fan, J., "The Recording Items of the Articles of Association of Joint Stock Company: 
Comment on Article 79 of China's Corporation Law" (1997) Nanjing University Law 
Journal No. 55-6 1 @43 I Economic Law and Labor Law) 3 5. 
Flowler, D.J., Rorke, CH. & Jog., V.M., "Thin Trading and Beta Estimation Problems on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1 980) 12 J. Bus. Admin 77. 
GiIson, R, "The Case Against Shark Repeiïant Amendments: Sfructt.tmI Limitations on 
the Enabling Concept" (1982) 34 Stan L. Rev. 775. 
GImkbeek, EJ., 'Pemocracy for Corporations: Corporations Against Democracy" in 
FacuIty of Law, McGiII University, Conference Meredith Lectures 199495, 
Coporutfüns at the CrmmOClCi (Montreai: McGiIl University, 1995). 
HofEnann, C-SL., 'Board Stewardship" in L. Sama e d  Coprate Sn~chne. Finance 
and Operations, vol. l O (Toronto: Carsweil, 1997). 
Holmes, W.D., "China's FinanciaI Reforms in the Global Market" (1997) 28 L. & Pol'y 
Int'I Bus. 715. 
Hopt, K.J., "New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor 
Representation on Corporate Boards" (1984) 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1338. 
Jiang, Z.M.. "Upholding the Great Banner of Deng Xiao Ping's Theory on Building 
Socialisrn with Chinese Characteristics, Seinng Current Oppominities and Making Bold 
Explorations to Advance Our Cause to the 21" Century" 1997 (Augua 25-31) Beijing 
Review. 
Jiang, Z.M., "HoId High the Great Banner of Deng Xiao Piag Theory for AU-round 
Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialisrn with Chinese Characteristics into the 
21" Century - report delivered at the 15& Nation& Congress of the Communist Party of 
China on September 12, 1997" 1997 (October 6 - 12) Beijing Review 14. 
Jiang, Z.M., "Decision of the Communkt Party of China Centrai Cornmittee on Some 
Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Soaalist Market Economic Structure1' (adopted 
on November 14, 1993 by the Third Plenary Session of the 1 4 ~  Centrai Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party) 1993 (Nov. 22 - 28) Beijing Review 12. 
Kaufman, D., "Oppression Remedies: Recent Developmentst' in L. S m a  ed. Corporute 
Structure, Finance and Operations, voI.3 (Toronto: The CarsweIl Company Limiteci, 
1984) 67. 
Lei, H., "Improving the Corporation Law on Mechanisms of Checking Power under 
Corporate Legal Person Institution" (1997.6.41 - 47) Legai Science (Northwestem 
Politics and Law Coliege Journal). 
Lin, L., "The Wectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Govemance Mechanism: 
Theories and Evidence" (1996) 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 888. 
Machtosh, J.G., "Institutionai Shareholders and Corporate Govexnance in Canada" 
(1996) 26 Can Bus. L.J. 145. 
Maclntosh, J.G., "The Role of uistitutonal and Retaii uivestors in Canadian Capitai 
Markets" (1993) 3 1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 2371. 
Machtosh, J.G. with H o h e s  I. & Thompson, S., "The M e  of Shareholder Fiduciary 
Duties" in (1991) 19 Can Bus. L. J. 86. 
MacIntosh, J.G., "The SharehoIders' Appraisd Right in Canada: A Critical Reapprisal" 
(1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 201. 
Meier-Schatz, C.I., "Corporate Govemance and Legai Rules: A Transnational Look at 
Concepts and Problems of Intemal Management ControP' (1 988) 13 J. Corp. L. 43 1.  
Montgomery, KE., "Market Shift - RoIe of Institutionai Investors in Corporate 
Govemance" (1996) 26 Can Bus. L.J. 189. 
Morck, RK, "On the Economics of Concentrated Ownership" (1996) 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 
63. 
Neave, E.H, "Organizational Economics and Directors' Controi" (1996) 26 Can. Bus. 
L.J. 106. 
Ottenbreit, K.G., & Waiker J.E., "Leamhg fiom the Delaware Expenence: A 
Cornparison of the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Delaware General 
Corporation Lawf' (1998) 29 Can. Bus. L.J. 364. 
Pye, L.W., "The State and the Individual", in B. Hook ed. 7he Indvidual and the State in 
China (U. S. : Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996). 
Roth, C.W., "Concentration of Ownership and the composition of the Board: An 
Examination of Canadian Public1 y-listed Corporations" (1 996) 26 Can. Bus. J. 1. 226. 
WaIdron, M A ,  "Corporate Theory and the Oppression Rernedy" (1981-82) 6 Can. Bus. 
L.J. 129. 
Zhao, Y.Q., "The Company Law of China" (1996) 6 uid. Int'I & Cornp. L. Rev. 46 1. 
Ziegel, J.S., "The CBCA - Twenty Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here" in Faculty 
of Law, McGiIl University, Conference Meredith Lectures 1994/95, Coporutzom ut the 
Crosw~~~ds (Montreai: McGiII University, 1995) 3. 
ZiegeI, I.S. et al., Cases and Materiuk on Partnerships und Cunradin Business 
Corpororion znd ed. vo1.2 (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1988) 
Cases 
Bowcitm Canadim Lrd v. R L Cr& Inc. (1988) 62 O R  (2nd) 752 (C.A.) 
Brant Iiwe~nnents L f d  v. KeepRile Inc. ((I987), 60 O K  (2d) 737, 42 D L R  (4th) 15, 
@C.J.), supplernentary reasons, 61 O R  (2d) 469, 43 D L R  (4th) 141. 
Bur~andv. hie, (I902), AC. 83 @?C.) 
Canadian Aero Service Ltd v. O1'iiMaIIky (Canaero), [1974] S.C.R 592, 40 D.L.R (3d) 
371 (S.C.C.). 
Edwmds v. Haliiwell, [1950] 2 AI1 E.R 1064 (C.A.) 
Foss v. Hmbonie (1 843), 2 Hase 46 1,67 E. R 189. 
Goldex Mines Ltd v. ReviIi (1975), 7 O R  (2d) 216 
Hoskin v. Price Waterhouse Ltd (1982), 37 O.R.(2d) 464 @iv. CL) 
Pender v. Lush»gton (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70 (C.A.) 
Re Jury GoldMnie Development Co., [1928] 4 D.L.R. 735 at 736 (0.C.A) 
Verdun v. Toronto-Domhion Bank, [1996] 3 S. C. R 550 
WestarMining Ltd me) (1992) 14 C.B.R (3rd) 101 
Papen 
Danielsr R J. & Morck, R, Cmadim Corporate Govemmce Poi'icy Options (Discussion 
Paper) (ûttawa: Industry Canada, 1996). 
uidustry Canada, Mmugement S M  DeveIopment in Cana& (Canada: Occasionai Paper 
Number 13, December 1995). 
Rao, P. S. & Sin& CRL., Govenance Structure, Cotporute Decision-makmg and Fim 
Pe@omance in North America (industry Canada, Working Paper Number 7, 1996). 
Schafer, DR, The Character of C d a n  Cube (worfd C U ~ N ~  project) (1990). 
Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financiai SeMces Sector, Discussion Paper, 
June 1997, 
Reports 
Canada, Cmrackr h the Worfd: Governent Stclement (ûttawa: Govemment of Canada, 
1995) 
"Decision of the Communist Party of China Central Cornmittee on Some Issues 
Concerning the Establishment of a Sociaiist Market Economic Structure7' (adopted on 
November 14, 1993 by the Thkd Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party) 
Committee on the Financial Aspeas of Corporate Govemance, Report of the Cornmittee 
on the FiMmcui Aspects of Corporate Gavemance (London: Gee and Co., 1992). 
Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, Where Were 
the Directors? Guideiiins for Improved Corporate Govemmce in Canada (1 994) 
Available online: European Corporate Govemance Network, 
<http://www.ec~.ulb.ac. be/ecgn/docs/codes/dey. p (date accessed: June 18, 1999). 
Toronto Stock Exchange and Institute of Corporate Directors, Report on Corporute 
Govemunce, 1999: Five Years to the Day 
Oniine: TSE ~http:/ltse.com/mregdindex. htmb (date accesssed": August 18, 1999). 
S. D. Beckowitz et al., (Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration Study No.17) 
Enterprise Structure and Corporate Concenbation ( A  Technical Report) (Ottawa: 
Minister of supply and S e ~ c e s  Canada, IO77). 
n>e Commz~niqué of the Third PLenmy Session of the Eleventh Centrai Corninittee of the 
Communzst Parîy of China (passed on December 22, 1978) (Beijing: People's Publishing 
House, 1978) at 7 (Chinese version). 
Ailen, T. I.A. "Disc1osure Obligations in Canadian Securities Law" online: 
<http:/fwww.brexcanact.cd-a-allen.htni (date accessed: June 28, 1999). 
Chao, F.J., "SharehoIding System: Basic Organization Form of Modem Enterprises" 
(1 998) 
China Securities, Chttp ://www.chinaseninties. commcn/enpnichenunwen4.fi (date 
accessed: Apri13. 1999). 
China htemet Information Center, "China ABC: Facts and Figures - Education", 
<http://m.chinaorgcrt/> (date accessed: JuIy 1, 1999). 
ChinaLaw Website, Oniine: Maryland University SchooI of Law, 
<http://wwwWWWqis.net/cblndawP (date accessed: M y  3, 1999). 
China News Digest Intemationai, The Visuai Museum of the C u I t d  Revolution, odine: 
<http://'md.org/CR~ (date accessed: June 18, 1999). 
Corporate Govemance, Odine: Worfd Bank 
~http://wwwworldbank.or~tmV~d/p~vateseor/c (date accessed: June 18, 1999). 
Conmittee on the Financiai Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Cornmittee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate. online: European Corporate Governance Network 
<http://www.ecgnuIb.ac. bdecgn/docs/codecadb. p d  (date accessed: June 19, 
1999). 
Department of Foreign Affain and Intemational Trade, "Trade Negotiations and 
Agreements: Opening Doors to the World, Canada's International Market Access 
Priorities 1999" Online: <http:/ /www.dfait-maeci .gc.caltnaddoor~ 
e. asp#4. I > (date accessed: August 8, 1 999). 
Department of Foreign AnaVs and International Trade, "Team Canada Inc Achievements 
Report 1998-99" (ApriI 1999). Online: <http://www. infoexportgc.ca/section4/tcac~eve- 
e. asp?#surnmary> (date accessed: August 8, 1999). 
Drinkwater, D-W., & Nathan, R. J. Wew Corporate Govemance Disclomre Standards of 
Canadian Stock Exchanges Became Effective 
~http://www.os1er.corn/Resources/BoardSumum2. htmP (date accessed: Aprit 25, 1999). 
"Economic Development Board: Frarnework for Economic Growth" Online: Governent 
of Manitoba, Canada ~http://www.gov.mb.ca/board~ (date accessed: April22, 1999). 
Electronic Commerce Task Force, "The Canadian EIectronic Commerce Strategy" 
Online: < http ://www.e-com.ic.gc.calengiis Wecomeg  p d  (date accessed : August 8, 
1999). 
Gertmenian, W. "Cultural Insights on Doing Business in China, Concepts of Tace' and 
"Tmst" are Iust the Beginningtr,The Graziadio Business Report, Online: University of 
Maryland, SchooI of Law, China Law Site: <hnp://www.qis.netlchinalaw/searchI-htm> 
(date accessed: June 26, 1999). 
Jiang, HZ., " Annual S hareho lders' Meeting: 'ïhe Place that Shareholders Disap pointed" , 
Online: Securities Times, 
~hnp://www.sed&mes.comm~d199906/18/c199906 1 4 0 5 9 h t m l  (date 
accessed: June 18, 1999). 
Jie, CC, "The Legd System in China", online: Legai Forum, 
<http://www. enstar. netlchindaw/vmvmarhc1esTrtemsf itern39htm> (date accessed: Juiy 3, 
1999). 
Kazanjian, I., "Canada Shareholder Proposais" online: Oder Hoskùi & Harcourt 
@arrister Br Solicitors, Patent and Trademark Agents) 
Chttp Y/www.osler. coni/p~bIicati~tlS/B~afdroom~Pef~~eCtivel'mdex 6tn-D (date accessed: 
Juae 18, 1999). 
Lloyd, RJ., "Canada's Capital Markets" onfine: WorId Legai Forum, 
<http://www. w o r I d l e g a l f o n i m . c o ~ u k / c a n a d ~ 7  O 1 8 .  html> (date accessed: 
June 28, 1999). 
Lo, B.T. 'chproving Corporate Governance: Lessons nom the European Community" 
Indiana University SchooI of Law, Odine: 
Chttp ://m. Iaw. indianaedulglsjlvo1 Ino. h (date accessed: Apd 24, 1999). 
L yons, S. (Barristem & Solicitors, Patent aad Trademark Agents), " Commentary : TSE 
Report on Corporate Govemce", Online: 
chttp ://m. smithIyons.ca/comment/tse. ht (date accessed: A p d  25, 1 999). 
Ma, I., "China's Economic Refonn in the 1990sW, January 1997, oniine: 
http://rnemben.aol.com/junrnanew/chap 1. htrn (date accessed: June 26, 1999). 
MiIIstein, LM. et aI., Corporute Govemce:  Improving Cotnpetitiveness and Access to 
CapitaI in Global Markets (OECD, 1998). Oniine: European Corporate Govemance 
Network: chttp ://m.oecd.org/news-anddevents/reIeadnd8-3 Sa. htm> (date 
accessed: June 19, 1999). 
Neoh, A. "China Strengthens Its Markets" (lanuary 14 1994) Online: Far Eastern 
Economic Review <http://www. feer.com/Restricted/index-business. h t m b  (date 
accessed: Iune 17, 1999). 
Osier, Hoskin & Harcourt (Bhsters & Solicitors, Patent and Trademark Agents), 
"Boardroom Perspectives - Corporate Govemance Update: Kirby Committee Report 
Reteased ", <http ://www.osIer.com/publicat ioI1S/BoardroornmPerspectivekrekrrby. h t m P  
(date accessed: Iune 18, 1999) 
Oder, HosEcin & Harcourt (Bmisters & Solicitors, Patent and Trademark Agents), 
"Chair and CE0 Should the RoIes be SpIit?" 
< h t t p : l ~ ~ . o s I e r .  comlpu blications/B0ardroorn~Perspectivelgovfeb97~2. h t d  (date 
accessed: Iuly 1 5, 1999). 
Oder Hoskin & Harcourt (Barrister & Solicitor) "Recent Topics in Canadian SeCllfities 
Law" ~http://~.osIer.com/Resources/recent.h Final Report of the TSE 
Committee on Corporate Disclome> (date accessed: April21, 1999). 
Rawski, T.G., "China's Economy - What's Next?" (October 1998) online: 
<http:/lwww.pitt.edd-tgrawsWchinahtmi> (date accessed: March 24, 1999). 
R M. Tory (fiom Tory Tory DesLamiers & Binningîon), "Corporate Finance in Canadatr, 
onIùie: WorId Legai Fonim, 
~ h n p : f / ~ ~ ~ ~ w o r t d I e g d f o r u m . c o . u k / c a n a d a / a  (d te accessed: 
June 28,1999)- 
Sachs, J D  & Woo, W.T., (Hamard Institute for InternationaI Development and 
University of California at Davis), "Asia Competitiveness Report 1999, Executive 
Summary: The Asian Financial Crisis: What Happened, and What is to be Done", Online: 
World Economic Forum 
~ h t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ ~ w e f ~ n u n . o r g / p u b l i ~ a t i ~ ~ a S i a ~ i I ~ a n ~ d ~ c r i ~ i ~ ~  A S P  (d te accessed: June 
26, 1999). 
Securities Times, ~http://~~~~seCUTitieStirnes~com~cn/zcf~~ss1998 1 125.htmb (date 
accessed: June 2 1, 1999) (m Chinese version). 
Sellers, E-A, 'Tinal Report of the Toronto Stock Exchange Cornmittee on Corporate 
Govemance" Online: <http://www.Iaw.comelI.eddtnjltse.htm~ (date accessed: Apri125, 
1999). 
Sommer, AA Jr. "It AI1 Cornes Down to Money , Face Ït: A Board's Main Goal is 
Corporate Profitst' online: ABA Section of Business Law, Business Law Today 
(January/Febniary 1999 <http://www.abanet.or~uslaw/8Jmoney. htmb (date accessed 
June 14, 1999). 
Song, TM., "Two Decades of Economic Reform" online: 
<htrp://www.ChinaToday/a98/a98-I 0-2. html> (date accessed: March 24, 1999). 
The Corporate Govexnance site, online: <http:l/www.corpgov.netl> (date accessed: Iune 
18, 1999). 
The NationaI Center for Employee Ownership 
<http://www.nceo.or9/1ibrary/history.htmI (date accessed: A p d  22, 1999). 
TSE News ReIease, "'How and Why Corporate Governance is Changing Worldwide' - 
Toronto Stock Exchange President RowIand Reming remarks to the International 
Corporate Governance Conference in San Francisco - Juiy 9,1998" TSE Online: 
chttp ://t se.com/cgi- biduni - fkarnset~cgi?content=news/newsSreVnewsSO3 6. htmb (date 
accessed: ApriI23, 1999). 
U.S. Department of Commerce, The Emerging Digital Economy II (Jme 1999) Online: 
United States Government Electronic Commerce PoIicy 
<http:l/www.ecommerce.govfede/~ (date accessed: A~tgust 8, 1999). 
Vandegr@ BM-, "Making Deais in China"(November/Decernber 1998) Online: ABA 
Section ofBusiness Law - Business Law Today. <http:lf~~~.abanet~orglbusIaw/8- 
2chllia htmP (date accessed: June 1 5, 1999). 
Wall, D., "Financial Market R e f d  (1998) 11 China Review, Ordine: Great Britain - 
China center, <http:l/-.gbcc.orgmaIlD-hm> (date accessed: ApriI 23, 1999). 
World Economic Forum 
~ h t t p : / / ~ ~ ~ . w e f o m r n o r g ! p u b I i c a t i o n d a s ~  (date ccessed: 
June 26, 1999). 
Yang L.T., "Remarks at the 3d Annual Conference, International Corporate Govemance 
Network" (Jdy 9, 1998), San Francisco, California, U S A ,  oniine: World Bank, 
<hnp : / l m -  w o r l d b a n k . o r g l h ~ ~ d / p ~ v a t e s e o r / c d o c d t s y g p  (date accessed: 
June 18, 1999). 
Zhou, Z.Q. (chaiman of China Securities Regulatory Committee), "A Securities Law 
Covenng a Long-terni Interests", onlie: China Seninties 
~http://www.chinaseCUCities.com.cn/enp/zq981~02. htm> (date accessed: Jwie 18, 
1999) 
1997 China S~utiisriai Yearbook, OOnlîe: China Statistical Idionnation Network 
<http://~.stats.gov.cn/information/nj9703 1 (date accessed: July 13, 
1999)). 
